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“Forgive me this my virtue,
For in the fatness of these pursy times
Virtue itself of vice must pardon beg – 
Yea, curb and woo for leave to do him good”
Hamlet , Act 3, Scene 4 - W. Shakespeare.
Preface
If the 21st century were a day, the clock would now be at around 4:30 in the morning.
While this text is being written, we are, in many senses, witnessing the verge of its dawn. And
in using this phrase as so many before myself already have, I would like to, for once, reverse
the  order  of  the  emphasis  usually  put  upon  its  parts.  Rather  than  saying  that  we  are
witnessing the verge of its dawn, I would like to stress that we are witnessing the verge of its
dawn. And we see nothing. We look at the horizon with our eyes wide open, waiting for the
sun to emerge and allow us to see the land before us with its generous light, so we can take a
step that will lead us safely to where we want. But it is still too dark – and while we still cannot
see the intricacies and obstacles that await on the path that lies ahead of us, we decide to
stand still, listening to the clock ticking in quiet anxiety and entertaining thoughts far darker
than our surroundings about what we will see when the sun finally rises.
The atmosphere of our day – mimicked to the best of my ability in the former paragraph
– insistently suggests that a certain aura of tragedy and respectability emanates from this
picture. We feel that our hands are tied by our unavoidable powerlessness over what lies in
the  oblivion,  and  this  makes  the  quietly  desperate  wait  for  the  sunrise  feel  not  only
inescapable, but also mandatory, and even further, right and justified. Many agree that taking
paths we have already been through – paths that we could thus easily follow from memory,
light and even eyes being totally dispensable – is not an option, for we know they lead to no
place to where we are willing to go. Some of these explicitly endorse the stillness in which
they see themselves, condemning every sketch of a move as reckless and threatening; while
others urge that such stillness cannot go on, only to face what they perceive as an even
harsher desperation provoked by the immobilising effect that their lack of vision exerts upon
them.  There  are  also  those  who  perceive  the  stillness  imposed  by  this  time  as  a
straightjacket, or their own live burial, and do not care to avoid going along old familiar roads,
as long as they are allowed to move freely again. And all fail to have the capability to even
conceive of a fourth option as a real possibility.
From the  point  where  I  now stand,  this  is  nevertheless  nothing  but  a  poor  taste,
egocentric and self-apologetic melodrama told by their own characters to themselves, and
which keeps them entertained enough not to be susceptible to listen to anyone or anything
else. This work is thus an attempt at giving these characters something else to which to listen.
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The rather tense historical period which we now live can be  described in many ways;
but  a way of grasping this “post-truth”  Zeitgeist in a fruitful  way is to take it  as a radical
contestation of the very notion of knowledge – or any contextually adapted guise of it – as
touchstone of a possible criterion to help us define or pursue legitimate ethical-political goals.
It is a far more radical situation than the epistemic-foundational crisis of the 19th century; for it
is not a crisis caused by the lack of criteria to fill the vacancy of the formal loci of knowledge
and foundation, but rather by the gradual  implosion, the ongoing conceptual shrinkage of
these very formal  loci towards senselessness and extinction, to which a series of historical
developments has been leading. Plato’s paradise is too small; and unless we are somehow
cut to fit in it, it shall not give us any shelter.
In early days, when West was still less than the vaguest plot of a nightmare, Aristotle
opened the doors to the formal investigation of language with aims which belonged in his
time;  a  time  when  knowledge  was,  from  the  political  viewpoint  upon  which  its  sense
unavoidably depends, still nothing but a promising possibility – one which he, following Plato
and preceding almost all  subsequent heroes of our tradition, vigorously embraced. These
aims led him to forge, in the Prior Analytics, the notion which is now to be the object of our
scrutiny: συλλογισμός; or, as the literary tradition from which this work descends calls it, proof.
This notion, as well as its investigation, was envisaged and concretised as a means to the
construction of the ideal of knowledge, the living seed of which was planted in fertile soil. The
plant  germinated,  nurtured  voraciously  from  it  and  grew  up  into  a  colossal  tree,  that,
eventually, drained its very source of life; and it is now dead, even though it stands, imposing
and stolid as ever, still  firmly attached to the now dry and sterile soil  from which it  once
emerged. The notion of proof, however, outlived it. In the absence of its original guiding ideal,
though, what is to become of it? – or, better said, what are we to make of it?
T.R.C.A., Tübingen, October 2017
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Prologue: a pseudo-historical account of the notion of proof as the conspicuous formal
contours of moral apologies for claims to knowledge
Thales of Miletus is commonly regarded as the first philosopher due to the fact that, by 
means of his doctrine that “all is water”, he has arguably  inaugurated a way of explaining the 
world; one that essentially consists of a radical reduction of the plurality of things and 
phenomena in general to an originary principle ( ρχήἀ ). It is nevertheless a later milesian 
thinker, Anaximander, who is more likely responsible for bringing the business of justification 
to the heart of what would become the philosophical activity. The only surviving fragment of 
Anaximander’s own text was bequeathed by means of a quotation made by Simplicius:
“ ξ ν δὲὲ  γένὲσίς στι το ς ο σι, και ὲ τὴὲ ν φθοραὲ ν ὲ ς τα τα γίνὲσθαι καταὲ  τοὲ  χρὲών· διδόναι ἐ ὧ ἡ ἐ ῖ ὖ ἰ ῦ
γαὲρ α ταὲ  δίκὴν και ὲ τίσιν λλήλοις τ ς δικίας καταὲ  τὴὲ ν το  χρόνου τάξιν” (In a free ὐ ἀ ῆ ἀ ῦ
translation: “Whence origin is to things, thereinto is also perishment, according to necessity. 
For they concede to each other justice and reparation for the injustice in accordance with the 
ordinance of time.”)
Tradition says that Anaximander deemed τοὸ  πειρονἄ  (“the undetermined” or “the 
boundless”) to be the ρχήἀ , and this rather enigmatic fragment can be interpreted so as to 
help us make an interesting and illuminating picture of what he might have meant by that.
The realm of inquiry of so-called pre-socratic thinkers was φύσις, i.e. the nature – for 
lack of a better expression – as becoming, a pervasive and relentless flux in which and by 
force of which all things come into being and cease to be. It seems that Thales looked upon 
φύσις as being fundamentally a multiplicity of things, and in operating his radical and general 
reduction of it to water, viz. a single element of which everything else is not but a variation, he 
succeeded in giving an explanation to the cohesion of things – ρχήἀ  is thus given the role of 
first and foremost a principle of unity.
The fragment transcribed above seems to suggest that Anaximander, on the other 
hand, has been impressed not so much by the multiplicity of things that come about within the
relentless flux of φύσις, but rather by the very relentlessness of the flux itself, of which the 
multiplicity that caught Thales’s attention is not but a symptom. The problem he has in hands 
is thus of a completely different nature; he feels the urge to account not for the compatibility 
between two apparently disparate aspects of φύσις – namely, the multiplicity of things and the
cohesion of their totality – but rather for the reason why, in the first place, things inexorably 
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come into being and, in so doing, inexorably cease to be – if there is any. The task given by 
Anaximander to his ρχήἀ  is thus to justify the very existence, the very there-being and 
persistence of φύσις.
According to the famous interpretation of Nietzsche, Anaximander’s fragment suggests 
that he saw the coming to be of everything within φύσις essentially as “injustice” ( δικίαἀ ) –, an
unavoidably unexplainable peremptoriness. Notwithstanding, the Milesian saw in the 
perishment and decay that, according to a “monstruous experimental evidence” given by 
φύσις itself, inexorably assails all things that once flourish within the flux,  a reparation for 
their “crime” of violating what would be the perfect balance of nothingness with their 
becoming. Ceasing to be is the price, the penalty to pay for coming into being – and so the 
relentless flux of φύσις provides itself with justification in a most concrete and literal way, as 
the expiation of its own unjustifiable coming into being.   
But “whence” and “whereto”?; what could be the originary and explanatory principle of 
such perennial self-expiatory crime?; or, in other words, how is this tragic dynamic balance 
possible? Once the question is put this way, it is easier to make sense of πειρονἄ . Since any 
determination of a thing can only come about a result of and within the flux of φύσις, then 
nothing the being of which consists of having this or that determination may provide φύσις 
with the ontological “fuel” and sustentation it needs to justify itself – were it otherwise, then we
would be somehow incurring in circularity. Hence water, earth, air, fire and in general anything
whatsoever that can be positively defined by having given properties or determinations must 
be rejected as ρχή ἀ according to Anaximander’s approach to φύσις. Indeed, it is easy to see 
that whatever may justify the persistence and there-being of  φύσις must be essentially devoid
of determinations; for only so it is free from the necessity of coming into being and perishing 
within the flux.
By creating the notion of the undetermined – τοὸ  πειρον –, ἄ then, something which is by
definition safeguarded from the vicissitudes of the flux, Anaximander succeeded in explaining 
the essential trait of a principle that justifies φύσις inasmuch as it alone can be the primal 
source, originary nature and ultimate destiny of everything that comes into being. By 
postulating its existence as the ρχήἀ , the Milesian thinker provided not only a principle of 
cohesion, a common measure and originary matter to all things, but also a justification to the 
very there-being of φύσις,   i.e. an explanation of it which makes it clear not only that it has a 
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cohesive and internally coherent structure, as Thales’s does, but also that it respects a 
demand for cosmological balance which is in force independently of its being and structure.
 Thus, in particular, Anaximander inescapably inserted deep in the core of the 
philosophical thinking what one could call its tragic element – which could be roughly 
described as the tendency to see and explain whatever happens to be the case as 
inexorable, inescapable, as somehow necessary. His reaction before such an awe-inspiring 
picture of the world was nevertheless quite unique: instead of falling on his knees in some 
form of despair or adoration, instead of fighting against or of letting himself innebriate and be 
taken along by the force of such an overwhelming flow, Anaximander’s grasp of φύσις as 
impregnated with an essentially moral character took him to question the object of his inquiry: 
“Why is it so and not some other way?; why is it at all, in the first place?” Anaximander 
pioneered the attitude of questioning the legitimacy of that which is not justified, and in so 
doing opened the doors to what tradition would later call “burden of proof” – an originarily and 
essentially moral burden, put by him from the very outset of his inquiry upon the shoulders of 
anything that dares laying claim to being (the case) – in short, a demand for justification. It is 
thus by virtue of the sublime weight of the moral burden of justifying a still unjustified world 
that explanations were shaped into justifications in the very dawn of Philosophy – and so the 
πειρον ἄ appeared as, in many and crucial senses, the key element of the first known non-
mythical and non-alegorical explanation in our tradition of why things must be the way they 
are claimed to be.
Now, Anaximander’s own way of questioning the legitimacy of his object of inquiry 
could be described as moderate; or, put another way, his attitude towards the flux of 
becoming could be quite understandably described as more apologetic than, say, challenging.
For although he does indeed set himself in a quest for a justification of the flux – i.e. to what 
he experiences as the nature of φύσις –, he, as already suggested above, seems never to 
consider the possibility of actually denying (the existence of) it on any basis. But what if his 
quest turned out as a failure? Would he keep on accepting the there-being of an injust and 
unjustified reality merely by the force of its own persistent and vociferous self-affirmation?
Indeed, it seems that this vociferous self-affirmation was enough at least for 
Anaximander to suppose the existence of the flux beforehand and so, in a way or another, 
safeguard its ontological status from the potentially destructive outcome that an eventual 
failure to meet the demands of his questioning could have. The milesian has thus attempted 
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to justify his depiction of reality as a means to, I repeat, free it from a moral burden; a burden 
it should carry even in case one should already feel compelled to accept its existence by 
virtue of other factors, which, it seems, he did.
It took a severe radicalisation of Anaximander’s questioning attitude – or, put another 
way, an understanding of the meaning of this questioning as a challenge with respect to his 
object of inquiry – to add existential import to its originarily moral character. Such a 
radicalisation can be variously witnessed in some key episodes of later pre-socratic thought, 
having yielded quite different, even diametrically opposed philosophies. For instance: 
Heraclitus of Ephesus, on the one hand, denies the legitimacy of an eventual existential 
challenge to φύσις by denying the supposition that becoming is in any sense in need of (or 
even compatible with) a justification of any sort. This thinker observes that becoming is all 
there is, the supposition of there being anything alien to it being unavoidably groundless; it is 
thus impossible to justify it by appeal to anything other than itself. The observance of this 
total, absolute character of the flux reveals that its nature and there-being are themselves 
neither unjustified nor justified; for justice, injustice, well-groundedness and indeed all things 
are possible only as unfoldings within the flux. Therefore, challenging becoming and its there-
being on the basis of its supposed lack of justification is not only failing to understand its total,
pervasive and necessarily self-sustaining character, but also its intrinsic incompatibility with 
the sort of moral questioning posed by Anaximander. The vociferous self-affirmation of 
relentless becoming referred before is completely innocent, inasmuch as it is essentially 
amoral, and it is senseless not only to condemn it, but also to deny it in any sense; for such 
self-affirmation by its very nature defines what it means to exist. Nietzsche provides us with 
an image, as usual very eloquent, that might help one understand this:
“Ein Werden und Vergehen, ein Bauen und Zerstören ohne jede moralische Zurechnung in 
ewig gleicher Unschuld hat in dieser Welt allein das Spiel des Künstlers und des Kindes. Und 
so, wie das Kind und der Künstler spielt, spielt das ewig lebendige Feuer, baut auf und 
zerstört, in Unschuld – und dieses Spiel spielt der Äon mit sich. Sich verwandelnd in Wasser 
und Erde, türmt er wie ein Kind Sandhaufen am Meere, türmt auf und zertrümmert: von Zeit 
zu Zeit fängt er das Spiel von neuem an. Ein Augenblick der Sättigung: dann ergreift ihn von 
neuem das Bedürfnis, wie den Künstler zum Schaffen das Bedürfnis zwingt. Nicht Frevelmut, 
sondern der immer neu erwachende Spieltrieb ruft andre Welten ins Leben. Das Kind wirft 
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einmal das Spielzeug weg: bald aber fängt es wieder an in unschuldiger Laune. Sobald es 
aber baut, knüpft, fügt und formt es gesetzmäßig und nach inneren Ordnungen.”1  
In this fashion, Heraclitus depicts becoming – even more tragically – as essentially 
spontaneous, innocent, and ontologically self-sufficient, thus being both existentially and 
morally unchallengeable; and hence free from the burden of justification and necessarily 
inexorable from the very outset. The radicalisation of the understanding of the meaning of 
Anaximander’s demand for justification with respect to its object in this case lies in the 
following: instead of considering that φύσις answers (or fails to do so) in any sense to 
Anaximander’s demand for justification, Heraclitus deems such demand as plainly 
incompatible with any proper scrutiny of φύσις.
On the other hand, however, we have Parmenides of Elea: a thinker who not only fully 
embraced the legitimacy of Anaximander’s demand for justification, but also understood it to 
have priority and normative power over the self-affirmation of becoming. The moral demand 
for justification is in fact taken to an absolutely radical level by Parmenides: he turns it into a 
condition for existence. Whatever there is, it must be justified; and whatever cannot be 
justified should have its being/existence denied.
Parmenides thus seems to let his inquiry be founded upon and primarily guided by the 
very principles of justification, and not, as in the case of his milesian predecessors and 
Heraclitus, upon and by the sheer unavoidable self-affirmation of becoming. He dedicates a 
significant part of his poem to derive the traces that τό οὸ νἐ  (“what [there] is”) must display 
from the constraints imposed by what he presumably takes to be “laws”, so to speak, in force 
upon whatever may lay claim to being – laws common to thought and being, for these are, 
according to him, the same.  
The result of such an enterprise is the probably most unusual picture of φύσις among 
all of the so-called φυσιολόγοι: a resolute and astonishing denial of becoming. The absurd flux
that insisted to happen before his eyes was not conceivable if not as a transgression of the 
conditions of possibility of being and thought – and thus had to be dismissed as a misleading 
illusion. In its throne, as the unavoidably true nature of φύσις, the eleatic put a static, 
unchanging, eternal, total, complete, atomic Being – the only picture capable of answering to 
the demands of ultimate justification imposed by thought upon being.
1 Nietzsche, F. Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen, §7
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The inversion of priority between the demand for justification and the intended object of
justification within Parmenides’s thought transformed the apologetic attitude of Anaximander 
into a decidedly and radically challenging one. For after Parmenides, the doors have been 
opened not only to condemn, but to actually deny whatever fails to meet the universal 
demand for justification bequeathed by Anaximander. And not only did the philosopher of Elea
challenge becoming; he has also judged it as having failed to meet the demands of his 
challenge most unequivocally. The supposed inevitability of the flux was not only solemnly 
unacknowledged, but substituted by the most absolute conviction of its ultimate impossibility.
Many might claim that acknowledging this fact amounts to the diagnosis that the tragic 
element of greek thought is strangely absent in Parmenides, but I strongly disagree from that. 
The inevitability of what is the case is incarnated in his philosophy in a most clear and 
eloquent way, although it has been radically reinterpreted into a most peculiar expression: that
of what tradition would later call logical necessity, which abounds in Parmenides’s description 
of reality as in probably no other within pre-socratic philosophy. Existence and the inevitability 
that adheres to it in tragic ancient Greek thought are thus reshaped as the result of the 
successful and radical satisfaction of the demands of the burden of Anaximander through 
justification.
Another remarkable consequence of Parmenides little “copernican revolution” in the 
realm of ancient Greek physiology is that the very nature of the object of inquiry is now also 
positively determined by the ways and features of the justification given to it. Thereby, 
justifications become more than  mere stamps of approval for an existentially independent 
object of inquiry, as they were to Anaximander, and are turned into an essential component in 
the determination of the nature and being of such object.2
With Parmenides’s radicalisation, then, the contours of the “burden of proof”, 
inaugurated by Anaximander, become significantly less fuzzy and more familiar when 
scrutinised from a contemporary viewpoint: for now only inasmuch as something can be freed
from this burden can it be truly claimed to be (the case). The initial moral questioning is now 
also existential. So, ever since being (the case) has been deformed into resisting the moral 
2 a component without which, to say the very least, acknowledging its nature and being is impossible. The 
importance of this peculiar trait of Parmenides’s philosophy to the tradition and issues to be addressed in this
work is unparalelled; it is a historical conditio sine qua non, a germ of what is called “constructivism” in the 
philosophy of logic and mathematics, and therefore also for the subject of this dissertation – viz. the question
concerning identity of proofs – not to have been doomed never to find a conceptual background against 
which it actually makes sense.
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questioning of Anaximander as radicalised and “perfected” by Parmenides, the originary 
formal locus within philosophical inquiry has been inaugurated which proofs would later 
occupy – namely, that of final justification.
The whole situation depicted so far facilitates a view of Plato as, before anything else, 
the heir to a clash of titans of thought. On one side, Heraclitus, who accepts and embraces 
becoming as inaugural with respect to any sense of existence one might come up with, and 
claims that the truth of φύσις – where “truth” is understood as something most faithfully 
correspondent to the nature of φύσις – is thus in no sense under the constraints of the laws of
thought and being hailed by Parmenides. The sage of Ephesus dances upon the very 
threshold of madness, demanding of himself and of his listener a disposition to be 
alphabetised into a language in which enigmas are clear and illuminating and contradictions 
are sensible and true – the only language he deems rich enough to, in being properly 
experienced, somehow express, reveal or indicate the truth of φύσις. On the other side, 
Parmenides himself, who claims that what there is and its truth – where “truth” is understood 
as something ultimately and definitively justifiable –  have by necessity as their contours, the 
very outline of their being and nature, the limits imposed by the same laws at which Heraclitus
seems to laugh, and thus claims that physiology as a whole, and in fact any investigation 
whatsoever, is doomed never to attain any truth if not as a result of the strictest observance of
such laws. The sage of Elea rests stolid in his fortress of self-discipline, systematically 
disregarding and almost pitying any expression alien to the only language he deems solid and
trustworthy enough to be capable of incarnating and expressing the tragic necessity of being.
The task before Plato seems herculean: nothing less than a reconciliation of 
Heraclitus’s demand for a truth that faithfully depicts and expresses the flux of becoming, and 
of Parmenides’s demand for a truth that is definitively justifiable according to the laws which 
govern any trustworthy inquiry. Two thousand and five hundred years later, a young Austrian 
soldier would, while in the trenches and prisons of World War I, come to the conclusion that 
this task – the reunion of meaningfulness and necessity in truth – is indeed unsurmountable; 
for it is not, he would claim, herculean, but rather quixotic. But for the entirety of those two 
and half millennia, Plato’s philosophy remained almost unshaken in its role of main paradigm 
for the proposition of the most various strategies to build a bridge over the abyss between 
each of these aspects which seem so crucial to the characterisation of truth.
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One of the most remarkable pearls of Plato’s legacy to the folklore of philosophical 
tradition – despite what exegetes and historians might have to say about Plato’s actual works 
or intentions – is precisely a model of such a bridge, built as an ontological-epistemic 
hierarchisation of φύσις, epitomised in the famous passage of the Line in the Republic. The 
multiplicity of things which rise and fall within becoming compose the two layers of the domain
of δόξα (judgement, frequently rendered also as belief or opinion), namely: at the bottom, the 
images, shadows and simulacra, objects of ε κασίαἰ  (likeness, depiction or figuration, usually 
translated as imagination); and immediately above, the ordinary physical things of which the 
images (shadows and simulacra) are images (shadows, etc.), objects of πίστις (conviction, 
interpreted by e.g. neoplatonists as faith, frequently taken to mean belief by contemporary 
readers). Above that of becoming in the hierarchy, Plato posits the realm of the νοητός 
(intelligible), domain of πιστήμη ἐ (especially after Plato, knowledge), which is also twofold: at 
the lower level, the mathematical entities, i.e. relations and proportions between structures, 
objects of διάνοια (discursive thought, characterised as, essentially, hypothetic-deductive 
reasoning); and above it, at the highest ontological level of all, the Forms, objects of νο ςῦ  
(thought or understanding, characterised as, roughly, a sort of direct apprehension by the 
mind, intellectual vision or intuition).
This structure enables Plato to give an account of, first, how stable, immutable being 
does not rule out the being of the relentless flux of becoming; and secondly, how it is that  
“trustworthy” truth (as well as the attainment thereof) , dependent on the stable immutability of
being as Parmenides has shown it to be, somehow refers to becoming – In other words, it is 
Plato’s means of (a) enabling a post-parmenidean, existential justification of becoming 
granted that one is ready to “commit parricide” and somehow accept its being; and (b) thus 
enable a solution to the conflict between Parmenides’s and Heraclitus’s demands upon truth 
for, respectively, trustworthiness and adhesion to becoming. By the observed in (a), then, one 
might feel tempted to suppose that Plato’s attitude is to be a return to the apologetic approach
to becoming of Anaximander; for indeed, instead of either fully embracing, as Heraclitus, or 
radically challenging, as Parmenides, the ontological citizenship of becoming, Plato renders 
the unavoidable self-affirmation of the flux as sufficient to acknowledge that it is not nothing, 
and therefore does have some kind or degree of being; and then, by means of his own 
justification of it, he shows just what kind or degree of being the flux and the things therein 
have.
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Plato’s explanation of this hinges essentially upon the notion of “partaking”. Just as the 
images and shadows of ε κασίαἰ  take their feeble degree of being from the objects of πίστις, 
the latter – that is, the ordinary things which rise and fall within the flux – take their stronger, 
yet still imperfect and unstable being from the fact that they partake in the stable, perfect and 
immutable being of the due Forms. Anaximander’s morally condemnatory depiction of 
becoming thus echoes and survives, transformed as it was by Parmenides radical existential 
appropriation of it, in Plato’s characterisation of this ontological realm as existentially 
imperfect and dependent.
The attainment of truth is then dependent on the “noetic” apprehension of the perfect 
and independent portion of φύσις   (which we may, after Plato, call reality  ), i.e. the Forms, 
which are its source (the term “cause” is more frequently used; meant here is α τίαἰ ) and 
condition of possibility, as well as the source and condition of possibility of the corrupt being of
the lower, imperfect layers of reality (cf. e.g. Phaedo 100d-e: “ο  γαὸ ρ τι το το διισχυρίζομαι, ὐ ἔ ῦ
λλ  τι τ  καλ  πάντα ταὸ  καλαὸ  γίγνεται καλά.”ἀ ᾽ ὅ ῷ ῷ ). This is suggested by Plato as possible by 
means of the process of dialectic ascension, depicted in the famous passages of the Line 
(Plat. Rep. 6, 509d – 511e) and the Cave (Plat. Rep. 7, 514a - 517c) in the Republic.  The 
attainment of truth in Plato’s version of what “trustworthy” inquiry is has thus the property of 
being, in many respects, qualitatively informative with respect to the very nature and content 
of φύσις (viz. reality) as a whole – even, in some sense or degree, with respect to becoming 
and its inhabitants. Therefore, Plato forges the conception of attainment of truth in inquiry as 
what tradition would consolidate as knowledge – i.e. the grasping of ultimately unwavering, 
ontologically justified, necessary truth that is, simultaneously, informative, viz. non-trivial. 
Notice that this not only is a novelty with respect to his predecessors Heraclitus and 
Parmenides, but also a solution to the aforementioned conflict between them: the first 
radically rejected and even disdained of the requirement of “trustworthiness” for inquiries 
towards truth, making of truth and whatever would be equivalent to a “grasping” thereof within
his conceptual economy – that is, if it makes sense to suppose that there is any place at all 
for such notions therein – something clearly different from, respectively, something one can 
know and knowledge; The second, in turn, sacrifices any descriptive, qualitatively informative 
value of truth with respect to becoming – the reality of which he thus denied, in spite of the 
plain inevitability of its self-affirmation –, and is contented with having attained a truth that, as 
trustworthy as it may be, is as empty of content and information as is the being about which it 
verses, the nature of which is limited to satisfying the necessary and sufficient “formal” 
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conditions to qualify as the only thing that Parmenides’s requirements allow to play the role of 
φύσις (the meaning of φύσις being thus bent into something close to “what there is”). One of 
the highlights of Plato’s legacy is thus, basically, the creation of the first and, until this very 
day, paradigmatic conception of knowledge of our tradition and the idea that it is somehow 
possible.
Now, how does Plato conceive of knowledge? Let us first, as a way to convey the idea 
of the process of knowledge acquisition outlined by Plato, try to briefly illustrate the 
aforementioned dialectic ascension, by means of which knowledge is suggested to be 
achievable. In the immediate approach to the objects within the flux, which happens as 
ε κασία ἰ and πίστις, a great many regularities, patterns and proportions may be observed, 
which cannot however be explained by any further observations made within ε κασία ἰ and 
πίστις. In order to explain such regularities, patterns and proportions, an inquirer may assume
hypotheses that are capable of leading by necessity to the conclusion that such regularities 
are true; this step outside of the realm of observable into hypothesising and deducing from 
hypotheses amounts to the entry into διάνοια. At such a stage, capable as the inquirer may 
already be of recognising true and necessary connections and relations between hypotheses 
and their consequences, he is still incapable of justifiedly acknowledging the truth of either 
hypotheses made or conclusions drawn. As Plato explains in the passage of the Line, the 
soul, by means of dianoetic thought, is forced to investigate “ ξ ποθέσεων, ο κ π  ρχηὸ ν ἐ ὑ ὐ ἐ ᾽ ἀ
πορευομένη λλ  πιὸ τελευτήνἀ ᾽ ἐ ” (“from hypotheses, proceeding not towards principles but 
towards ends”) (6, 510b); in short, any explanation attained dianoetically takes unjustified 
hypotheses as departure point and then heads towards conclusions, which are then true 
merely relatively to the initial hypotheses. The attainment of truth by means of διάνοια, πίστις 
and ε κασία ἰ alone is thus impossible – for, on one hand, unjustified hypotheses cannot justify 
any conclusions, valid as they may be, drawn from them; and on the other hand, the 
observation of regularities alone may only go as far as planting conviction into the soul of the 
inquirer, informing nothing regarding the reason why such regularities are true. To explain how
one could overcome διάνοια and attain truth by noetic apprehension of Forms – a matter 
surrounded by mystery and controversy –, one can compare two possible approaches to the 
hypothetic-deductive reasoning used within διάνοια to account for its intended conclusions. 
Firstly, one could look at it as aiming to directly support/yield the eventual conclusions to 
which it comes. Secondly, one could look at it as a means to make clear the reality from which
the hypotheses and the conclusions involved take their eventual truth. The first approach is, 
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again, the one characteristic of διάνοια: it merely shows how the eventual truth of the 
hypotheses and conclusions are deductively related, and how the conclusions can be 
deduced from the hypotheses, having ultimately nothing to do with whether the hypotheses or
conclusions involved are actually true. The second, in turn, aims, to use Plato’s expression, 
“not at ends but at principles”; principles which are nevertheless not to be confused with mere
“higher” hypotheses, axioms or something akin. What makes the second approach differ from 
the first is not a mere inversion of direction in a deductive march between hypothetical 
assumptions and conclusions, with the ultimate goal of, instead of reaching desired 
conclusions, finding more fundamental  hypotheses that are fit to play the role of principle. 
Rather, the principles at which the inquirer aims by means of the second approach belong to 
a totally different category than hypotheses and conclusions – for they are not themselves 
true, at least not in the sense that hypotheses and conclusions might be true, but rather they 
are what makes true hypotheses and conclusions true: the realities to which they correspond, 
and from which the objects of ε κασία ἰ and πίστις which eventually motivated them take their 
defective, imperfect being, by partaking in them. Such realities are the Forms, and their 
apprehension, νόησις, is the necessary and sufficient condition for the actual recognition – 
rather than the supposition, assumption or conviction – of the truth of any given hypothesis 
made or conclusion drawn.  
Let us consider a concrete example. A theorem – say
(( A⊃B )∧(B⊃A ))⊃¬((¬A∧B)∨( A∧¬B )) – could have its validity explained by someone 
by appeal to the claim that the due natural deduction rules are valid and the subsequent 
derivation of the theorem by means of an adequate succession of applications of the rules. 
Such an explanation can be given in a way that it takes for granted that the inference rules 
are valid, and merely shows that the theorem can be derived stepwise from them and should 
be therefore valid. Notwithstanding, the inference rules assumed from which the theorem can 
be derived could be used in the explanation not as primitive valid principles to be taken for 
granted, but rather as means to somehow describe, indicate, mirror the reality from which 
they take their validity – say, the fact that conjunction, disjunction, implication and negation 
are actually, in reality such that their meaning is faithfully depicted by the given inference 
rules. While the first, merely hypothetical use of the inference rules as principles does lead to 
a valid derivation of a valid theorem from valid principles, it is incapable of accounting 
satisfactorily for the reason why the theorem is valid – it simply shows how it can be properly 
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derived from the unfounded hypotheses that the rules are valid, and the cause (α τίαἰ ) of the 
validity remains thus in oblivion. The second use, in turn, ultimately sustains the conclusion of 
the validity of the theorem not upon the validity of the inference rules themselves, but rather 
upon the due portions of reality itself. The reality that makes the rules valid is indicated by 
means of displaying the rules; in this fashion, each conclusion that is stepwise derived from 
the initial rules serves as an indication to the stepwise apprehension of the respective regions
of reality from where they take their validity, never being inferred in a blind manner, as simply 
a step the trustworthiness of which is merely inherited from that of the former, but rather 
always as a sign of the apprehension of the reality that makes it valid. By means of such a 
process, in which reason makes use only “ε δεσιν α το ς δι  α τ ν ε ς α τά, καιὸ τελευτ  ε ς ἴ ὐ ῖ ᾽ ὐ ῶ ἰ ὐ ᾷ ἰ
ε δηἴ ”  (“of Forms, [proceeding] through Forms to Forms, and ending in Forms”, Plat. Rep. 
6.511c ),  the theorem itself is at last gotten to know to be valid.
By means of his solution to the dilemma between Heraclitus and Parmenides, then, 
Plato has in his own way freed becoming from the moral burden of Anaximander and from the
existential threat into which Parmenides has reshaped the latter, and thus established a 
paradigmatic way of dealing with this cosmological problem. Even more interesting, however, 
is the fact that, in so doing, he has also provided the means to deal with the ethical-political 
problem of whether or not justice is possible, both as an ethical and as a political virtue. The 
possibility of justice is advocated by Socrates in the Republic as secured precisely by the fact 
that knowledge is possible – the cosmological solution, thus, in enabling knowledge, yielded a
criterion to what would be a just solution of disputes at the ethical and political level. Indeed, it
is not unusual to look at this whole picture upside-down and understand the cosmological 
solution as somehow tailored to allow for the ethical-political one. In any case,  in order to 
actually and successfully apply viz. enforce the ethical and political criterion yielded by Plato’s
approach, one must be able to show that one possesses knowledge, and not e.g. mere 
appearance thereof – and so, the moral burden of Anaximander is shifted by Plato’s 
philosophy from the shoulders of that which is claimed to be (the case) –  kosmos and phýsis 
–  to those of that which is claimed to be knowledge (judgements, opinions, beliefs, i.e. δόξα), 
thus finally acquiring the epistemic shape of the burden of proof as we manipulate it today. 
Whatever one now claims, now that such a thing as knowledge is possible, one also implicitly 
claims to be knowledge. And this amounts to one’s commitment to the capability of justifying 
not really that which one (at least implicitly) claims to know – i.e. a thing in reality or a fact –, 
but rather what one claims to be knowledge – i.e. a given judgement, belief, etc. about what 
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one knows –, and consequently the very claim to knowledge in the first place. In the present 
context, such a claim is also a self-entitlement to determining how people should or should 
not proceed in practical life with respect to the known matter. It is then a matter of the utmost 
practical importance in this framework whether or not one may have a clear idea of what 
knowledge itself is – for only against a clear enough idea of knowledge could one indeed 
differentiate between right and wrong claims to it; thus, between those who have it and those 
who do not.
Despite the fact that he seems to enable knowledge as a possibility by means of the 
structure of dialectic ascension as described previously, in no work does Plato present any 
clear or explicit enough definition of what knowledge is which Socrates embraces. The work in
which Plato most directly and substantially discusses this issue is the Theaetetus. In this 
dialogue, after the rejection of the thesis that knowledge is true judgement, the young pupil of 
Theodorus remembers someone having told him that, when accompanied by an account 
( “λόγος”) – and only then –, true judgement (“δόξα”) is knowledge, and proposes this as a 
new definition of knowledge to be scrutinised:
“  γὲ γώ,  Σώκρατὲς, ὲ πόντος του κούσας πὲλὲλήσμὴν, ν ν δ  ννο : φὴ δὲὲ ὅ ἐ ὦ ἰ ἀ ἐ ῦ ᾽ ἐ ῶ ἔ
τὴὲ ν μὲὲν μὲταὲ  λόγου  λὴθ  δόξαν πιστήμὴν ὲ ναι, τὴὲ ν δὲὲ λογον κτοὲς πιστήμὴς: και ὲ ν ἀ ῆ ἐ ἶ ἄ ἐ ἐ ὧ
μὲὲν μή στι λόγος, ο κ πιστὴταὲ  ὲ ναι, ο τωσιὲ και ὲ νομάζων,  δ  χὲι, πιστὴτά.” ἐ ὐ ἐ ἶ ὑ ὀ ἃ ᾽ ἔ ἐ
(Theaetetus, 201c-d)
The passage quoted above is thus the one by means of which Plato, through 
Theaetetus, eternalises what would become the most influential formula ever used to define 
knowledge in western philosophical literature: “μεταὸ  λόγου ληθ  δόξανἀ ῆ ”.
The proper evaluation of the thesis that the addition of λόγος to true judgement yields 
knowledge depends crucially on, among other things, what one takes λόγος to be. It could be 
argued that Plato himself, in other dialogues, makes some suggestions as to what the nature 
of a knowledge-producing λόγος should be. A conception arguably endorsed by such 
suggestions is ultimately expressed by the phrase α τίας λογισμός ἰ (cf. Meno, 98a), rendered 
into English as “causal reasoning” or “causal argumentation”; in short, an account of the 
reason why the true judgement is true. If added to the respective true judgement, then, such a
λόγος would bring about knowledge.
Whether or not Plato actually held such a point of view at any time is an irrelevant 
matter to our present purposes; in any case, this account of λόγος, even if good enough to 
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make a true definition of knowledge out of the formula μεταὸ  λόγου ληθ  δόξαν, ἀ ῆ can be seen 
as insufficient to the practical purpose of attaining a definition of knowledge that may help in 
actually sorting out those pieces of μεταὸ  λόγου ληθ  δόξαν ἀ ῆ which are knowledge and those 
which are not – and thus also those who possess knowledge about a given matter and those 
who do not. The reason would be that it is in principle not necessarily the case that there is 
something in the “surface”, so to speak, of a λόγος that may provide one with good reason to 
decide immediately, without further, whether or not it gives an account of the cause of what is 
claimed to be known. Put another way, one who claims to possess knowledge would always 
be in a position where it could be asked how does one know, if at all, that the λόγος added to 
his true judgement is causal; for whether or not the λόγος is an α τίας λογισμός ἰ is in principle 
not necessarily a self-evident matter. To answer to such questioning, one would in turn have 
to provide again some λόγος to support the truth of the implicitly claimed judgement about the
causal nature of the former λόγος as a known matter; and then the same question could be 
asked again with respect to the newly provided λόγος, and this could go on indefinitely. So, it 
makes sense to try and spell out a way of reducing the “causal” character of a λόγος in this 
context to some conspicuous, immediately recognisable feature of it, in such a way as to 
disallow such sort of regress.
The sequel of Plato’s Theatetus can of course be variously interpreted, but one 
interesting way of looking at it is, precisely in the spirit of the observation just made in the 
previous paragraph, as a tentative investigation of what form does a knowledge-producing 
λόγος – arguably, an α τίας λογισμόςἰ  – have. We should be aware of the fact that, by 
employing the terminology “form” now, we are not talking of the Forms that Plato posits as the
core entities of his ontology; it is rather a loose use of this vocabulary, that should be 
understood roughly as follows. Inasmuch as the cause of something known – say, that a given
body is hot – is given by a λόγος in direct dependence on the specific content of that which is 
known – e.g. because of its partaking in hotness, or, less “stupidly”, as Socrates suggests in 
the Phaedo (105b-c), because of the fire in it – , this λόγος is not necessarily a formal 
expression of the notion of cause at all; for one has to know something about what hot, 
hotness and fire are and what relations hold between them to understand why there is even 
an attempted causal account going on in it, if any. But if there is some way of specifying this 
λόγος as to guarantee that it expresses the cause of something known independently of the 
content of what is known – say, to say that for everything that can be known, the cause of 
what is known can always be expressed as an exhaustive enumeration of the fundamental 
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elements of which it is composed –, then there would be a formal constraint upon λόγος that 
would necessarily or sufficiently (ideally both) yield this connection, i.e. necessarily or 
sufficiently condition its status of α τίας λογισμόςἰ .   
Now, the attempted definitions can be roughly described as follows: (a) λόγος is to be 
understood in its plain sense of just speech; (b) λόγος is to be understood as an enumeration 
of the elements of the known matter; (c) λόγος is to be understood as exposition of the 
differential feature of what is known. The precise nature of those attempted definitions need 
not detain us here; it suffices to notice that all of them are ultimately rejected by Socrates, 
thus leading the dialogue to end in aporia. Notwithstanding, there are two interesting points to
be noticed: first, the formula  μεταὸ  λόγου ληθ  δόξαν ἀ ῆ is itself not positively rejected as a 
definition of knowledge; and second, the conception of α τίας λογισμόςἰ , to which Socrates 
seemed quite sympathetic in previous dialogues (cf. Meno, 98a) , is not even mentioned as a 
possible answer to what the nature of a knowledge-producing λόγος would be. One could 
wonder why this is so.  
It should be once again stressed that, of course, it might well be the case that α τίας ἰ
λογισμός is a clear and maybe even the true specification of  λόγος in μεταὸ  λόγου ληθ  ἀ ῆ
δόξαν according to Plato; but the former observations allow the suggestion that it is 
nevertheless not exactly to be understood as a formal specification thereof – at least not in 
the same sense as the attempted specifications of the Theaetetus  are now being claimed to 
be. The idea is that, even if it were the case that one does have a clear notion of what would 
be necessary and sufficient conditions for some μεταὸ  λόγου ληθ  δόξανἀ ῆ  to be knowledge –  
arguably, that the λόγος gives an account of the cause of what is known (e.g. the truth of the 
judgement, the object of the true judgement, etc.) – , one could still fail to give an account of 
conspicuous formal restrictions upon λόγος which condition its success in accounting for 
causes –  i.e. fail to defend that  λόγος accounts for the cause by e.g. being an enumeration 
of the elements or exposition of the differential feature of what is known, whatever it is that is 
known. So, the Theaetetus raises and leaves us with the question of whether or not one could
find a proper way of specifying  λόγος formally so that the formula succeeds in defining 
knowledge.
If such a picture is adequate, we should see the search of the characters in the 
Theaetetus as directed not merely towards a true definition of knowledge, but rather towards 
a true definition of knowledge that enables one to recognise some μεταὸ  λόγου ληθ  δόξαν ἀ ῆ
as being or not a piece of knowledge by means of scrutinising conspicuous formal aspects of 
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the λόγος – a much more demanding task, the possibility of completion of which Theaetetus’s
aporetic character puts in doubt. As clear from the former discussion, the political impact of an
eventual decisive outcome of such an investigation is of the utmost significance in the 
framework of Plato’s thought – it bears on the possibility of implementation and enforcement 
of the political model of the Republic in practice, and could either take it far beyond or 
definitely confine it to the status of a mere ideal depiction of political justice.
This view presents Plato as already inaugurating the investigation of the formal aspects
of λόγος which condition the constitution of knowledge; though in a rather indirect, laconic and
unsystematic fashion, rather differently from what Aristotle would later accomplish in the 
works contained in the Organon. The investigation of the nature of λόγος in the Theaetetus is 
thus hereby depicted as addressing in essence the same matter as the investigations of 
Aristotle’s Analytics – which concern, in the philosopher’s own words,  “ πόδειξιν καιὸ ἀ
πιστήμης ποδεικτικ ς”ἐ ἀ ῆ  (in most translations, demonstration and demonstrative science – 
the translation of πιστήμη ἐ and related terms in Aristotle, especially in the Analytics, is a quite 
controversial subject; options range from “science” through “knowledge” to “understanding”.) 
Of course, there must be many solid reasons to reject such a reading of the Theaetetus which
ignorance and ineptitude prevent me to consider at this stage; but this is again of no 
importance. The essential point is that Plato’s depiction of knowledge-producing λόγος as 
α τίας λογισμόςἰ  in dialogues earlier than the Theaetetus does invite as relevant possibilities 
such formal investigations as that of the kind that definitely is carried out in Aristotle’s 
Analytics and that may have already started to be developed in the Theaetetus – i.e. 
investigations of conspicuous formal aspects of a λόγος that are decisive for it to produce or 
constitute a piece of knowledge when somehow combined with true judgement.     
Be that as it may, the pathway of Aristotle into this terrain had a quite different 
background than merely Plato’s doctrine of Forms, and ended up leading him much deeper 
into the intricate meanders of what we after his work call formal logic than anyone before him 
had ever ventured. Let us now, as briefly as possible – which of course causes the sacrifice of
fidelity to a significant, yet hopefully still acceptable extent –, try to reconstruct this pathway as
it may be seen being trod within some of the investigations of the Organon.  
It will be useful now to look upon Aristotle’s so called logical investigations as devised 
as a systematic march towards the goal of gathering all the necessary material to explain how
πόδειξιν ἀ and πιστήμης ποδεικτικ ς ἐ ἀ ῆ may come about by specifying these notions – in the 
quite literal sense of defining by providing gender and specific difference. At the most basic 
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level, thus, we can see three main theses: the so called semantic triangle (as presented in 
e.g. De Interpretatione 16a3-9); the doctrine of the ten categories in its two aspects – the 
ontological and the logical; and the doctrine of the predicables as presented in the Topics 
(I.v). Abstraction on this last doctrine allows the emergence of the concepts necessary to the 
definition of, in crescent order of abstractness, modal and plain syllogisms, as presented in 
the Prior Analytics. Finally, provided with the formal tools of syllogism, the philosopher is able 
to specify the notions of πόδειξιν ἀ and πιστήμης ποδεικτικ ς ἐ ἀ ῆ in the Posterior Analytics, 
thus completing his depiction of what formal aspects must a λόγος display in order to be 
knowledge-producing.
The semantic triangle identifies and describes a bond between language, thought and 
reality. Spoken sounds signify παθήματα τ ς ψυχ ς ῆ ῆ (affections of the soul), as their symbols. 
Written signs are in turn symbols of spoken sounds – thus being indirectly also symbols of the
same affections of the soul. These affections are in turn μοιώματαὁ  (likenesses) of actual 
things, which then may, through combination and separation, be true or false – a property 
which is inherited by their spoken and written signs. The triangle is thus closed by the indirect 
reference of written and spoken signs to actual things by means of the affections in the soul 
that they symbolise, which refer to actual things by virtue of their being likenesses thereof.
Now, the doctrine of the ten categories can be looked at as, before anything else, a 
theory of highest ontological kinds – i.e. substance, quality, quantity, etc. are first and 
foremost universals, real highest genera of things, that thus are in the things that belong in 
them. This is how they are described in the Categories (4, 1b25–2a4, Ackrill’s translation, my 
additions in square-brackets):
“Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or 
qualification or a relative or where or when or (…). To give a rough idea, examples of 
substance are man, horse; of quantity: four-foot[long], five-foot[long]; of qualification: white, 
grammatical (...)” 3
Notice that things said without any combination (arguably the names and verbs of De 
Interpretatione – c.f. 16a9-19) are in this passage not themselves claimed to be either 
substance or quality or etc. –  rather, what they signify are. As indicated by the semantic 
triangle, Aristotle could be referring to two kinds of thing with this: either affections of the soul 
3 “ Τ ν καταὲ  μὴδὲμίαν συμπλοκὴὲν λὲγομένων καστον τοι  ο σίαν σὴμαίνὲι  ποσοὲν  ποιοὲ ν  πρός τι  ῶ ἕ ἤ ὐ ἢ ἢ ἢ ἢ
πουὲ   ποτὲὲ  (…)  στι δὲὲ ο σία μὲὲν ς τύπωι ὲ πὲ ν ο ον νθρωπος, ππος· ποσοὲν δὲὲ ο ον δίπὴχυ, ἢ ἢ Ἔ ὐ ὡ ἰ ῖ ἷ ἄ ἵ ἷ
τρίπὴχυ· ποιοὲν δὲὲ ο ον λὲυκόν, γραμματικόν· (...).” (Text by Minio-Paluello, L. 1949, ἷ Categoriae et Liber de 
Interpretatione. Oxford University Press, London)
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or actual things. But the sequel makes it clear that the second option is the adequate one; for 
the examples given to illustrate substances, etc. –  e.g. man, horse, etc. –  are referred to as 
things, and not as likenesses thereof in the soul.
Now, additionally to the highest kinds of beings being such, the semantic triangle gives 
us a hint that what signifies them – both at the level of the affections of the soul and at the 
level of spoken and written signs – will somehow mimic their nature. It is thus not at all 
surprising that in the Topics, we find a formulation of the doctrine of the ten categories that 
applies to the level of predicates/predication (I.9, 103b20–25):
“Next we must define the kinds of categories [predicates, predication] in which the four 
above-mentioned predicates[predications] are found. They are ten in number: essence [“what-
it-is”], quantity, quality, (...). For the accident, the genus, the property and the definition [i.e. 
the four above-mentioned predicates] will always be in one of these categories; for all 
propositions made by means of these indicate either essence [“what-it-is”] or quality or 
quantity or one of the other categories.”4
Notice that the naming of the first category shifts from ο σίαὐ  (substance) in the first 
formulation to τί στιἐ  (“what-it-is”) in the second. This is not by chance: while substance is a 
category that applies to beings, the “what-it-is” applies to predicates; or, what better suits this 
passage, to the way in which a predicate is predicated of its subject in a πρότασις 
(proposition).  
So, just as substance is the primary kind/mode of being, so is “what-it-is” or “(the) this”,
on the one hand, the corresponding kind of predicate, i.e. the kind of predicate which signifies
a substance, and, on the other hand, the kind of relation of a predicate to its subject in a 
proposition in which the first determines what the second is. The same can be said of all 
categories at the levels of being, predicates and predication. Roughly summarising, then, the 
doctrine of the categories qua formal ontology of the highest kinds/modes of being echoes in 
the linguistic realm, thanks to Aristotle’s semantic/semiotic conceptions expressed in the 
semantic triangle, qua a formal classification of, in the first place, predicates according to the 
respective beings they signify and, secondly,  predications, i.e. ways given predicates that 
signify given beings are predicated of a subject in a proposition.
4 “Μὲταὲ  τοίνυν τα τα δὲ  διορίσασθαι ταὲ  γένὴ τ ν κατὴγορι ν, ν ο ς πάρχουσιν α  ὴθὲ σαι τέτταρὲς. στι ῦ ῖ ῶ ῶ ἐ ἶ ὐ ἱ ῥ ῖ ἔ
δὲὲ τα τα τοὲν ριθμοὲν δέκα, τί στι, ποσόν, ποιόν (…) ὲι ὲ γαὲ ρ τοὲ  συμβὲβὴκοὲς  και ὲ τοὲ  γένος και ὲ τοὲ  διον και ὲ  ῦ ἀ ἐ ἀ ἴ ὁ
ρισμοὲς ν μι  τούτων τ ν κατὴγορι ν σται· π σαι γαὲ ρ α  διαὲ  τούτων προτάσὲις  τί στιν  ποιοὲ ν  ὁ ἐ ᾷ ῶ ῶ ἔ ᾶ ἱ ἢ ἐ ἢ ἢ
ποσοὲν  τ ν λλων τιναὲ  κατὴγορι ν σὴμαίνουσιν.” (Text by Bekker, I., Berlin, 1831)ἢ ῶ ἄ ῶ
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The doctrine of the categories, then, whose logical and ontological aspects are glued 
together and made indissociable by Aristotle’s semantic/semiotic conceptions, not only 
bridges ontology and logic but also determines the first as the limiting frame of the Stagirites 
interest in logical matters, namely, the extent to which they condition declarative discourse 
(λόγος ποφαντικοὸ ςἀ ) on being.
The basis of Aristotle’s  logical considerations is also composed by the doctrine of the 
four predicables. These are precisely the four predications mentioned in the passage just 
quoted from the Topics, namely: accident (συμβεβηκός), genus (γένος), proprium ( διον) and ἴ
definition ( ροςὅ ). As already stated in the very same passage, Aristotle deems these kinds of 
predication to divide exhaustively into the categories. He explains these four kinds of 
predication roughly as follows: definitions are predications made by means of an expression 
(a) which applies to a subject that conversely applies to it; and (b) which signifies the essence
(τοὸ  τί ν ε ναιἦ ἶ ) of the subject. Propria are those predications which also have property (a), but 
which do not have property (b), i.e. do not signify the essence of the subject. For example 
“animal capable of reasoning” is a definition of man, whereas “capable of laughing” is merely 
a proprium of man; for the first not only applies conversely to man, but also signifies its 
essence, while the second, even though conversely applicable to man, does not signify its 
essence. Genera, in turn, are those predications which do display property (b), but not 
property (a); instead, while they apply to the subject, the subject does not apply to them. 
“Animal”, for example, is a genus of man. Finally, accidents are those predications which 
display neither (a) nor (b); i.e., neither can they have the subject predicated of them, nor do 
they signify the essence of the subject to which they apply. In Aristotle’s own way of 
expression, an accident is thus something which can belong or not belong to some particular 
thing. For instance, white, if applicable to wall, is an accident of it; for it could be that any wall 
was not white – or, alternatively: for neither does wall apply to white (i.e. there are many white
things that are not walls), nor does white signify the essence of wall.
As one can easily verify, the four predicables arise from exhausting the possible 
combinations of a predication possessing or not possessing properties (a) and (b). Since, for 
any given predication, it either has or has not property (a) – and the same holds for property 
(b) – , the list of the four predicables is exhaustive with respect to all predications. Sustaining 
it with a similar reasoning, Aristotle claims this same thesis in the Topics. Since, as argued 
above, the ten categories are also exhaustive with respect to all beings – and also with 
respect to all predications –, Aristotle then justifiedly claims, in the passage already quoted of 
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the Topics, that each of the four predicables belongs to one of the ten categories of 
predications listed. The bond of soundness and completeness with respect to the formal 
ontology of highest kinds is therefore not lost in the realm of the predicables.
Abstracting from the four predicables, one reaches the level of modalised predication  
– i.e. the level of abstraction at which the modal syllogisms of the Prior Analytics lie. 
Predications of genera, propria and definitions instantiate, on the one hand, the relation of a 
predicate necessarily belonging to the subject to which it applies, due to possessing property 
(a) or possessing property (b); Predications of accidents, on the other hand, instantiate the 
relation of a predicate two-way possibly (and hence also one-way possibly) belonging to the 
subject to which it applies, due to possessing neither property (a) nor property (b).
The next higher level – the highest – is thus, unsurprisingly, that which corresponds to 
the plain syllogisms of the Prior Analytics; i.e. the level at which the relation of predication is 
considered “as such”, or at least as such that all of the less abstract classifications of 
predication described so far instantiate it – and exhaustively so at each respective level of 
abstraction.
Now, the most interesting and peculiar aspect of Aristotle’s treatment of these two last 
and most abstract levels of consideration of the relation of predication is the fact that it is at 
them that he starts investigating the formal structure of syllogism ( συλλογισμός, sometimes 
alternatively translated simply as “deduction”). The term is not strictly technical throughout the
Organon, and it seems to aim at applying to a wide range of valid arguments involving only 
pieces of λόγος ποφαντικοὸ ςἀ . Aristotle’s definition of syllogism is given at the very beginning 
of the Prior Analytics (A1, 24b18-22) as follows:
“συλλογισμοὲς δέ στι λόγος ν ι τὲθέντων τιν ν τὲρόν τι τ ν κὲιμένων ξ νάγκὴς ἐ ἐ ὧ ῶ ἕ ῶ ἐ ἀ
συμβαίνὲι τ ι τα τα ὲ ναι. λέγω δὲὲ τ ι τα τα ὲ ναι τοὲ  διαὲ  τα τα συμβαίνὲιν, τοὲ  δὲὲ διαὲ  τα τα ῶ ῦ ἶ ῶ ῦ ἶ ῦ ῦ
συμβαίνὲιν τοὲ  μὴδὲνοὲ ς ξωθὲν ρου προσδὲ ν προὲς τοὲ  γὲνέσθαι τοὲ  ναγκα ον.” ἔ ὅ ῖ ἀ ῖ 5
Despite the fact that such a wide definition is given, Aristotle occupies himself later in 
the Analytics with a very specifically structured group of syllogisms, namely: those having only
two premisses and one conclusion, each of which is a (possibly modalised) categorical 
sentence – in the traditional sense, inspired by the developments of De Interpretatione –, with
a total of three terms, one of which (the middle) occurs in each premiss but not in the 
5 “A syllogism is an argument in which, certain things being posited, something other than what was laid down 
results by necessity because these things are so. By 'because these things are so' I mean that it results 
through these, and by 'resulting through these' I mean that no term is required from outside for the necessity 
to come about.” (G. Striker’s translation.)  
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conclusion. This restriction is nevertheless justified by the fact that Aristotle later argues that 
every syllogism can somehow be given in viz. reduced to this very specific form.
It is therefore in accordance with his definition of syllogism that Aristotle then starts 
systematically investigating which combinations of two such premisses do and which do not 
yield syllogisms. In chapters 4 to 6 of book A, for example, the philosopher considers the 
combinations of plain categorical premisses that yield syllogisms, each of these chapters 
being dedicated to one of the three figures – the first, in which the middle term is subject in 
one and predicate in the other premiss; the second, in which the middle term is predicate of 
both; and the third, in which the middle term is subject of both; thus exhausting all possible 
combinations of such premisses. Later, the same procedure is carried out with respect to 
combinations of premisses of which at least one is modalised.
While the interstices of Aristotle’s formal investigation of syllogisms are not to be object 
of our considerations at this moment, it is important not to lose sight of the role of this 
enterprise in his  guiding plan of establishing the features of a λόγος which condition its being 
knowledge-producing. Firmly sustained by the developments at the lower layers of abstraction
of his theory of predication – which is in turn itself firmly sustained by his ontology of highest 
kinds and his ideas on how written and spoken signs of language signify –, Aristotle’s 
investigation of syllogism allows him to concretise his depiction of  πόδειξιν ἀ and πιστήμης ἐ
ποδεικτικ ς ἀ ῆ as his answer to the guiding question in the Posterior Analytics (A2, 71b16-25):
 “Ε  μὲὲν ο ν και ὲ τὲρος στι το  πίστασθαι τρόπος, στὲρον ρο μὲν, φαμὲὲν δὲὲ και ὲ δι  ἰ ὖ ἕ ἔ ῦ ἐ ὕ ἐ ῦ ᾽
ποδὲίξὲως ὲ δέναι. πόδὲιξιν δὲὲ λέγω συλλογισμοὲ ν πιστὴμονικόν· πιστὴμονικοὲν δὲὲ λέγω ἀ ἰ ἀ ἐ ἐ
καθ  ν τ ι χὲιν α τοὲν πιστάμὲθα. ὲ  τοίνυν στι ὲ τοὲ  πίστασθαι ο ον θὲμὲν, νάγκὴ και ὲ ᾽ ὃ ῶ ἔ ὐ ἐ ἰ ἐ ἐ ἷ ἔ ἀ
τὴὲ ν ποδὲικτικὴὲ ν πιστήμὴν ξ λὴθ ν τ ὲ ναι και ὲ πρώτων καιὲ μέσων και ὲ γνωριμωτέρων ἀ ἐ ἐ ἀ ῶ ᾽ ἶ ἀ
καιὲ προτέρων και ὲ α τίων το  συμπὲράσματος· ο τω γαὲ ρ σονται και ὲ α  ρχαιὲ ο κὲ αι το  ἰ ῦ ὕ ἔ ἱ ἀ ἰ ῖ ῦ
δὲικνυμένου. συλλογισμοὲς μὲὲν γαὲ ρ σται και ὲ νὲυ τούτων, πόδὲιξις δ ο κ σται· ο  γαὲ ρ ἔ ἄ ἀ ᾽ ὐ ἔ ὐ
ποιήσὲι πιστήμὴν.”ἐ 6
There is indeed at least one kind of “scientific” knowledge to which Aristotle refers in 
the Posterior Analytics that is not demonstrative: knowledge of the first principles. These 
6 “Our contention now is that we do at any rate obtain knowledge by demonstration. By demonstration I mean 
a syllogism which produces scientific knowledge, in other words one which enables us to know by the mere 
fact that we grasp it. Now if knowledge is such as we have assumed, demonstrative knowledge must 
proceed from premisses which are true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to, and causative of the
conclusion. On these conditions only will the first principles be properly applicable to the fact which is to be 
proved. Syllogism indeed will be possible without these conditions, but not demonstration; for the result will 
not be knowledge.” (G. Striker’s translation.)
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would be, in an analogy, grasped by the soul in a similar way as colours are seen by the eye: 
just as one is already fully equipped and capable from the outset and needs to learn nothing 
to see a given colour – say, red – , and yet one cannot get acquainted with the colour without 
having an adequate experience – e.g. having something red before the eyes; so is one’s soul 
fully capable of immediately grasping viz. learning first principles with the concurrence of 
proper experiences. Just what these proper experiences would be in the case of first 
principles is nevertheless not clear.
Given these observations, then, one can see that Aristotle’s notion of syllogism of the 
Analytics amounts to the determination of the conspicuous formal aspects – where both 
“conspicuous” and “formal” have a much stronger, stricter sense than what could be claimed 
to occur in the Theaetetus – of πόδειξιςἀ , that is, something that can be seen as a fit 
candidate to the role of λόγος in the formula μεταὸ  λόγου ληθ  δόξαν – ἀ ῆ viz. a knowledge-
producing λόγος. It seems clear that the idea is rejected that this formula, at least if so 
understood as discussed here so far viz. as built from a well defined and unequivocal notion 
λόγος, defines knowledge in general; still, obviously enough, it seems adequate to the cases 
of knowledge that can be called πιστήμης ποδεικτικ ς.ἐ ἀ ῆ
The notion of a knowledge-producing λόγος, then, has been given by Aristotle a special
region of interest. While it could be argued whether or not Aristotle’s non-demonstrative 
knowledge demands the concurrence of some sort of λόγος in order to come about, not only 
is it settled that πιστήμης ποδεικτικ ςἐ ἀ ῆ  demands a specific kind of λόγος – namely, 
demonstration –, but also that the very notion of demonstration does have certain clear and 
rigorously determined, conspicuous formal boundaries incorporated to its “application criteria”:
they need to be in some sense reducible to the form of syllogism.
This special region of interest determines precisely the extent to which questions 
concerning the “burden of proof” are made essentially subject to objective, public scrutiny by 
Aristotle. Notice that πόδειξις ἀ is not itself completely within the limits of this region; 
“scientific” proof – or, more generally, what we have been calling knowledge-producing λόγος 
–, thus, and consequently also knowledge in general, escape the strict limits of objective, 
public surveyability. It seems rather adequate, then, that even while believing that aristocracy 
is the ideal instance of political justice as a regime, Aristotle bets in democracy as the best 
political regime one can realistically hope for; the core idea of Plato’s Republic of enabling 
justice by grounding it upon knowledge is thus indeed and ultimately relegated to an 
unenforceable ideal. Looking at the same matter from another angle, though, one could say, 
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equally in consonance with the Stagirite’s logical developments, that the essence of Plato’s 
ideal endured and remained through his thought as the conceptual embodiment of justice, 
and that democracy, inasmuch as it can be said to be part of the legacy of Aristotle’s and, 
more generally, of classical Greek philosophy to ourselves, is nothing but the less imperfect 
applicable solution to the matter of the form of exertion of political power given certain 
unavoidable limits imposed by the nature of language, reality and the relation between them.
 In opposition to πόδειξις ἀ and knowledge, though, συλλογισμός is made intrinsically, 
unavoidably and very strictly self-contained and conspicuous. The doors were thus opened by
Aristotle to a domain the rules of which are (at the very least in principle) all accessible and 
clear, but at the cost of it being insufficient to yield or be anyhow more closely related to 
knowledge – and thus, as dictated by the platonic legacy, also incapable of being alone the 
soil from which any sort of justified ethical or political solution might germinate. Nevertheless, 
this is far from claiming that this domain is ethically or politically innocuous; indeed, inasmuch 
as πόδειξις ἀ is an instance of συλλογισμός, knowledge – and hence justice, still following 
Plato – are at least partially conditioned by the rules discovered by Aristotle in his exploration 
of the realm of syllogism.
It is also important to notice that the explicit goal of laying the foundations of πιστήμηςἐ
ποδεικτικ ςἀ ῆ  which led Aristotle into this realm in the first place imposed significant 
restrictions upon his journey therein. Let us not forget that the whole conception of λόγος 
ποφαντικοὸ ς ἀ which determines the limits of the formal investigations of the Prior Analytics is 
built up from linguistic expressions tailored to mirror ontological entities and structures as to 
be their names or true or false declarations about them – or, at the very least, selected by 
virtue of the fact that they do mirror them in such a way.  The definition of syllogism of the 
Prior Analytics is nevertheless very broad, and phrased in complete independence of such 
constraints; the core idea involved in the notion, it seems, is some relation of consequence 
holding of necessity between two distinct and different parts of a λόγος– as expressed in the 
phrase “a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from 
the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so”. Were the goals any 
different, what instances of syllogism could then have come about? To which extent does it 
make sense to talk of syllogism in the absence of some or all of such constraints?
The idea of logical consequence thus rises within Aristotle’s philosophy as an eminently
relevant contribution to the founding discussion of which a general picture is sketched here; 
for it is the core notion of an ontologically/cosmologically based account of how some key 
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formal aspects of language which condition knowledge constrain the settlement of eventual 
disputes concerning or involving “demonstratively” knowable matters – i.e., in the terms 
employed previously, it is a depiction of some conspicuous restrictions upon that which may 
free some claims to knowledge from the burden of proof. But possibly its most fruitful feature 
is rather the fact that it opened a universe of possibilities less tightly connected to the original,
cosmo-ontologically motivated discussion of φύσις and more closely related to the posterior, 
essentially ethical and political debate inaugurated by Plato, namely: how to establish beyond 
disputability that a given rule is valid? Plato’s genius was to try and make of “reality”, instead 
of a mere local criterion for the settlement of disputes concerning its own nature, a general 
criterion capable of adequately orienting the proper settlement of every dispute. But what if 
λόγος itself displays features that, independently of reality and what the eventual relation 
between them looks like, impose conditions on the proper settlement of at least some 
disputes? Some crucially important “reactive” streams of thought within philosophical tradition7
– from traditional medieval nominalism, through Kantian critical philosophy, to Wittgensteinian 
therapeutic of language –  may be seen as arising precisely from the entertainment of some 
guise of such a possibility; which is certainly invited by the consideration of Aristotle’s Prior 
Analytics, especially when carried out in isolation from the rest of his general metaphysical 
project.
 This conceptual field – that of  συλλογισμός, as determined in terms of the notion of 
logical consequence – is where the main subject of this dissertation is located. We shall here 
discuss the identity of what the literary developments under the labels general proof theory 
and proof-theoretic semantics usually call proofs – which is really nothing but the same old 
general notion usually understood as what Aristotle named syllogism, adequately restricted 
and contextualised. The question concerning the identity of proofs is an essential departure, 
on the one hand, from a discussion which relegates syllogisms/proofs to the role of mere 
constitutive elements of what may help one get rid of what is, in essence, the same old moral 
burden by means of which Anaximander inaugurated philosophy – i.e. the role of mere 
constitutive elements of what may satisfy demands for justification; and, on the other hand, 
towards the consideration of syllogisms/proofs as having themselves meaning and value, 
rather than as mere stamps of approval the only interest of which is to enable certain uses of 
their conclusions, the nature and meaning of which is fundamentally independent of them. 
Just what the purpose or relevance of this move is will of course depend on how the meaning 
7 One could even reasonably entertain the thought of including Parmenides in such a list.
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and value of proofs is to be characterised. Most of the considerations to be made here are 
thus designed to lead to the questioning of precisely what do different ways of identifying 
proofs – both considered as a universal kind and as those things which fall under this kind – 
imply with respect to how one conceives of the meaning and value of proofs; and thus, to the 
questioning of what do different conceptions of the meaning and value of proofs imply with 
respect to more general philosophical questions, not only of a logical or epistemic, but also – 
and most importantly –  of a fundamentally ethical and political character. The eventual failure 
to appreciate this last point in particular will unavoidably lead to failure to understand the point
of this work as a whole.
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I. Kant’s Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren
About what more precisely are we talking when we ask ourselves about something 
such as the identity of a proof?  Providing an indication as to how it is possible to answer this 
question, even if at no more than a rudimentary level, in such a way as to make of it the 
expression of a real and meaningful philosophical issue – and not of some formal or 
conceptual entanglement pertaining to some specific piece of literature – is the motivating 
ideal of this section. There is, after all, little to no point in starting to read a philosophical 
dissertation the nature of the subject-matter of which is to such an extent immerse in mist that
one cannot even see why it is at all of any interest – which is the case here. For the present 
purpose, it might be thus reasonable to start by trying, before anything else, to give an 
account of the following: why is it that one asks (that is, if there is any reason at all to do so) 
oneself about the identity of proofs?; for knowing the reason why we ask a question might 
avoid misunderstandings regarding its meaning, its subject-matter, and thus also regarding 
the adequacy of eventual answers.
It is usual in the literature on identity of proofs – if it makes any sense at all to call 
something usual in such scarce a literature – either simply not to address questions 
concerning the reasons why engaging into this sort of investigation, or to quite light-mindedly 
refer to an en passant remark made by Kreisel on the matter in the sixties, which points at 
how an interesting theory on identity of proofs could arise from the apparently objective terms 
of discussions among mathematicians interested in priority questions regarding whether or 
not two proofs are the same. The first attitude is an explicit declination to answering the 
question; and while the second seems not to avoid it at first glance, it is a mere tergiversation:
for it proposes no indication as to why such an investigation could be of profit in any sense. It 
is also usual to claim that a proper grasp of identity of proofs is of the utmost importance to a 
better comprehension of the notion of proof itself – and while I cannot bring myself to disagree
with such a claim, it does not usually come accompanied by any proper arguments to sustain 
it, which makes it seem to be put in a quite question-begging fashion.
Instead of trying to provide here arguments to explain why identity of proofs may be 
relevant to one’s comprehension of the notion of proof – which would be an interesting and 
feasible enterprise –, let us instead begin by taking the shortcut of history, and ostensively 
pointing at how the matter was actually handled, in the hope of being able to read off of this 
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indications or sensible reasons to approach such a question.  The concrete task of this 
section is thus to advocate that identity of proofs was an issue addressed by mainstream 
philosophical literature a couple of centuries before general proof theory, proof-theoretic 
semantics and the akin literary streams that hegemonise the current discussion of the matter 
even came into being. This shall be done by means of a brief interpretive analysis of Kant’s 
1762 essay Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren.
One way of formulating the main thesis argued by the philosopher in this opuscule is 
this: only valid syllogisms of the first figure are to be taken as “Formeln der deutlichsten 
Vorstellung eines Vernunftschlusses”. Before anything else, it is of the utmost importance to 
make absolutely clear that, whilst holding such a thesis, Kant does not – contrarily to what 
Patzig quite absurdly claims in his otherwise quite instructive and detailed study of Book A of 
Aristotle’s Prior Analytics – by any means question the validity of syllogisms in the other three 
figures. Not, at least, insofar as validity is understood as the obtention of a relation of (logical) 
consequence between premisses at one side and conclusion at the other, and such a relation 
is in turn understood as the entailment of the truth of the conclusion by the truth of the 
premises by force of their mere (logical) form – a conception which has been the standard on 
the matter for a considerable time now, and which is quite naturally assumed by Patzig along 
his text.
Indeed, Kant shows in the course of this very text that the validity of syllogisms in the 
three last figures follows (in a quite strong sense, as I hope will be clear in the sequel) from 
the validity of the syllogisms in the first figure and that of so-called immediate inferences, and 
explicitly acknowledges such validity when he says that e.g. “Man kann nicht in Abrede sein, 
daß in allen diesen vier Figuren richtig geschlossen werden könne.”, and   “Es sind also die 
übrige drei Schlußarten als Regeln der Vernunftschlüsse überhaupt richtig” (see §5 of said 
text). Neither should he be taken to be doing nothing but bursting through open doors, i.e., 
stating what one could call a sloppy and hardly original version of a logico-conceptual 
justification for a thesis akin to the Aristotelian distinction between complete (perfect) and 
incomplete (imperfect) syllogisms – a point which, I hope, will become clear along this 
section.
Nevertheless, as Patzig states, Kant clearly denies that syllogisms of the three last 
figures are, as they stand, clearly provided with what he calls “probative force” (Schlußkraft) 
(see ibid.,§4). Of what is he stating that syllogisms belonging to these figures are deprived by 
means of such a phrase, then, if not validity? Quite luckily, as soon as one tries to answer this
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question in the obvious way, a great deal is gained. The suggestion I make is thus to take the 
hypothesis that, even though Kant recognised the validity of syllogisms of second, third and 
fourth figures, he did not understand them to be proofs – that is, he did not believe them to 
explicitly display a reason why  their respective conclusions follow inferentially or deductively 
from their respective premises. This can be eloquently illustrated by means of a radical 
example. Take, for instance, an argument which has the axioms of Peano’s Arithmetic as 
premises and Fermat’s last theorem as a conclusion: it is very easy to understand that, even 
though it is valid, it is in no sense whatsoever provided with any probative force – i.e. although
it is a valid, truth-preserving inference , it is definitely not a proof. What Kant is claiming about 
valid syllogisms not belonging to the first figure is that they are analogous to the argument in 
this example – i.e., they share with it the property of being simultaneously valid and 
insufficient as proofs. What we should now try to clarify is what Kant understands to be the 
conditions to be satisfied by an inference so that it enjoys the property of being provided with 
probative force – for these are the touchstone of the eventual distinction between a valid 
argument and a proof made by the philosopher, on which this interpretive hypothesis of ours 
depends.
Roughly speaking, Kant acknowledges two kinds of logically valid inferences: some are
inferences of understanding, others are inferences of reason. The first kind corresponds to the
inferences that in traditional Aristotelian logic are called “immediate”, and that consist of only 
one premise and one conclusion which follows logically from it. The second kind, also called 
“mediate” inferences, corresponds roughly to what traditional logic addressed with the theory 
of syllogism, i.e. two premisses which share a middle term, and one conclusion that logically 
follows from them which has as its subject a concept that is called “minor term”, that also 
figures in the minor premiss, and as its predicate a concept that is called “major term”, that 
also figures in the major premiss.  
Now, the observation of some facts shall help us understand more precisely in what 
sense Kant understands the conclusions of these kinds of logically valid inference to follow 
from their respective premisses. Thus, regarding the immediate inferences or inferences of 
understanding, (a) Kant claims that the truth of some judgements is “immediately recognised” 
(unmittelbar erkannt) from some other judgement, “without a middle term”. These judgements 
can be derived from those from which they follow by means of some operation that, in Kant’s 
explanation, does not tamper with the “content” of the premiss – i.e. the concepts involved in 
the judgement that serves as premiss – but “merely with its form” (see Jäsche Logik, §44); 
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such operations are, in accordance with the form of the premise, simple conversion, 
conversion by accident, etc. Regarding the inferences of reason, in turn, (b) Kant explicitly 
states his adhesion to the thesis that so called dictum de omni and dictum de nullo are the 
only basic principles that justify all of them. I quote the opening of §2, where this is stated 
most clearly:
“die erste und allgemeine Regel aller bejahenden Vernunftschlüsse sei: Ein Merkmal 
vom Merkmal ist ein Merkmal der Sache selbst (nota notae est etiam nota rei ipsius); von 
allen verneinenden: Was dem Merkmal eines Dinges widerspricht, widerspricht dem Dinge 
selbst (repugnans notae repugnat rei ipsi). Keine dieser Regeln ist ferner eines Beweises 
fähig. Denn ein Beweis ist nur durch einen oder mehr Vernunftschlüsse möglich, die oberste 
Formel aller Vernunftschlüsse demnach beweisen wollen würde heißen im Zirkel schließen. 
Allein daß diese Regeln den allgemeinen und letzten Grund aller vernünftigen Schlußart 
enthalten, erhellet daraus, weil diejenige, die sonst bis daher von allen Logikern vor die erste 
Regel aller Vernunftschlüsse gehalten worden, den einzigen Grund ihrer Wahrheit aus den 
unsrigen entlehnen müssen.”
Kant then proceeds to show that (b.1) all valid syllogistic moods of the first figure are 
directly, immediately justified exclusively by one of these two principles. Take, for instance, 
Barbara: all As are Bs, All Bs are Cs; Therefore, all As are Cs. It states that C, a note of all Bs,
which is in turn a note of all As, is itself a note of all As. It is thus par excellence an example of
a single application of dictum de omni to a pair of premises that suffices to infer a conclusion. 
Put another way, one can see dictum de omni and dictum de nullo as more abstract inference 
rules, so to speak, which roughly look like the following, respectively:  (d.d.o.) Q As are Bs. All
Bs are Cs. Therefore R As are Cs; (d.d.n.) Q As are Bs. No Bs are Cs. Therefore R As are not
Cs (Where “Q” and “R” are to be understood as variables for “All” or “Some”; Q ≥ R; and 
finally, All > Some). The first of these rules allows, given a pair of schematic premises of the 
form All/Some As are Bs, All Bs are Cs – i.e., respectively, the premises of Barbara or Barbari 
and Darii – to draw the schematic conclusion that All - Some/Some Bs are Cs – i.e., 
respectively, the conclusions of Barbara, Barbari and Darii. Barbara, Barbari and Darii are 
thus the schematic rules one “derives”8 by applying the more abstract schematic rule dictum 
de omni, which is primitively taken as valid. Analogously, one “derives” the rules Celarent, 
8 The quotation marks mean only to stress that the operation meant has rules as outputs, not sentences. Such
a distinction is in many respects dispensable –  see e.g. Schroeder-Heister, P., 1984, A Natural Extension of 
Natural Deduction, The Journal Of Symbolic Logic, Volume 49, Number 4, Dec. –, but I decided to introduce 
it nonetheless to avoid the reader to take me as having somehow failed to regard it.
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Celaront and Ferio by applying dictum de nullo to pairs of schematic premises of an adequate
form and consequently obtaining a schematic conclusion of an adequate form.9
 After this, he shows that (b.2) all valid syllogistic moods of the other three figures can 
be justified by means of these two principles, but only in a mediate, indirect way – i.e. the 
derivation of the conclusion from the premises demands the application of other rules than 
just dictum de omni or dictum de nullo.  Such additional rules the application of which is 
demanded by their derivation are those governing the inferences of understanding, i.e., the 
immediate inferences. The “derivation” of these syllogistic moods consists thus of 
appropriately connected applications of immediate inferences and d.d.o. or d.d.n., and shall 
thus inevitably contain more than just three judgements (i.e. two premisses and one 
conclusion). This means that they belong to a category which Kant calls ratiocinium hybridum 
or mixed inferences of reason, as opposed to ratiocinium purum or pure inferences of reason.
Kant’s definition of these notions is as follows:
“Wenn nun ein Vernunftschluß nur durch drei Sätze geschieht, nach den Regeln die 
von jedem Vernunftschlusse nur eben vorgetragen worden, so nenne ich ihn einen reinen 
Vernunftschluß (ratiocinium purum); ist er aber nur möglich, indem mehr wie drei Urteile mit 
einander verbunden sind, so ist er ein vermengter Vernunftschluß (ratiocinium hybridum).”
I believe it is thus legitimate to understand as mixed the inferences of reason the 
“derivation” of which by d.d.o. and d.d.n. has more than three judgements; and as pure, in 
turn, those the “derivation” of which from the mentioned principles has only three judgements. 
This last category, according to Kant, encompasses all and only the valid syllogistic moods of 
the first figure.
In other words:  the valid moods of the first figure are immediately “derived” by single 
applications of one of two basic principles of the inferences of reason, d.d.o. and d.d.n., to an 
adequate pair of schematic premises, and  the valid moods of the other figures cannot be 
“derived” in the same way, i.e., by mere single applications of these principles. In a sense, 
thus, the valid moods of the first figure are “consequences” at the level of schematic inference
rules of the mere validity of the abstract schematic principles d.d.o. and d.d.n., of which they 
are direct instances; that is to say, each of them expresses solely an aspect of these abstract 
principles as actual inference rules.  Since no valid mood of some other figure instantiates 
9 One might find odd that two variables are used in the formulation of d.d.o. and d.d.n., i.e., that the quantity 
expressions of the minor premise and of the conclusion might be different from each other. This demands the
proviso in brackets, that would be otherwise quite unnecessary. This rendering is notwithstanding required 
for the sake of the coherence of Kant’s text, according to which Barbari and Celaront, as valid moods of the 
first figure, must also be immediately derivable from, respectively, d.d.o. and d.d.n.   
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directly these abstract schematic principles, they cannot be said to be consequences of the 
validity of d.d.o and d.d.n. alone – and therefore, they also cannot be said to express them 
purely.
Here one is already able to notice some striking similarities, both in the subject matters 
treated and the way they are approached, between the Kantian discussion and that found in 
general proof-theoretic developments of the early 1970s. Kant is, in effect, first, identifying 
and separating in a quite formal way what he takes to be the most basic logical operations of 
deduction; and second, justifying the validity of all logical (chains of) inferences of relevant 
form by means of establishing their canonisability10 with respect to such operations. If we 
consider e.g. Prawitz’s 1971 text Ideas and Results of Proof Theory, these very tasks are 
explicitly formulated and their realisation is taken up as part of a kind of general philosophical,
foundational program; and despite the adoption of a philosophically engaged attitude along 
the text and there being a whole section dedicated to historical remarks in it, no reference 
whatsoever to any work written before 1925 is made. This is remarkable – negatively so –, 
especially because it seems that one could even argue convincingly that already at the time 
of Kant, this sort of enterprise was quite old – ancient, indeed – news.
Before we proceed, let us say a few words about the notion of canonisability viz. 
canonicity, involved in Kant’s explanation of the logical validity of syllogisms and also 
fundamental in paradigmatic approaches of proof-theoretic semantics to what is in essence 
the same issue. This will give the unfamiliar reader a rough yet useful idea of why this matter 
has relevance in the present discussion. Let us then suppose that a girl is looking for her 
book, and she thinks it might be in the drawer of her writing desk. The book, however, is not 
there, but rather lies upon her bed, hidden under her pillow. There are two ways in which she 
may properly come to the conclusion that her book is not in the drawer: she may either find 
this out directly, by opening the drawer and seeing that it is indeed not there; or she may find 
this out indirectly, by lifting her pillow and seeing that the book is under it, and thus inferring 
that it is not in the drawer. Canonical verifications are those of the first kind; they are 
distinguished by the fact that they happen by means of direct reference, so to speak, to that 
which is established as the conditions to be satisfied so that something – a sentence – may 
10 In the sense that an inference is canonisable if and only if it reduces to a canonical one; and an inference is 
canonical if and only if its “immediate” partial inferences are canonical and its conclusion is obtained by 
application of one of the immediate inferences or of the first figure inferences of reason – which are taken as 
primitively valid. We shall still explore further the issue of canonicity in this text – indeed, we shall see that 
one further, stricter notion of canonicity is mobilised in the text under scrutiny as well, which concerns only 
inferences of reason.
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be justifiedly inferred or simply asserted. Verifications of the second kind, in turn, are only, if at
all, indirectly or mediately related to such conditions, and do not – or at least in principle not 
necessarily – involve reference to them. Now, logically valid inferences or chains of them can 
be seen as a special case of verifications with respect to their conclusions; thus, in the same 
sense suggested above, they can be thought of as either canonical/direct or non-
canonical/indirect in accordance to how they entail their conclusion, i.e. whether they do so by
direct reference to the conditions which make it the case that the conclusion(s) follow(s) from 
the premiss(es) or otherwise. It is then clear that it makes sense to say that Kant’s approach 
attributes canonicity only to valid inferences of understanding and to valid first figure 
inferences of reason – for the former are “immediately recognised” as valid, and the latter are 
the only direct instances of the only principles by virtue of which inferences of reason are 
logically valid, i.e. by virtue of which a conclusion logically follows from a pair of premises in 
the form of an inference of reason , namely d.d.o. and d.d.n. Furthermore, since it only makes
sense to understand the validity of inferences of reason in general as obtaining, if at all, 
because of their reference to d.d.o. and d.d.n., the valid such inferences of the remaining 
figures must be shown to refer to them in an indirect fashion to be properly recognised as 
such, since it is immediately evident that they do not refer directly to these principles. Kant 
shows this much by exposing the fact that, despite not being canonical, they are canonisable 
– i.e. they can be systematically reformulated into a canonical (chain of) inference(s) of the 
same conclusion that starts from the same initial premisses –, and therefore indirectly refer to 
d.d.o. or d.d.n. An inference can be called canonical in this sense if and only if its “immediate” 
partial inferences are canonical and its conclusion is obtained by (i.e. its last step is an) 
application of one of the immediate inferences or of the first figure inferences of reason – the 
“base cases” of canonical inferences for the reasons just explained11. Now, while it is well-
known that, some two thousand years before, Aristotle had already shown how syllogisms in 
general can be reduced to first figure syllogisms, it is highly controversial whether or not these
reductions are in any sense conceived in the work of the Stagirite as semantical foundations 
of the validity of the reduced syllogisms, rather than mere didactical devices. In the Kantian 
text under scrutiny, on the other hand, the first option is unequivocally the case – which shows
Kant’s anticipation of the strategy of proof-theoretic semanticists such as Prawitz and 
11 We shall still explore further the issue of canonicity in this text – indeed, we shall see that one further, stricter 
notion of canonicity is mobilised in the text under scrutiny as well, which concerns only inferences of reason.
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Dummett to explain the logical validity of inferences in general in terms of an epistemically 
loaded yet logically definable notion of canonicity.  
The next capital fact to be noticed regarding Kant’s text now is (c) the philosopher 
entertains the hypothesis that one might think of valid moods of the second, third and fourth 
figures as expressing aspects of some basic principle of inferences of reason other than the 
ones expressed by those of the first figure. Not only that, but, furthermore, (d) he believes that
the only reason why his predecessors have attributed to the valid moods of the second, third 
and fourth figures a certain logical “citizenship” is the fact that they did indeed believe them to 
somehow correspond to such further aspects of basic principles. These two observations are 
very clearly grounded in the following passage, which, due to its importance, I quote in 
extenso:
“Hier könnte man nun denken, daß darum die drei andere Figuren höchstens unnütze, 
nicht aber falsch wären. Allein wenn man die Absicht erwägt, in der sie erfunden worden, und 
noch immer vorgetragen werden, so wird man anders urteilen. Wenn es darauf ankäme, eine 
Menge von Schlüssen, die unter die Haupturteile gemengt wären, mit diesen so zu 
verwickeln, daß, indem einige ausgedruckt, andere verschwiegen würden, es viele Kunst 
kostete, ihre Übereinstimmung mit den Regeln zu schließen zu beurteilen, so würde man 
wohl eben nicht mehr Figuren,[608] aber doch mehr rätselhafte Schlüsse, die Kopfbrechens 
genug machen könnten, noch dazu ersinnen können. Es ist aber der Zweck der Logik, nicht 
zu verwickeln, sondern aufzulösen, nicht verdeckt, sondern augenscheinlich etwas 
vorzutragen. Daher sollen diese vier Schlußarten einfach, unvermengt, und ohne verdeckte 
Nebenschlüsse sein, sonst ist ihnen die Freiheit nicht zugestanden, in einem logischen 
Vortrage als Formeln der deutlichsten Vorstellung eines Vernunftschlusses zu erscheinen. Es 
ist auch gewiß, daß bis daher alle Logiker sie vor einfache Vernunftschlüsse ohne notwendige
Dazwischensetzung von andern Urteilen angesehen haben, sonst würde ihnen niemals 
dieses Bürgerrecht sein erteilt worden. Es sind also die übrige drei Schlußarten als Regeln 
der Vernunftschlüsse überhaupt richtig, als solche aber, die einen einfachen und reinen 
Schluß enthielten, falsch.”
Now, bearing in mind that (e) one can easily see that the valid moods of the first figure 
cover all the instances of d.d.o. and d.d.n.; and remembering fact (a), i.e., that Kant 
understands d.d.o and d.d.n to be the only basic principles of inferences of reason; it is then 
quite easy to understand that (f) the valid moods of the last three figures are not directly 
derivable from or instances or pure expressions of any aspect of any basic principle of 
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inference of reason whatsoever; and (g) they are also no expressions, either mediate or 
immediate, of any basic principle of inference distinct from d.d.o. and d.d.n. – which can 
indeed be inferred from (a) alone. Their validity, thus, cannot be explained if not as a 
consequence of the validity of other schematic inference rules, namely, the immediate ones 
and those which stem immediately from d.d.o. and d.d.n.; or, put another way, their derivation 
consists of an adequate composition of the application of basic principles expressed by the 
valid inferences of understanding and the valid syllogistic moods of the first figure.
We are now, I believe, provided with means to approach satisfactorily the question 
regarding Kant’s notion of “probative force” (Schlußkraft) of an argument. One can notice that 
there is a relation of consequence holding between premises and conclusion in an inference 
that Kant seems in effect to address primarily in this effort of his, and that is different from the 
standard, truth-conditionally defined one. That the conclusion follows from the premises in this
sense, most especially in the case of inferences of reason, means not as much that the truth 
of the premises entails the truth of the conclusion as, instead, that the conclusion can be 
derived from the premises by exclusive means of given licit operations. Such licit operations 
are precisely those exclusively by means of which we infer from some judgement or some 
pair of judgements a further judgement which the competent rules that govern our cognitive 
apparatus (i.e. dictum de omni, dictum de nullo, and the rules governing the inferences of 
understanding) enable us to recognise without further as entailed by the former.
The first important point made by Kant which we should remark here is thus a sort of 
completeness result concerning this deductive notion of logical consequence and the 
traditional truth-conditional notion of logical consequence, namely: an inference of reason (or, 
alternatively, a syllogistic mood) is truth-conditionally valid  if and only if it is also deductively 
valid. So, inasmuch as truth-conditional validity implies deductive validity; and the latter is in 
turn defined, as noted above, in terms of the possibility of deriving a conclusion from given 
premisses in an epistemically binding and absolutely transparent way; then, what is 
guaranteed by the validity of an argument – understood not only deductively, but also truth-
conditionally, since the latter follows from the former – is merely the possibility of deriving its 
conclusion from its premisses in such an epistemically binding and transparent way.  
This takes us naturally to a further distinction that must be observed. That something 
can be derived by exclusive means of given epistemically binding operations does not mean 
that something was in fact derived in such a way. Put another way: the fact that an inference 
is deductively valid does not mean that it displays in itself a sufficient reason why it is 
44
deductively valid. And here lies the condition for an inference to have Schlußkraft: it must be 
carried out in such a way that it is identical to a complete, self-contained justification of its own
validity. Given the way Kant develops these notions in his text, this means that only inferences
consisting of adequately connected applications of first figure inferences of reason and 
inferences of understanding are primitively provided with Schlußkraft. All others, even if 
deductively valid, are all by themselves deprived of Schlußkraft – or, in a slightly different 
formulation, more in accordance with Kant’s own explanations, their Schlußkraft is indeed the 
Schlußkraft of the respective complete, self-contained justifications of their validity (see ibid. 
§3, II 52, and §4, II 53,54).  
As noted in the beginning of this section, the valid syllogisms of the three last figures 
can, Kant acknowledges, be used for inferring correctly – although they need not in any case 
be used for such a purpose. It is then in a sense completely legitimate to use arguments of 
these forms – a point that Kant explicitly confirms in the following passage, already 
transcribed above:
“Man kann nicht in Abrede sein, daß in allen diesen vier Figuren richtig geschlossen 
werden könne. Nun ist aber unstreitig, daß sie alle, die erste ausgenommen, nur durch einen 
Umschweif und eingemengte Zwischenschlüsse die Folge bestimmen, und daß eben 
derselbe Schlußsatz aus dem nämlichen Mittelbegriffe in der ersten Figur rein und 
unvermengt abfolgen würde. Hier könnte man nun denken, daß darum die drei andere 
Figuren höchstens unnütze, nicht aber falsch wären.”
 Nevertheless, insofar as such an argument stands for some epistemically binding and 
transparent inferential process – i.e. a proof, in the sense which is in accordance with Kant’s 
use of the expression Schlußkraft – we must then conclude that it cannot be said to stand for 
anything different from the composition of accordingly epistemically binding and transparent 
inferential steps – namely inferences of understanding and first figure inferences of reason – 
that justifies its validity. And the latter are obviously what arguments in the form of first figure 
syllogisms and immediate inferences stand for. Hence, one must admit that, as proofs, valid 
syllogisms of the three last figures neither are simple, nor can be distinguished from mere 
compositions of some known simple proofs, namely, immediate inferences and syllogisms of 
the first figure.
It is thus by means of a strikingly idiosyncratic assessment of the role of the valid 
syllogistic moods within Logic – that is, that they should first and foremost be the basic and 
simple formulas for all formal proofs, not valid arguments –, which somehow reflects his own 
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idiosyncratic general understanding of the nature of logic and its role for knowledge, as well 
as his consequent misunderstanding or misjudgement of many of his predecessors works and
views on these matters, that Kant is actually giving explicit literary expression – the first to 
appear that I know of – to an answer to a particular question concerning the identity of proofs.
Indeed, he is showing that valid syllogisms not belonging to the first figure do not carry with 
themselves any basic, primitive sort of what Prawitz would 209 years later call “proof idea” 
that was not already expressed in those of the first figure and in the immediate inferences 
themselves – thence the “falsche Spitzfindigkeit”.
 Since only the validity of moods belonging to the first figure immediately follows, as 
Kant claims, from dictum de omni and dictum de nullo – the validity of all other moods being 
derivable from these two principles only by means of their reduction to moods of the first 
figure –, they are alone to be counted as the primitive, simple valid schemes of the inferences
of reason. For there is nothing new with respect to basic principles of inferences of reason 
which is expressed by valid moods of the other three figures; neither some new aspect of 
dictum de omni or dictum de nullo, nor some aspect of an eventual further basic principle of 
inferences of reason – for, according to Kant, there simply is no such principle.  
In short, then, Kant is:
(i)not only explicitly justifying the validity, but also establishing the canonicity of the 
valid moods of the first figure based in his acceptance of dictum de omni and dictum 
de nullo;
(ii)employing canonisability of logical arguments in general as means to justify their 
validity;
These two tasks – at least the second, at any rate – could be claimed to have already 
been somehow performed by Aristotle in the Prior Analytics. Besides, they do not concern 
identity of proofs. But further than that, Kant is also:
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(iii)demonstrating that valid moods of the last three figures, though canonisable12, are 
not canonical at all, by showing that they do not follow immediately from dictum de 
omni or dictum de nullo, and by rejecting other eventual basic principles of inferences 
of reason;
(iv)and thus showing that valid moods of the other three figures, since only valid 
because ultimately reducible to inferences in the first figure and immediate inferences, 
do not allow the expression of any canonical argument whatsoever that is different 
from those already expressible by means of valid first figure moods.  
I hope to have succeeded in illuminating hereby, then, that identity of proofs, as the 
contemporary tradition of general proof theory usually mobilises the notion, is a matter 
addressed by mainstream, traditional philosophical literature since at least 1762; and for 
reasons that, in being far more philosophically relevant than quarrels among mathematicians 
worried about questions of priority, do indeed give some indication of the fact that this 
discussion is intimately connected to how one is to comprehend the notion of proof.
12 In fact, Kant also shows that the fourth syllogistic figure encompasses a valid mood which is not canonisable 
according to a stricter notion of canonicity, defined only for inferences of reason (see §4, II 55,56). Taking into
account what has already been said on the matter of canonicity in this section, one could formulate it as 
follows: an inference of reason is strictly canonisable if and only if it reduces to a strictly canonical one; and 
an inference of reason is strictly canonical if and only if all its immediate partial inferences are canonical and 
its final conclusion is obtained by an application of ddo or ddn. Thus, although all strictly canonical (viz. 
strictly canonisable) inferences of reason are canonical (viz. canonisable), the converse is not true: the 
mentioned valid mood of the fourth figure is enough to show this much.
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II. Preliminary non-historical considerations
 Although Kant’s reflections on logic might have actually led him into conceptual 
meanders where talk of identity of proofs was due, it is not really evident from his approach 
that a proper answer to the question “what is a proof?” would be jeopardised by an eventual 
disregard of this matter. We have seen that Kant’s interest in identity of proofs had to do with 
understanding how the semantic and epistemic import of valid syllogistic moods of distinct 
figures compares to one another. His conclusion is epitomised by the title of his short 
investigation: the distinction between four syllogistic figures is understood by him as a “false 
subtlety”, in the sense that the valid moods belonging to the three last figures do not bring 
about probative import of a different semantic or epistemic nature from those belonging to the 
first. In a sentence: valid “inferences of reason” in the last three figures are, as proofs, 
identical with compositions of apropriate “inferences of understanding” and inferences of 
reason in the first figure. But how could such a development be in any way regarded as 
contributing to Kant’s better understanding of what a proof is? Indeed, it seems that we 
witness the exact reverse happening in this effort of Kant: it looks as if Kant’s rather clear 
previous ideas regarding of what proofs are – crucially based in the conviction that dictum de 
omni and dictum de nullo are the only principles which justify the validity of inferences of 
reason – were indeed what provided him with the material to understand why they behave the
way they do with respect to their identity.  So, as much as this short historical consideration 
might have exemplified and illustrated the fact that the philosophical investigation of identity of
proofs may be relevantly influenced by one’s eventual way of previously conceiving the notion
of proof, then, it certainly did not give an account of why it would be an indispensable or at 
least a particularly important enterprise to the proper investigation and understanding of what 
a proof is; neither in Kant, nor in other cases, let alone in general. The question then returns, 
now begging for a different approach: why is it that one asks (that is, if there is any reason at 
all to do so) oneself about the identity of proofs? As probably clear by now, however, this 
question itself admits various interpretations, to which correspond accordingly different 
answers – which are in turn justified by reference to different phenomena.
Firstly, it should be observed that one can frequently prove or argue validly for the 
same things in a variety of significantly different ways.  It is thus convenient to put the matter 
in the following rough yet expressive enough terms: it seems clear that the identity of a proof 
is not entirely determined by what it establishes – e.g. some consequence relation between 
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propositions or sets of them  –, but also by how it does this much. This, however, by no 
means implies that every two different ways of proving something are significantly different 
from one another – which means that it remains rather unclear which differences between two
given proofs of a certain thing are significant with respect to their identity and which are not.
Secondly, one should also notice that there is no reason to rule out without further the 
possibility of proofs of different things being in such a way analogous that their differences are
not to be regarded as significant. Therefore, it also remains unclear whether two proofs must 
be deemed significantly different by force of the mere fact that they prove different things. 
Bearing these two observations in mind, the question as to why one asks about the 
identity of proofs can be answered in at least two versions. A brief research on the specialised
literature (see e.g. Widebäck 2001, p.9) shows that one does ask oneself about identity of 
proofs because of what the first observation points at, namely, that what a proof proves – 
which is something mostly taken for unequivocal, transparent and undisputed – is not 
evidently enough to determine its identity. Even if tacitly, though, it is more often than not 
assumed that two proofs are significantly different whenever they are proofs of different 
things, and more precisely because of the mere fact that they are proofs of different things. 
The second observation points out that this move lacks justification, and therefore gives us a 
further reason why one could ask oneself about the identity of proofs – even though it is not a 
reason that has taken many to actually do it –, namely, because it might well be the case that 
what a proof proves is not even a necessary trait to the determination of its identity.  In other 
words: what one usually takes for granted and plainly transparent about given proofs , namely
what they are proofs of, is neither sufficient nor (necessarily) necessary to assess whether the
proofs considered are significantly different or not; and these are reasons why one 
respectively does and could ask oneself about the identity of proofs.
Still, these answers are of little use in the task of understanding what importance 
identity of proofs has in the investigation of the notion of proof, since they only help us 
understand that the identity of a proof, whatever this means, is not something easily, clearly or
even necessarily understandable in terms of things that are purportedly already clear, such as
e.g. what a proof is a proof of.  Yet there is still a version of the persistent question of the first 
paragraph – the answer to which could in fact be more useful to understand why identity of 
proofs is relevant to the understanding of what a proof is – that remains unanswered, namely:
why should one ask oneself about the identity of proofs?
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The first points to be fixed in order to avoid getting lost in dealing with this question 
here are then these: firstly, since we want to understand how identity of proofs may contribute 
to our understanding of what a proof is – if at all – , we should not have to rely on a previously
fixed conception of what a proof is in order to adequately account for the question of identity 
of proofs; and secondly, we shall need to formulate more clearly just what is being 
investigated here under the label identity of proofs. It is no sheer stipulation, but rather the 
short study of Kant’s text on the syllogistic inferences just carried out, toghether with the 
observations made in the previous paragraphs that provide us with a way of defining this: 
under an investigation concerning identity of proofs, we understand a study of the conditions 
under which the semantic or epistemic values of things which are understood to be proofs are
the same viz. equivalent.  
There is, of course, a great many ways of answering the question as to why one should
investigate identity of proofs , which shall usually vary in accordance with ideological 
inclinations and goals. I here merely suggest a sketch of a possible answer that, I hope, shall 
suffice for now. A brief explanation of this may be given by appeal to the general Quinean 
slogan “no entity without identity”. In a brief text on the concept of identity13, Sundholm points 
out the following:  
“ Consider the two types ℕ+×ℕ+ of ordered pairs of positive integers and ℚ⁺ of positive 
rationals. Formally they have the same application criterion:
p :ℕ+ q :ℕ+
⟨ p , q ⟩ :α
<2,3> and <4, 6> are equal elements of type ℚ⁺ , but not of the type ℕ+×ℕ+ . In order to 
individuate the types in question different criteria of identity are needed: the type ℕ+×ℕ+ is 
individuated by the identity criterion
p :ℕ+ q :ℕ+ r :ℕ+ s :ℕ+ p=r :ℕ+ q=s :ℕ+
⟨ p ,q ⟩=⟨r , s ⟩ :ℕ⁺
and the type ℚ⁺ by the criterion
13 Sundholm, G.B. (1999) Identity: Propositional, criterial, Absolute, in The Logica 1998 Yearbook, Filosofia 
Publishers, Czech Academy of Science, Prague, pp. 20–26.
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p :ℕ+ q :ℕ+ r :ℕ+ s :ℕ+ p×s= q×r :ℕ+
⟨ p ,q ⟩=⟨r , s⟩ :ℚ+
”
The same observation could be applied to the present context of discussion of proofs: 
we have an application criterion (say, being [represented by/expressed as/carried out by 
means of] a derivation), out of which a distinct, particular notion of proof (as a type) could only
be made in case a specific identity criterion is associated with it, different identity criteria 
yielding correspondent altogether different notions of proof.  Notice that an identity criterion is 
necessary not only to determine the identity of the individual proofs inside the type, but also 
the identity of the very type itself. It is in this sense that Martin-Löf, according to Sundholm, 
suggests as an easy way to reconstruct the Quinean slogan “no entity without identity” the 
combination of the type-theoretic maxims “no entity without type” and “no type without 
identity”.  One could understand the claims that identity of proofs is a central question to the 
field of general proof theory and, more generally, to the task of providing an answer to the 
question “what is a proof?” rather in such a spirit.
1. Proofs, results and identity criteria
It has already been indicated here how it is that accounting for the identity of proofs 
may be regarded as a fundamental task for the clarification of the notion of proof. But there is 
something we may say about proofs – at least as far as they concern us in this work – already
at this initial point, without being afraid of betraying our guideline and determining what a 
proof is beforehand: proofs are always proofs of something. This transitive structure of proofs 
makes it clear that every proof inevitably brings with itself also that which is proved: which we 
shall henceforth call the result of the proof. 
Now, depending on how one chooses to deal with certain matters which are relevant 
for the determination of the semantical value14 of a proof, accordingly different criteria of 
identity of proofs may be deemed adequate viz. inadequate. Here, three such matters shall 
concern us: first and most importantly, (a) the relationship between the identity of a proof and 
the identity of its result; secondly (b) the category to which proofs are taken to belong; and 
14 This expression should be taken in a general sense here, which may encompass things such as meaning, 
sense, intension, extension etc.; and not simply as some denotation. 
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finally (c) the category to which results of proofs are taken to belong. Variations in how one 
conceives of (a) will generate distinct general kinds of criteria of identity of proofs; in the case 
of (b) and (c), in turn, variations will affect the meaning of certain formal consequences of 
adopting certain given criteria of identity of proofs.
In the sequel, a taxonomy will be proposed for each of the items (a) – (c). Provided 
with this tool, we will be able to identify and better understand certain conceptual 
entanglements concerning the discussion of proposals as to how one could account for 
equivalence between derivations and how they fare as attempts to describe or deal with 
identity of proofs.
a. Taxonomy of identity criteria
In some possible frameworks, identity of proofs shows itself as a rather trivial question, 
unworthy of our attention. For instance, one could simply regard all proofs as equivalent 
inasmuch as one considers relevant merely an aspect that they all trivially share, namely: 
being a proof. Since their semantic or epistemic role is analogous if seen from this 
perspective, there is no sense in separating proofs by means of such a criterion. 
Unsatisfactory as it may be in a number of senses, this is still a possible and quite sufficient 
way of accounting for the identity of proofs: to deem the relation as perfectly trivial.
A less trivial way of dealing with the matter is the folkloric background conception the 
rejection of which seems to have triggered the young literature dedicated to identity of proofs, 
namely: what is relevant about proofs is ultimately what they prove, two proofs being thus 
equivalent if and only if they prove the same thing. Of course, the question of just what it is 
that a proof proves viz. what is it that we understand to be the result of a proof is to be 
answered satisfactorily if any clarity is to come from such an attitude towards identity of proofs
– a question mostly neglected by discussions within this young literature, by the way. In any 
case, this attitude towards identity of proofs is tantamount to reducing the question regarding 
the identity of a proof to one regarding the identity of whatever it is that we consider as the 
result of a proof; in other words, it is a trivialisation of the identity of a proof with respect to 
that of its result. This is, then, a second possible way of accounting quite sufficiently for the 
identity of proofs while dismissing the question itself as ultimately uninteresting: to reduce the 
52
identity of a proof to that of its result, thus resolving the initial question in terms of one that 
does not necessarily have anything whatsoever to do with proofs.
This has nevertheless proved to be a quite unsatisfactory thesis for the enthusiasts of 
so-called general proof theory, as I have just hinted at. An emblematic expression of this fact 
is given by Kosta Došen 2003 (p.14):
“For the whole field of general proof theory to make sense, and in particular for considering 
the question of identity criteria for proofs, we should not have that any two derivations with the
same assumptions and conclusion are equivalent, i.e. it should not be the case that there is 
never more than one proof with given assumptions and a given conclusion. Otherwise, our 
field would be trivial.”
We shall return to this observation of Došen and discuss an interesting aspect of it 
soon; for now, it suffices to note that it commits to the idea that there being different proofs of 
at least some given result is a necessary condition for an adequate approach to the notion of 
proof. 
Now, this implies a rupture with one of the directions of the precedent thesis, but not 
with the other – i.e. proving the same result is not anymore considered a sufficient condition 
for two proofs to be equivalent, but it may well remain as a necessary condition for this much. 
And it seems to be precisely the decision to regard having the same result as a not sufficient 
yet necessary condition for two proofs to be equivalent that motivates most of the actual 
developments on identity of proofs available. This is the first attitude towards identity of proofs
considered here so far that does not trivialise or dismiss the question in any sense, viz. the 
identity value of a proof is made neither trivial nor reducible to that of something else. 
Nevertheless, the identity of the result still plays a prominent role in the determination of the 
identity of the proof in this view, and an account of it must be provided so that the limitation it 
imposes upon the identity of the proof becomes clear.
One could still of course move a step further and conceive the possibility of proofs of 
different results being equivalent, thus breaking also with the other direction of the thesis 
criticised by general proof theory. This indeed hardly could be regarded as an extravagant 
hypothesis; for proofs of different things might be strongly analogous in various and significant
senses. In such a framework, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that two proofs share the 
same result for them to be equivalent – i.e. there may be distinct proofs of one and the same 
result, and there may also be equal proofs of distinct results. At least in the outset of this 
53
conception, then, the identity of a proof is neither trivialised, nor reduced to the identity of 
something else, nor restricted in any decisive way by the identity of its result.
These different possible ways of approaching identity of proofs – and, consequently, 
proofs – allow us to speak of a semantical taxonomy of criteria for identity of proofs. The 
exposition I shall now provide of such a taxonomy shall prove helpful, and I hope to be able to
make that clear, in avoiding confusion with respect to the proper philosophical evaluation of 
different formal proposals which intend to deal with the matter of identity of proofs, as well as 
how they are related to each other conceptually.
With respect to the relation between a proof and the result of a proof, criteria for the 
identity of proofs let themselves divide exhaustively in the following categories:
1) Trivial criterion restricted to the result: the second kind of criterion described in this 
section, which identifies all and only proofs of a same result, i.e. which reduces the 
identity of proofs to that of their result;
2) Non-trivial criterion restricted to the result: the third kind of criterion described in this 
section, which identifies only but not all proofs of a same result. To this kind of criterion 
belongs e.g. what we may call the strict criterion: a kind of criterion not described 
above, which simply deems every proof equivalent only to itself;
3) The third criterion: a kind of criterion not explicitly described above, which identifies all 
but not only proofs of a same result. To this kind of criterion belongs e.g. the first 
criterion described in this session – which we may call the unrestricted trivial criterion 
–, which simply deems all proofs equivalent, regardless of their result;
4) Unrestricted non-trivial criterion: the last kind of criterion described above, which 
identifies neither all nor only proofs of a same result;
The importance of stressing and not losing sight of the fact that this taxonomy is of a 
semantical nature could never be overestimated, so this is to be stated now, before any 
confusion on this matter finds opportunity to come about: within this section, until this point, 
the expressions “proof” and “result” all have an essentially informal, semantical meaning; so 
“proof” does not mean derivation, “result” does not mean end-formula, etc.  This sort of 
assimilation of meaning which we are blocking here is, by the way, precisely what seems to 
happen at the transcribed passage of Došen 2003 above: assumptions and conclusions of 
derivations are formulas, just as syntactical as these are; assumptions and conclusions of 
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proofs, on the other hand, are semantical.  Thus, the triviality viz. non-triviality of a relation of 
equivalence between derivations of a certain A from a certain Γ is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for the triviality viz. non-triviality of any relation of equivalence between 
proofs of a certain conclusion from given assumptions – unless, of course, one shows that 
there is a correspondence of a specific nature between, on the syntactical side, formulas,  
and, on the semantical, results of proofs. In principle, it could well be the case that, for every A
and Γ, all derivations of A from Γ were equivalent to one another, and yet there still were 
different proofs of a given result from given assumptions – just let the distinct formulas A and 
B express the same proof result and the distinct sets of formulas Γ and Δ express the same 
proof assumptions, and further let no derivation of A from Γ be equivalent to a derivation of B 
from Δ, and voilà. Since we have argued neither for nor against any kind of correspondence 
relation between formulas and proof results, and since it is also fairly usual to see some such 
correspondence being taken for granted in the literature, the proviso just made is justified.
b. Taxonomy of the notion of result of a proof
Another aspect of our taxonomy shall now concern how the notion of result of a proof is
understood in the framework of a given criterion for the identity of proofs. As mentioned 
above, this and other crucial questions are left mostly in the oblivion within the discussion of 
identity of proofs.
Given that proofs are being dealt with here only inasmuch as they can be carried out 
by means of derivations, it is not to take too narrow a perspective if we deal with whatever it is
that we take to be results of proofs as belonging either to a propositional or to a deductive 
category. 
1) Propositional category
1.1 Result of a proof as a (collection of) proposition(s); 
1.2 Result of a proof as a(n) (collection of) intension(s) stricter than a proposition – say, e.g., 
(scheme of) formulation of a proposition;
1.3 Result of a proof as a(n) (collection of) intension(s) looser than a proposition – say, e.g., 
form/scheme of proposition
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2) Deductive category
2.1 Result of a proof as a (collection of) deduction(s);
2.2 Result of a proof as a(n) (collection of) intension(s) stricter than a deduction – say, e.g., 
(scheme of) formulation of a deduction;
2.3 Result of a proof as a(n) (collection of) intension(s) looser than a deduction – say, e.g., 
form/scheme of deduction.
c. Taxonomy of the notion of proof
Proofs themselves, in turn, given the restrictions imposed by the application criteria 
mentioned just above, can be here regarded as belonging to one of the following categories:
1) Proofs as  performable ; i.e., e.g. as a more or less specific list of instructions that can be 
carried out;
2) Proof as performance; i.e. as the act of carrying out such list of instructions;
3) Proof as performed; i.e. e.g. as the object produced by the such a performance viz. by 
carrying out such instructions.
It is never too much to stress again that the taxonomic divisions of this subsection are 
by no means intended to be exhaustive with respect to any notion of proof broader than one 
that can be outlined by means of the application criteria mentioned above, i.e. one such that 
all proofs are expressible as derivations. Even when considered in this narrower framework, it
is certainly nothing but one among many possibilities of categorising proofs in a sufficiently 
systematic way – although one the conceptual nature of which will allow for the proper 
illumination of certain aspects of proofs, as well as of attempts to account for their identity, 
ahead in this work.
Unlike the notions addressed in the previous two subsections of this taxonomy, the 
notion of proof has been addressed frequently enough by taxonomic approaches similar to 
the one presented here (see e.g. Sundholm 2000 and references mentioned therein). In the 
absence of a simultaneous taxonomic account of the other notions addressed here, however, 
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this sort of development would not be enough for a proper evaluation of relevant aspects of 
the question concerning the identity of proofs, as will become clear along what is to follow. 
57
III. A philosophical assessment of the normalisation thesis concerning identity of 
proofs
The kind of task to be carried out in this section can be seen as belonging to, quoting 
Kreisel, “the sort of Kleinarbeit which is generally needed to support a genuine hypothesis (...)
as opposed to a mere mathematical fancy.” (A Survey of Proof Theory II, p.114, in 
Proceedings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium, Edited by J.E. Fenstad, Studies 
in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics Volume 63, Elsevier ,1971, Pages 109-170). For
reasons which will, I hope, become clear in the course of the text, substituting “support” for 
“understand” and “genuine hypothesis” for “relevant proposal” in Kreisel’s formulation would 
make it more in tune with the perspective of this work. We shall examine the normalisation 
thesis concerning identity of proofs with respect to some of its significant philosophical 
aspects: what does it state?; to which question does it propose an answer?; why, if at all, is 
this question relevant?; how good an answer to such a question is it?; how, if at all, can it 
influence in the handling of other relevant problems?; etc. Thereby, we shall try and evaluate, 
against the background of the reflections already carried out, how this influential proposal on 
identity of proofs fares in the task which is allegedly the very goal of so-called general proof 
theory: to improve our understanding of what a proof is. The sequel of this text requires that 
the reader is acquainted with some basic notions of the framework of natural deduction 
formalism – most especially that of derivation (or, alternatively, deduction) and those directly 
related to it. The unfamiliar reader is thus referred to the first chapter of Prawitz 1965 doctoral 
dissertation Natural Deduction, most especially §§ 2-3.
1. Some essential traits of the normalisation thesis
The normalisation thesis “official” formulation is the one given to it by Prawitz in his 
1971 Ideas and Results in Proof Theory, p.257 : “Two derivations represent the same proof if 
and only if they are equivalent”15. As dull and tautological as it may sound put this way, this 
thesis is, in several respects, not trivial at all. 
15 Prawitz, D. (1971) Ideas and Results in Proof Theory in: J.E. Fenstad ed., Proceedings of the Second 
Scandinavian Logic Symposium, North-Holland, Amsterdam (1971), pp. 235-307.
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Firstly, the notion of equivalence in terms of which it is formulated is a very specific 
one: it concerns natural deduction derivations, and can be defined as the reflexive, transitive 
and symmetric closure of the relation of immediate reducibility between derivations. The 
reductions considered are those involved in the normalisation of derivations; thus, a derivation
reduces immediately to another derivation (see Ideas and Results, Section II.3.3) when the 
latter is obtained from the former by removing a maximum formula (i.e. a formula with a 
connective * that is the conclusion of an introduction of * and the major premiss of an 
elimination of *). For example, in the case of conjunction, the derivation: 
Π1
A
Π2
B
A∧B
A
Π3
 Immediately reduces to the derivation:
Π1
A
Π3
Derivations also reduce immediately to others by immediate expansions. These are 
reductions that can be performed on the minimum formulas of normal derivations, thus 
conforming them to what Prawitz calls expanded normal form, where all the minimum 
formulas are atomic. For example, let the following derivation be normal and A∧B be a 
minimum formula in it:
Π1
A∧B
Π2
By immediate expansion, it reduces immediately to the derivation below16:
Π1
A∧B
A
Π1
A∧B
B
A∧B
Π2
16 One might ask oneself why the application of immediate expansions is restricted to these cases. The reason,
as I hope will become clear, has nothing whatsoever to do with identity of proofs, but rather with 
normalisation of derivations; which is the very purpose for which these reductions were devised in the first 
place. It turns out that the restriction upon immediate expansions is what allows the obtention of strong 
normalisation in the presence of the reductions by means of which maximum formulas are removed (on this 
and closely related matters, see C.Jay, N.Ghani, The virtues of eta-expansion. J. Functional Programming 5 
(2): 135-154, April 1995, Cambridge University Press).
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Let us note in passing that there is a certain analogy between the two kinds of reduction just 
presented, namely: both involve derivations in which one draws, from a given premiss, a 
conclusion which plays no role, so to speak, in the obtention of the end-formula from the top-
ones – in some cases, such as that of conjunction, one even immediately returns to the said 
premiss after drawing the kind of conclusion in question. Thus, in the first case, the derivation 
from Γ to A to be reduced is characterised by the introduction and immediately subsequent 
elimination of a complex formula, which is removed by means of the reduction without 
prejudice to the derivation of A from Γ; and dually, in the second case, the reduced derivation 
from Γ to A is characterised by the elimination and immediately subsequent introduction of a 
complex formula, which comes about by the insertion of one or more simpler formulas by 
means of the reduction.17
Other reductions by means of which a derivation immediately reduces to another are 
the so-called permutative reductions, which concern the eliminations of disjunction and of the 
existential quantifier. By means of them, it is possible to remove maximum segments (which 
are called “maximum” by a similar reason as maximum formulas are: they are sequences of 
repeated occurrences  of a same given formula in a row viz. immediately below each other, 
such that the first one is the conclusion of an application of an introduction rule and the last 
one is the major premiss of an application of an elimination rule. Notice that maximum formula
and maximum segment can be so defined that the first are a special, limiting case of the 
latter, where only one occurrence of the given formula happens. Longer maximum segments 
may come about by virtue of applications of the elimination rules of disjunction and existential 
quantifier. See Prawitz 1965 p. 49, and Prawitz 1971, II.3, p.248 3.1.2) . There are also the 
reductions called immediate simplifications, which aim at removing eliminations of disjunction 
where no hypothesis is discharged; there are further similar immediate simplifications that 
concern the existential quantifier, and also so-called “redundant” applications of the classical 
absurdity rule.  
Thanks to the analogy discovered between natural deduction and typed lambda-
calculus known as the Curry-Howard correspondence – especially effective in the 
17 Here one might also wonder why the second reduction, contrarily to the first, inserts, instead of removing, a 
formula which is dispensable for the obtention of the end-formula of a derivation from its top-ones. The 
answer, once again, is not connected to identity of proofs, but rather to the confluence of the reduction 
procedure: if we took the immediate expansions in the other direction – i.e. as contractions rather than 
expansions –, then e.g. the unicity of the normal form of derivations in general would be lost in the presence 
of the reductions by means of which one removes maximum formulas. Again, see C.Jay, N.Ghani, The 
virtues of eta-expansion. J. Functional Programming 5 (2): 135-154, April 1995, Cambridge University 
Press). 
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conjunction-implication fragment –, it is possible to verify that the equivalence relation yielded 
by the reduction system described here and in terms of which the normalisation thesis is 
formulated corresponds to βὴ-equivalence, and to β-equivalence in case immediate 
reductions are left out of the system. The normalisation thesis can thus be formally regarded 
as the identity clause of a definition of “proof” as a type, the central idea of which is that β- 
and ὴ-conversions – or, correspondently, that the conversions respectively associated to the 
reductions that eliminate maximum formulas and to the immediate expansions –  are identity 
preserving.18
It should also be observed that the thesis puts forward two separate claims: one to the 
soundness, another to the completeness of the equivalence relation defined in terms of the 
reductions with respect to the informal relation holding among derivations representing same 
proof. The soundness or if part says that equivalence suffices for two derivations to represent 
the same proof, i.e. that all derivations equivalent to one another represent the same proof, 
or, in other words, that the formal relation of equivalence between derivations is sound with 
respect to the informal relation holding among derivations representing same proof. The 
completeness or only if part of the thesis, in turn, says that equivalence is necessary for two 
derivations to represent the same proof, i.e. that there are no derivations non-equivalent to 
one another that represent the same proof, or, in other words, that the formal relation of 
equivalence between derivations is complete with respect to the informal relation holding 
among derivations representing same proof.
Rather than an arbitrarily conceived criterion, this idea is inspired to a significant extent
by simple and in some senses appealing philosophical conceptions and formal results, as we 
shall try to make clear in what follows. 
a. Informal idea and relevant (arguably supporting) formal results
In accordance with the initial assumptions made regarding how one manipulates the 
notions of proof, derivation and the relation between these in a semantical framework, the 
normalisation thesis seems to make sense as an answer to the question regarding identity of 
18 For brevity, the terminology of the lambda-calculus will be frequently employed when referring to the 
reductions and conversions, even though the discussion here takes place in a natural deduction setting.  
This is especially unproblematic here since, as will be clear, the conjunction-implication fragment is enough 
for almost all considerations to be made. 
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proofs viz. synonymy of derivations if understood as a formal account of a very simple and 
reasonable idea: 
(α) that any two proofs the difference between which resolves into irrelevant features 
are indeed not significantly different; 
(β) that any two proofs that differ with respect to any other feature are significantly 
different.  
To this, advocates of the thesis usually add that 
(γ) a specific proof can always be given with no irrelevant features. 
In short, the idea is that any two proofs are significantly different if and only if they are 
different even when given without any irrelevant features. Back reference to these three 
clauses by means of the respective tags (α), (β) and (γ) will be abundant in the sequel. 
Besides, the following three formal results seem crucial, both from the historical and 
the conceptual viewpoint, to the proposal now under scrutiny, namely: the normal form 
theorem, the (strong) normalisation theorem and the uniqueness of normal form.
The normal form theorem states that every formula A that can be derived from a set of 
formulas Γ can be derived from Γ normally (that is, without the occurrence of maximum 
formulas viz. segments in the derivation); i.e., every valid consequence relation between 
some Γ and some A is provable without resort to any non-normal derivation. This result can 
be regarded as a kind of completeness theorem that seems essential to the normalisation 
thesis, which could be stated in the following fashion: every provable result can be proved 
normally; or: normal derivations alone can prove all provable results. Furthermore, the 
normalisation theorem yields a mechanical procedure by means of which derivations can be 
reduced to normal ones, showing that the (syntactical) difference between them resolves into 
certain deductive patterns that “play no role” in the deduction of the end-formula from the 
undischarged top-formulas – no matter in which particular way the deduction was performed 
–, and that can thus be properly removed viz. inserted without consequences for the 
fulfillment of this task – namely, the ones involved in the reductions described above. The 
soundness part of the normalisation thesis seems to amount to the claim that the removal viz.
insertion of these patterns from viz. in a derivation is innocuous19, in some sense, to its 
19 Prawitz acknowledges that this may not be the case for the “redexes” of permutative reductions associated 
to the eliminations of disjunction and existential quantifier. But this does not stop him from putting the 
normalisation thesis forward anyway. For the sake of the argument, then, we shall henceforth not question 
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semantical value; and hence supposedly irrelevant to the determination of which proof is 
represented by the derivation itself in which it is eventually performed. The reasons given for 
such a claim are to be explored later (III.2.a). Uniqueness of normal form, in turn, adds to the 
normalisation procedure the flavour of an evaluation; one in which derivations are 
unambiguously judged with respect to which proof they represent, normal derivations playing 
the role of identity values – or, more in tune with the terms of the official formulation of the 
thesis, unique canonical representatives of proofs, which are the actual identity values. The 
situation can be regarded as analogous to what happens with e.g. numerical expressions in 
general and canonical numerals as representatives of natural numbers: the very fact that 
“3+2” ,“4+1”, “1+2+2”, etc. all ultimately reduce to “5” and to “5” alone can be regarded as 
suggestive of the fact that these numerical expressions have the same value, namely 5 – i.e. 
the “direct”, disquotational value of “5”. This particular kind of understanding of the 
normalisation procedure is presumably one of the main motivations behind one of the most 
popular reformulations of the normalisation thesis, used by e.g. Troelstra in his non-
extensional equality, namely: Two proofs corresponding to deductions π and π’ are the same 
iff π and π’ reduce to the same normal form. 
In what follows, an attempt will be made to investigate the extent to which the 
normalisation thesis makes justice to the informal motivational thesis formulated above by 
analysing its success in fulfilling certain important tasks necessary for it to adequately 
preserve the virtues of the informal ideas involved in it.  But let us first try and describe certain
basic semantical conceptions that seem to be involved in its formulation – namely, some 
regarding the idea of derivations as “representatives” of proofs –, so that we can try and 
properly evaluate the thesis in the intended respect. This will be done in a purposefully naive, 
as literature independent as possible fashion; in this way, we can sensibly nurture more hopes
to avoid a viciously biased starting point for our discussion. 
b. Derivations as “representatives” of proofs
Let us start by noticing some background semantical assumptions apparently involved 
in the formulation of the thesis, which are actually very important for, before anything else, the
the soundness of permutative reductions; nor will we question the soundness of so-called immediate 
simplifications. Instead, let us grant from the very outset that they are trivially identity preserving, so that they
may be safely ignored without the need of adding provisos regarding them at the many places those would 
be due. The considerations regarding the normalisation conjecture in this section were thus made aiming 
basically at β- and ὴ-conversions – and most especially at the first.
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proper delimitation and comprehension of the problem at stake. The “official” formulation of 
the thesis carries with itself one crucial semantical departure point which constitutes, far 
beyond a mere characteristic determination of an answer to the question regarding identity of 
proofs, clear indications as how such question is supposed to be asked in the first place. It is  
the following: derivations are conceived as “representatives” of proofs, which are in turn 
conceived as their semantical values. Thus, the question to which the normalisation thesis 
offers an answer – namely, “When do two derivations represent the same proof?” –, taken as 
an interpretation of the question regarding identity of proofs, turns the latter into a quest for 
how to properly map certain linguistic entities – namely derivations – onto semantic values – 
namely proofs. Thus derivations are taken to denote – i.e. “represent” – proofs; the question 
regarding “identity of proofs” becomes indeed a question that regards, before anything else, 
synonymy or, more specifically, co-referentiality of derivations, and the identity of their 
semantic values, which we, following Prawitz, in this context call proofs – whatever these are 
considered to be – may in principle remain a simply unaddressed issue. 
Now, once it is established that the relation between proofs and derivations is that the 
latter denote the former, some further conclusions can be drawn once we take into account 
some simple formal consequences of the normalisation thesis – at least if taken in its official 
formulation. The first to be noticed here is this: given that there are different equivalent 
derivations, it follows that the same proof may be denoted by different derivations. But what to
say of the converse of this statement? – i.e. could a given derivation be taken to represent 
different proofs? It is important to notice that there is an asymmetry between these 
expressions of the two directions of the relation of denotation between derivations and proofs.
It is due to an ambiguity of the expression “different proofs” in the formulation of the question 
concerning the second direction, which is absent in the case of the expression “different 
derivations”. While “different derivations” unequivocally refers in this context to any two 
distinct syntactical objects which we call derivations, different proofs may mean either, on the 
one hand, proofs to which the relation of identity of proofs, however we decide to understand 
it, cannot be correctly ascribed; or, on the other hand, proofs which are (say, numerically) 
distinct objects, regardless of whether or not these objects are identified by our relation of 
identity of proofs. If we take the expression in the first of these senses, it seems the question 
– namely, “could a given derivation be taken to represent different proofs?” – should then be 
answered negatively in the framework of the normalisation thesis: otherwise, derivations 
could denote ambiguously, i.e. a single derivation could have distinct and non-equivalent 
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semantical values. And here we notice a further implicit semantical departure point of the 
thesis under discussion: the non-ambiguity of derivations with respect to their semantical 
value. On the second of these senses, however, one could answer to the question positively. 
To illustrate this, just take a derivation to be a syntactical doppelgänger of the proof it denotes;
an exact “depiction” of it, so that there would be a distinct proof for every distinct derivation. 
This way, to see how a derivation could denote different proofs under the assumption of the 
normalisation thesis, it would suffice e.g. to say that the relation of identity viz. equivalence 
between the denoted proofs mirrors exactly that between the derivations that denote them; so
that, say, two equivalent distinct derivations Π and Π’ that denote respectively the 
consequently equivalent and distinct proofs Π and Π’ would each also denote, respectively, Π’
and Π. In this fashion, a derivation could denote many distinct – yet equivalent – proofs; 
indeed, as many as there are distinct derivations equivalent to it. 
This second picture seems to distort a little the question “when do two derivations 
represent the same proof?” into “when do two derivations represent equivalent proofs?”; for 
although it serves as an answer to the first question, it seems much more in tune with the 
second. In any case, it has the virtue of doing more justice to the idea that the normalisation 
thesis answers to a question that actually concerns the identity viz. equivalence of proofs, 
rather than merely some arguably semantical equivalence between derivations; for it counts 
on a certain conception of proof that is a copy of that of derivation at the level of denoted 
objects. Thus, once equivalence between derivations is established to be in a certain way, so 
is identity between proofs. This semantical background to the study of properties and relations
concerning proofs – and, in particular, to the problem of identity of proofs – clearly fits into the 
general strategy described by Kreisel in his 1971 Survey of Proof Theory II, p.111: 
“The general nature of our problem is quite clear. Consider formal rules which are intended to 
formalize certain proofs; in other words, we have syntactic objects, derivations d which 
represent or describe mental acts d, the proofs (which carry conviction);(...) the relation 
between d and d (...) is a particular case of the general relation between words and the 
thoughts they express. Since we are dealing with a "small" class of words, we can hope for 
more precise results than are known for the more general (and more familiar!) relation. (...)
Given a property P or a relation R between proofs our task is to find relations PF, resp. RF 
such that for all d of our formal system PF (d) iff P(d) and RF (d, d’) iff R(d, d’ ).
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For exposition, we shall reverse this procedure, and first describe some formal relations PF, 
RF which will then be used to state the facts about the objects of principal interest, namely 
properties and relations of proofs.” 
The obvious problem with this “doppelgänger” approach is, of course, that it makes the 
denotational talk of “representation” involved in the formulation of the normalisation thesis 
become rather dispensable. The positing of proofs as objects distinct from and denoted by 
derivations becomes beard for Ockham’s razor; one could, after all, simply take the 
normalisation thesis as the characterisation of a relation of equivalence of meaning of, say, an
intensional character between derivations (which we could just as well call proofs), and regard
the latter as themselves the proofs the identity of which we intend to investigate, rather than 
as syntactical or linguistic “representatives” of some objects of a more ineffable nature. Thus, 
one could completely eschew the denotational talk and formulate the thesis in the following 
terms: Two derivations/proofs are synonymous if and only if they are equivalent (in Prawitz’s 
sense). 
Nevertheless, the fact is that the denotational talk is there. So, to make better sense of 
it, it is easier to answer negatively to the question as to whether or not a derivation could 
denote different proofs also in the second of the senses mentioned20, and understand the 
normalisation thesis as a solution to the question concerning identity of proofs in a quite 
simple way. Namely: first, as suggesting from the outset that each derivation, besides not 
being ambiguous, i.e. denoting only equivalent objects, denotes only one object viz. proof; 
second, as suggesting that the relation of equivalence between derivations is, as already 
observed, necessarily and sufficiently conditioned by their co-referentiality – i.e. by the fact 
that they denote one and the same proof; and third, as suggesting that the relation of identity 
20 Although it hardly seems impossible to do otherwise. One could e.g. consider every distinct β-normal 
derivation Πi of A from Γ as a canonical representative of a correspondently distinct proof Πi , and say that 
every derivation that reduces to Πi would also denote proof Πi. Further, ler the Πi be, despite distinct from one
another, all equivalent proofs; say, by virtue of the fact of their correspondent canonical representatives being
ultimately reducible to a unique βὴ-normal form. So, every derivation that reduces to Πi would denote proof 
Πi, but not only; they would also denote all proofs equivalent to Πi. One could then make sense of such a 
situation in the following way: β-normal derivations are the doppelgängers, the canonical representatives of 
proofs conceived as the intensional contents of derivations, so that proofs that are β-convertible to one 
another share this intensional content. These intensional contents, the proofs, are themselves equivalent viz.
“identical” when their canonical representatives reduce to a common βὴ-normal form. In such a picture, 
derivations may denote more than one proof; the proofs could not be simply considered Ockham-beard 
without further; and the treatment would yield an answer not only to a matter regarding semantical 
equivalence of derivations, but also identity of proofs in a literal way. Such a theory would nevertheless need 
much philosophical underpinning not to be merely an ad hoc way of making, simultaneously, the positing of 
proofs demanded by the denotational formulation of the normalisation thesis relevant; and the matter 
addressed by the normalisation thesis actually be, further than mere semantical equivalence of derivations, 
identity of proofs.  
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viz. equivalence concerning proofs themselves, the denoted objects, is to be understood as 
holding only between an object and itself, and is thus trivial and uninteresting. While this 
approach makes it harder to understand in which sense the normalisation thesis addresses a 
problem worthy of the label “identity of proofs” – instead of, say, co-referentiality of derivations
–, it certainly accommodates much better the denotational mode of expression adopted in the 
formulation of the thesis.   
Now, once it has been seen that it is not necessary at all to posit proofs as semantical 
denotations of syntactically conceived derivations in any sense or way in order to formulate 
the normalisation thesis in a sensible way; and that, as a matter of fact, positing such objects 
and denotational semantical relations make the thesis quite prone to be accused of displaying
weaknesses such as Ockham-beardiness or lack of success in addressing a problem worthy 
of the title “identity of proofs”; one might then ask oneself just what would be the reasons to 
choose to formulate the normalisation thesis in its traditional, denotational fashion. Regarding 
this matter, I believe it is particularly interesting to stress that the normalisation thesis, as first 
put forward, is given descriptive rather than definitional contours. We shall see more precisely
how this makes a difference to the matter under consideration shortly (III.2.a), when we shall 
dirty our hands with some observations more dependent on specialised literature. For now, let
us just say this: the positing of proofs as independent objects denoted by derivations allows a 
quite Fregean-spirited solution to the question whether or not two derivations represent the 
same proof: just as the morning star and the evening star are identical by virtue of being the 
same celestial body or 117+136 and 253 are identical by virtue of being the same natural 
number – which implies that “the morning star”  [“117+136”]  and “the evening star” [“253”], in 
spite of their eventual difference in Sinn, are descriptions of the same object (i.e. have the 
same Bedeutung), and can thus be the arguments of a true and informative identity statement
–  so would, say 
Π1
A
Π2
B
A∧B
A
Π3
     and      
Π1
A
Π3
(and here I am using rather than mentioning the derivations) be identical by virtue of being the
same proof – which implies that
67
“
Π1
A
Π2
B
A∧B
A
Π3
“     and      “
Π1
A
Π3
“ 
(now I am mentioning the derivations), in spite of their eventually different “senses”, are 
representatives/descriptions of the same object, thus serving as arguments for a true identity 
statement. The denotational talk can thus be understood as an essential ingredient of the 
possibility of resorting to the idea that proofs, taken as actual objects, and their nature viz. the
properties they display and relations in which they partake, are the ultimate foundation of an 
adequate criterion for the truth or falsity of statements concerning the semantical equivalence 
of derivations – which would otherwise be arguably solely founded on stipulations or 
conventions concerning the meaning (Sinn,  or – to untie us from Fregean terminology and 
doctrine – meaning intensionally conceived) of the latter, ultimately rendering the 
normalisation thesis a purely definitional account of synonymy/identity of derivations/proofs.  
As already observed, though, the label “identity of proofs” for an investigation conceived in 
such terms is quite misleading: just as Frege’s investigation in Über Sinn und Bedeutung did 
not concern the identity of celestial bodies, natural numbers or other objects, but was rather 
“über Sinn und Bedeutung” – i.e. it concerned phenomena related to the semantics of the 
linguistic expressions that denote celestial bodies, natural numbers and other objects –, this 
one also seems not at all concerned with the identity of denoted objects, but rather with the 
semantical equivalence of certain linguistic expressions. Furthermore, there is still an 
elephant in the room if one wants to use this denotational approach to identity of proofs: while
we know very well what celestial bodies are and how to identify them viz. tell them apart – 
and the same holds even for the more “abstract” natural numbers, especially when it comes 
to telling them apart (which is what matters the most for our present concerns) –, it does not 
seem that we have this much clarity about the elusive supposed objects we here refer to as 
proofs.   
2. General reconstruction and criticism of the thesis
Regarding the informal idea presented in III.1.a as support to the normalisation thesis: 
Premisses (α) and (β) are, so to speak, the main matter of the driving informal thesis itself, for
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each of them corresponds, respectively, to the soundness and the completeness parts of the 
normalisation thesis, their formal counterparts. In order to make full justice to the importance 
of these two premisses, however, it is important to stress that the roles they play are not quite 
the same: (α) is the actual core of the doctrine, for it provides the positive criterion according 
to which proofs should be identified, while (β), in stating simply that nothing that is not 
identified by (α) should be identified, is of a dependent and merely negative nature. 
At the very informal and undetailed level they have been presented here, (α) and (β) 
seem remarkably resistant to disagreement; indeed almost trivial. This stems from the fact 
that they are built upon an appropriate notion of irrelevance; one such that its proper 
comprehension makes it a truism that irrelevant differences are always identity preserving, 
and also that any difference that is not irrelevant is also not identity preserving. 
In  the way down to the concretion of their formal counterparts, however, their 
resistance to disagreement diminishes considerably. Premiss (α), in the first place, can be 
regarded as being preliminarily specified to a still informal restriction of itself, of which the 
soundness part of the thesis is intended as a mere formalisation. Let us call this informal 
particularization (α1), and leave undetermined the question of what more precisely it should 
look like. Despite the fact that it is merely a particular case of (α) – actually, precisely because
it is merely a particular case of (α) –, (α1) brings about a severe problem when combined with
(β); one of the most severe problems, indeed, that the normalisation thesis faces as it stands, 
namely: the difficulty of supporting its claim to completeness.
It is thus presumably having something that fits into the role of (α1) – i.e. some form of 
restricted version or specification of (α)21 – in mind that advocates of the normalisation thesis 
end up simultaneously, on the one hand, depositing their full confidence upon its alleged 
formal counterpart – namely, the soundness part of the normalisation thesis –, to the point of 
deeming it obvious (see Prawitz 1971, Kreisel 1971 (SPT II); cf. Feferman’s 1975 review of 
Prawitz 1971); and, on the other hand, acknowledging (β), the completeness part of the 
normalisation thesis, as a sort of Achilles’ heel of the proposal – an attitude rather more 
frequent previously to the obtention of the Post-completeness/maximality results concerning 
21 Just to provide the reader with an idea of what (α1) could roughly look like, we could suggest something in 
the spirit of the following formulation: any two proofs that can be mechanically transformed in one another by 
sequences of additions and/or removals of irrelevant features are not significantly different. This is, again, 
rough and certainly not the best possible characterisation of (α1), but it will do to convey those eventually 
bothered by the lack of an image an idea of what such a premiss may involve. How (α1) is to be properly 
formulated is of no consequence to the sequel.
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the notion of identity of proofs yielded by the normalisation thesis, widely accepted as a stamp
of approval of the completeness part by enthusiasts (we shall return to the issue of the 
maximality results soon, in III.2.b).  Indeed, in order to accept the soundness of (α) – which, 
as observed, is difficult not to do –, it seems inevitable that one also accepts the soundness of
a specific case of it. As much as we keep with a completely trustworthy claim to soundness in 
passing from (α) to (α1), however, this does not prevent at all the loss of justification to a claim
to completeness in the second case. And the reason is the very same that supports the trust 
in the soundness of (α1): it is merely a specific case of (α), the soundness of which we 
already accepted, and may thus in principle leave out some proofs that (α) could identify. 
The soundness part of the thesis, however, is quite distinct from both (α) and (α1), 
regardless of how the latter is determined: 
(αF) If two derivations are (βη-)equivalent, then they represent the same proof. 
It seems that(αF) inspires far less confidence than their informal counterparts, simple and 
solid objections to its soundness having been presented in the literature (see. e.g. Troelstra 
1975, Feferman 1975 review of Prawitz 1971, Došen 2003), two of which shall be scrutinised 
in the sequel (in III.2.a.1 and III.2.a.2). We shall nevertheless first try to reconstruct (αF) as a 
formal specification of (α1) and understand the reasoning behind its formulation. 
a. The case for the soundness of (αF) or Prawitz’s teleology of proofs.
In his 1965 doctoral dissertation, p.33, Prawitz describes a relation observed to hold 
between the usual introduction and elimination rules of usual logical constants, which he, 
following Lorenzen’s terminology, calls the inversion principle: 
“Let α be an application of an elimination rule that has B as consequence. Then, deductions 
that satisfy the sufficient condition (…) for deriving the major premiss of α, when combined 
with deductions of the minor premisses of α (if any), already “contain” a deduction of B; the 
deduction of B is thus obtainable directly from the given deductions without the addition of α.”
The principle refers first to the following deductive pattern:
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Π1, ... ,Πn
*n(A1, ... , An1)
*
n
- introduction
Γ1
⋮
C1
⋯
Γm
⋮
Cm
B
α  
Its claim is roughly that B, the conclusion, could always be obtained by eschewing the 
introduction of *n (A1, …,An) in the following way:
Γi
⋮
C i
⋮
Π j
⋮
B
Even though this is evidently not the case in general, the restriction to the intended constants 
and rules indeed confirms the principle. For each such constant, the former deductive pattern 
can be re-written as the latter according to the reduction steps described by Prawitz in the 
sequel (pp.36 – 38) – the same mentioned here some sections before.
Notwithstanding, it is worth noticing that, before the presentation of the reduction steps,
Prawitz rephrases the sober observations that constitute the formulation of the inversion 
principle as a somewhat cautiously – yet still quite loudly – expressed semantical battle cry, 
which occurs in passages such as the following (emphasis by myself):
“The inversion principle says in effect that nothing is ‘gained’ by inferring a formula through 
introduction for use as a major premiss in an elimination.” (pp. 33 - 34)
“We note that a consequence of an I-rule which is also major premiss of an E-rule constitutes 
a complication in a deduction. As such a complication can be removed (…), we may ask 
whether it is possible to transform every deduction to a corresponding ‘normal’ one which 
proceeds, so to say, directly, without any detours, from the assumptions to the end-formula.” 
(p.34)
He still adds, in the very same 1971 paper where he would, later, put the normalisation thesis 
forward:
“Here, I shall consider a more direct way of making the inversion principle precise. Since it 
says that nothing new is obtained by an elimination immediately following an introduction (of 
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the major premiss of the elimination), it suggests that such sequences of inferences can be 
dispensed with.” (p.247)
And right after presenting the thesis, he claims that the previous discussion of the inversion 
principle should make (αF), i.e. its soundness part, somehow obvious. 
Notice that β-redexes viz. maximum occurrences of formulas are here already most 
definitely characterised as somehow superfluous. But superfluous to what purpose?; 
according to which criterion? (see the discussion in 4.2 on the suppression of the position of 
criterion that marks the contemporary appropriation of the relation of synonymy, as opposed 
to that of Aristotle). Unless we are able to answer this, accepting or rejecting such a 
characterisation shall remain equally arbitrary options. And the answer apparently suggested 
in the passages themselves is this: superfluous to the purpose of obtaining the end-formula of
a given derivation from its assumptions. 
 In the first place, the fact should be acknowledged that β-redexes are indeed 
unnecessary to the derivation of any given end-formula A from any given set of assumptions 
Γ; and indeed completely removable from any given derivation of a given A from a given Γ in a
mechanical way, without prejudice to the status of derivation of the formula-tree in question at 
any stage of the procedure – this much is guaranteed by the normalisation theorem, proved 
by Prawitz himself. Now, this helps us understand the purpose to which β-redexes are 
superfluous viz. add nothing new, etc., namely: to the construction of any specific derivation of
a formula A from a set of assumptions Γ. They neither have the power to prevent, if 
suppressed, nor to favour, if added, that A is in fact derived from Γ in a given derivation. As 
the structure of the reductions proposed by Prawitz makes clear, the presence of a β-redex in 
a derivation of a formula A from a set of assumptions Γ amounts to the addition of a formula 
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which is either redundant, i.e. literally an unnecessary repetition within the derivation, or 
simply irrelevant22 to the obtainment of the end-formula from the top ones.23
But between the acknowledgement of this much and the conclusion that addition or 
suppression of β-redexes preserve the identity value of a derivation lies an abyss, upon which
no bridge seems to stand (see the sections below on objections to the soundness of the 
normalisation thesis). Unless, of course, one is ready to admit a most peculiar kind of 
teleology of derivations and proofs; a metaphysical doctrine according to which the “final 
cause”, so to speak, the purpose of a proof is the obtainment of its (end)result from the 
assumptions; and that the way to do this by means of a derivation is obtaining the end-
formula, the formal counterpart of the (end)result, from the top-formulas, the formal 
22 It is important to stress the difference between the use of the terms “unnecessary” and “irrelevant” in this 
context. While many normal derivations could be said to have occurrences of formulas that are, strictly 
speaking, unnecessary to the obtainment of its end-formula from its undischarged top ones, none of them 
could be said to contain occurrences of formulas that are irrelevant to the same end. Consider, for example, 
the following two normal derivations of A from (A∧B)∧(B∧A) :
(A∧B)∧(B∧A )
A∧B
A
(A∧B)∧(B∧A)
B∧A
A
Notice that there is a clear sense in which the occurrences of (A∧B) in the derivation to the left and of
(B∧A) in the one to the right are unnecessary: the very existence of a normal derivation of A from
(A∧B)∧(B∧A) which does not contain one or the other makes evident what is meant by that. It is 
nevertheless essential that (A∧B) (resp. (B∧A) ) occurs in the derivation to the left (resp. right) for the 
obtainment of the end-formula from the undischarged top ones, in the  sense that its suppression would in 
any case tamper with the status of derivation of the formula-tree viz. turn it into an “ill-formed” derivation. The
qualification of the mentioned repetitions as unnecessary thus entails neither that all nor that some specific 
occurrence of the repeated formula is unnecessary – only the repetition itself is unnecessary according to the
present manipulation of this expression.  
23 It is worth noticing that a reduction proposed by Ekman in his doctoral thesis seems to address the very 
same issue. He proposes the following reduction scheme, where the derivation to the left, Δ, reduces to the 
one to the right, Δ’, and where all the undischarged top-formulas of Π are also undischarged in Δ: 
Π
A
Σ
A
⇒ Π
A
As one clearly sees, this reduction also avoids repetitions in a derivation which are utterly unnecessary to the
obtainment of the end-formula from the top ones; and in so doing it might also erase formulas in the 
derivation the occurrence of which was not relevant to the same purpose. 
There are nevertheless some crucial differences: in the first place, while Prawitz’s reductions aim at 
eliminating irrelevant formula occurences that might by chance also be repetitions, the point of Ekman’s 
reduction is to eliminate repetitions, which may eventually also cause the elimination of irrelevant formulas 
which are not repetitions. Secondly, Prawitz’s reductions are motivated by the inversion principle, which 
holds specifically for the constants he deals with, while the motivation for Ekman’s reductions is in principle  
independent of particularities of the constants in the deductive system. Furthermore, Ekman’s reduction 
yields a trivial notion of identity of proofs of a given A from a given Γ, which is not the case of Prawitz’s 
reductions. Lastly, Prawitz’s redexes seem to be properly understandable as superfluous  according to his 
characterisation both in a global and in a local sense with respect to the derivations where they occur, while 
Ekman’s redexes only seem to be properly understandable as superfluous in general in a global sense.
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counterparts of the assumptions. The suggestion that precisely such a teleology is assumed 
by Prawitz is actually corroborated by himself more than once. Answering to criticism raised 
by Feferman to his notion of identity of proofs, for instance, he says that he looks upon proofs 
not “as a collection of sentences but as the result of applying certain operations to obtain a 
certain end result” (Prawitz 1981, p.249). In an answer to an article written by Sundholm 
addressing his views on the proof-act vs. proof-object distinction, in turn, he gives a most 
eloquent indication of this in quite general, analogical terms, which I will quote in extenso:
“(...)it is certainly undeniable that a word like building can be used for the act that an agent 
performs when he builds something and also for the building, a house for instance, that is the 
result of his act. It is equally obvious that to acts like constructing, travelling, cooking, and 
planning there are associated certain objects, in this case referred to by other words than 
those used for the act, viz. constructions, travels, dishes, and plans, which are results of the 
performances of the acts. Let us call the object that in this way results from an act an act 
product. (…)
Finally we may speak about the goal or the purpose of an act, naturally also called the 
object of the act, and which, again following Sundholm, I shall refer to by this term hoping that
it shall not cause confusion. The long-range goal of an act varies of course but there may be 
goals that are conceptually connected with the act. Often the act product is just the goal or 
object of an act, or to be careful we should perhaps say that it is not the house but there being
a house which is the goal of building. The object of an act may perhaps also be counted as an
outcome of the act, but it may sometimes be of interest to differentiate between the object of 
the act and the act product. Travelling may sometimes have just the resulting journey as its 
object, but the object of travelling to Italy is more likely to be the arrival to Italy; of course, one 
could say that in the latter case the journey is not the act product but the act process. 
Planning is a clearer example, the planning of a conference, say. The act product is the plan 
of the conference, which may contain such things as a program, a time schedule, a budget 
etc. But the planning is not made for its own sake: the conference, or the conference taking 
place, is the goal, the object of the planning. The act process on the other hand may contain 
such elements as the kind of meetings held, the program committee, and other aspects of 
how the planning was made.
It is now of interest to see how these concepts can be applied to acts such as 
assertions, inferences, observations, verifications, and proving.” (pp. 319 – 321 of Prawitz, D. 
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Comments on the papers, Theoria 64 (Special issue on the philosophy of Dag Prawitz), pp 
283-337, 1998.)
The adoption of such a peculiar teleological metaphysics of proofs is nevertheless not 
to be regarded as the only root of the confidence in the soundness part of the normalisation 
thesis. It makes, one could say, the context become clear in which the idea of β-redexes viz. 
introductions of maximum formulas as irrelevant deductive patterns in a proof – “detours”, as 
they are so often called – sounds like the triviality its proponents seem to consider it to be; i.e.
it exposes the criterion according to which these deductive patterns become intensionally 
innocuous. However, there is also a more extensional, denotationally conceived underpinning 
to the faith in the soundness part of the thesis – one that also gives more substance to the 
denotational terms in which it is formulated. It has to do with a certain approach to proof-
theoretic semantics championed by Prawitz and Dummett, centered in explaining the 
meaning of propositions and logical constants by means of “what counts as (canonical) proofs
of them”; viz. by means of their introduction in proofs. This doctrine is closely related to the so 
called Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation of the logical constants, and might 
be reasonably regarded as favouring a view of proofs as, essentially and before anything 
else, “meaning-makers”, so to speak, for respective logical constants, and, analogously, 
“truth-makers” for respective propositions/assertions. Thus, to illustrate how this doctrine 
provides a basis for the soundness of the normalisation thesis, let us take proofs to be objects
– linguistic, mental or whatever – characterised by the BHK clauses, and natural deduction 
derivations to be linguistic entities that have meaning by virtue of the fact that they denote 
them. When one accepts beforehand such a view of what proofs are as that expressed by the
BHK clauses, it then becomes quite tempting to see normal viz. canonical derivations as 
direct, “disquotational” representatives of proofs; for the structure of these derivations mirrors,
so to speak, the structure of the denoted proof. The reason is that BHK-clauses characterise 
proofs in a recursive way as proofs of a proposition of a given form built out of proofs of other 
propositions by means of operations analogous to the respective introduction rules of natural 
deduction; and this makes their structure match the structure of (inductively conceived) 
normal derivations of formulas which correspond to the propositions of relevant form.  For 
example, the BHK clause for conjunction states that a proof of A∧B  is a pair constituted 
by two proofs, one of A and one of B; analogously, as shown by Prawitz already in his 1965 
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dissertation, a normal derivation of a conjunction is obtained by ultimately joining together, by 
means of the introduction rule for conjunction, two derivations, one for each of the two 
conjuncts (see Prawitz 1971 Ideas and Results, section II.3.2 on the form of normal 
derivations; especially corollary 3.2.4.1). 
However, since derivations are inductively conceived rather than recursively as in the 
case of proofs, and since one may apply elimination rules to build them, there can be non-
normal derivations. Thus, unsurprisingly, when it comes to non-normal derivations, the 
mirroring of the structure of proofs is lost; and with it, the solid reason to regard these 
derivations as representatives of proofs. The normalisation theorem, however, offers a way to 
amend this: it shows not only that but also how one can mechanically “reorganise”, so to 
speak, a non-normal derivation so as to turn it into a normal one.  If one pays close attention 
to the structure of the reductions proposed by Prawitz to remove maximum formulas 
(segments), they are ways of avoiding an application of an elimination rule to obtain a given 
conclusion from a given (major) premiss within a derivation, provided that this premiss was 
itself first obtained by an introduction rule – i.e. it is,  put roughly, a way to enable the 
obtention of the mentioned conclusion without resorting to elimination, provided that its 
premiss was also so obtained. Thus, once the reductions are accepted, a non-normal 
derivation can be seen as a method to obtain a normal derivation – just as the numerical 
expression “117+136” can be seen as a method to obtain the numeral “253”. So, just as 
“117+136” and  “253” denote the same number, namely 253, a (non-normal) derivation and 
the normal derivation to which it reduces – which, as already observed, is unique – are taken 
to denote the very same BHK-proof; the latter directly, the former “indirectly”. And, in general, 
derivations one of which reduces to another denote the same proof. 
In such a theoretical framework, in which proofs are recursively conceived acording to 
the proposition they prove as dictated by the BHK-clauses, it does not at all come as a 
surprise that the point of a proof is to “build” a specific given proposition according to the 
meanings of the constants involved in it – the meanings of which are in turn also determined 
by what their introduction conditions determine to count as proofs of propositions in which 
they are the main connectives. 
Furthermore, it is important to notice that the normalisation thesis was proposed by 
Prawitz as a conjecture: i.e. a possibly true, possibly false description of the conditions under 
which derivations are semantically equivalent. Thus, it is somehow assumed that the aimed 
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relation of semantical equivalence between derivations is, in some sense, founded upon 
some independently given object(s) of investigation, to which one could resort in order to 
decide whether descriptions of it are true or false. Now, it is a clear fact that the normalisation 
thesis lacks any intention of describing how derivations are in practice judged with respect to 
their eventual semantical equivalence – so real life is not fit to play the role of criterion for the 
truth/adequacy of the thesis. But what would then be? It is easy to see that if one takes the 
thesis as a purely intensional, non-denotational account of semantical equivalence between 
derivations in terms of the formal equivalence relation specified by Prawitz, this quite 
inevitably deprives the thesis of the possibility of addressing any relevant “truth-making” 
reality; rather than a possibly true, possibly false description of the conditions under which 
derivations are semantically equivalent, it would thus be a definition of this much. This is of 
course not to claim that such a definition would necessarily be an arbitrary stipulation; there 
could be many ways to argue quite respectably for e.g. the idea that Prawitz’s reductions are 
meaning-preserving. But ultimately, a notion of semantical equivalence so intensionally 
conceived could not be supported by any facts if not by what being semantically equivalent 
eventually means for derivations – i.e. a matter of definition, not of fact. On the other hand, 
when derivations are taken as representatives/descriptions of BHK-proofs, the latter in turn 
taken as independent objects, one can appeal to the fact that these very proofs are 
themselves such that certain (different) derivations – which might even perhaps differ in 
meaning in some other respect – will have viz. share them as their denotation. 
Thus, in a single strike, the mystery around the teleology disolves – well, at least it is 
swept under the carpet: the adoption of a BHK-like view on proofs from the outset of the 
investigation remains simply unjustified24 –; and the conjectural character and denotational 
terms in which the thesis is originally formulated find, together, a reason to be.
Apart from the many and solid direct objections one might  have against this view of 
proofs as meaning- viz. truth-makers and the faithfulness of the particular formalisation of it 
involved in the formulation of the normalisation thesis, there is a disturbing issue regarding 
the (lack of) coherence of this particular approach to proof-theoretic semantics and Prawitz’s 
own philosophical agenda of a general proof theory. According to the author himself, general 
24 One would do well also to remember that the acceptance of such a view on proofs from the outset of the 
investigation breaks one of the guidelines suggested in the previous chapter as essential to the obtainment 
of clarity about how identity of proofs may contribute to our understanding of what a proof is, namely: one 
should not have to rely on a previously fixed conception of what a proof is (BHK in particular) in order to 
adequately account for the question of identity of proofs.
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proof theory is distinguished by the fact that it is a study of proofs “in their own right”. He 
states that “In general proof theory, we are interested in the very notion of proof and its 
properties and impose no restriction on the methods that may be used in the study of this 
notion.” (ideas and results 1971, p.236) – and arguably, as e.g. Kosta Došen puts it, identity of
proofs is at the heart of such a study, for only by means of an adequate account of it can we 
hope to answer satisfactorily the driving question “what is a proof?”. But studying proofs 
inasmuch as they are conceived beforehand as being, essentially and primarily, the semantic 
foundations for the explanation of the meanings of other entities, such as logical constants 
and propositions, is hardly to consider them “in their own right”; rather, their meaning is thus 
reduced and distorted in order to allow for attempts at satisfactorily explaining the meanings 
of other things – things which are undoubtedly relevant and interesting, but the construction of
which does most certainly not exhaust even the central interesting aspects of proofs and their 
potential; not even those within the competence of logic. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how 
an investigation of identity of proofs so conceived could help in any significant way to 
understand what a proof is in a literal and relevant enough sense – after all, the whole 
enterprise, as well as the solution it yields, seem to depend quite heavily on a preconceived 
and quite specific idea of what a proof is. I daresay that, while we keep determined not to give
up a certain way of explaining the meaning of logical constants and propositions by means of 
proofs, our approach to the notion of proof will at best always be viciously biased by a 
semantical goal we force proofs to fulfill from the very outset, and our explanation of their 
identity and nature will thus result unavoidably ad hoc – or, maybe even worse, no more than 
a petitio principii. 
a.1. An objection to the soundness of (αF) suggested by Kosta Došen
In the same text where he suggests the notion of propositional identity (viz. synonymy) 
discussed above, Kosta Došen voices a possible objection to the normalisation thesis. His 
point is that one might doubt the putatively “reliable” direction of the thesis, i.e. its claim to 
soundness, based on the observance of the fact that there are certain βὴ-equivalent 
derivations which generalise  differently viz. to derivations of different formula-schemes. He 
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presents two typed lambda-terms as example, which correspond to the following two 
derivations:
[A⊃A ]1 [A⊃A]2
(A⊃A)∧(A⊃A)
(A⊃A)⊃((A⊃A)∧(A⊃A))
1,2
[A ]3
A⊃A
3
(A⊃A)∧(A⊃A)
≫βη
[A ]1
A⊃A
1
[A]2
A⊃A
2
(A⊃A)∧(A⊃A )
Indeed, while the first derivation cannot be further generalised, the second, which one 
obtains by removing the β-redex/maximum formula that occurs in the first – and is therefore 
βὴ-equivalent to it – clearly generalises to a derivation of (A⊃A)∧(B⊃B) . As Došen himself
points out, this phenomenon does not depend at all on the introduction of conjunction (since 
he discusses lambda-terms, he speaks of surjective pairing), and may arise within purely 
implicational logic ( viz. merely with functional types). The following pairs of (βὴ-)equivalent 
derivations illustrate this point adequately:
[A ]2
C⊃A
[B⊃C ]3 [B]1
C
A
B⊃A
1
A⊃(B⊃A)
2
(B⊃C)⊃(A⊃(B⊃A))
3 ≫β
[A ]1
B⊃A
A⊃(B⊃A)
1
(B⊃C)⊃(A⊃(B⊃A ))
In this example, while the first derivation cannot be further generalised, the second 
clearly generalises to a derivation of C⊃(A⊃(B⊃A )) . 
[A⊃B]2 [A]1
B
A⊃B
1
(A⊃B)⊃(A⊃B)
2 ≪ η
[ A⊃B ]1
(A⊃B)⊃(A⊃B)
1
79
Similarly, in the example above, while the first derivation cannot be further generalised, 
the second generalises to a derivation of A⊃A . 
Notice further that the last two examples above together show that neither β- nor ὴ-
conversion preserve the generality of a derivation in general; not even when we are restricted 
to the minimal implicational fragment of propositional logic. Both β and ὴ reductions may 
obliterate (or create) bonds of variables so that the form of some formula occurrences 
becomes superfluous (or essential) in the reduced derivation, even though they were 
essential resp. superfluous before the reduction. Indeed, such obliterations are what leads to 
the variation in the generality, as observed in the cases just displayed.
a.1.1 Interpretation and radicalisation of Došen’s objection
The idea behind Došen’s objection – viz., that two derivations that generalise differently
should be considered different – is one of the pillars of the generality thesis on identity of 
proofs, addressed by the author in the same text. Interestingly enough, when Prawitz first 
presented the normalisation thesis, he seems to have resorted to the very same idea to give 
some support to the proposal. He presented two different normal derivations – that are 
therefore not βὴ-equivalent and hence ex hypothesi not identical – of the theorem
(A⊃A)⊃(B⊃(A⊃A )) , one of which generalises to a derivation of C⊃(B⊃(A⊃A )) , the 
other to a derivation of A⊃(B⊃A) , and claimed that they are clearly based on different 
“proof ideas” – the elusive concept which plays the role of Holy Grail in the philosophical 
discussion concerning identity of proofs which takes place in the literature. 
Now, the reason to find it odd that two derivations that generalise differently in the way 
the ones above do should be identified/considered equivalent lies on two main assumptions: 
(i) the widespread practice in the literature on identity of proofs of only considering criteria of 
identity belonging to the section “restricted to the result” of the taxonomy proposed here in the
previous chapter; and (ii) the interpretation of the generalisation procedure as somehow 
making explicit  the “real result” (see. e.g. Widebäck 2001, p.53)  proved by means of a 
derivation. In short: the possibility of two proofs of different results being equivalent is most 
usually ruled out from the very outset, and having generalisations with different end-formulas 
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means roughly proving different results. This is a way to explain why the examples presented 
above should be understood as posing a challenge to the normalisation thesis.
In my opinion, this argument against the normalisation thesis is underdeveloped as it 
stands. A light flare of open-mindedness is enough to safeguard the advocate of the thesis 
from the objection: it would suffice them to e.g. drop the idea that the normalisation criterion 
belongs to the section “restricted to the result” of the taxonomy, i.e., accepting that there is no 
problem in principle in identifying proofs of different results – which amounts to simply 
rejecting (i).25 Notwithstanding, some formal facts closely related to the one observed by 
Kosta Došen allow one to ground scepticism towards the normalisation thesis in a more 
robust way. 
THEOREM: Some theorems cannot be obtained as the conclusion of a maximally generalised
closed normal derivation. 
 
In other words, there are theorems which express no “real result” proved by a normal 
derivation. 
PROOF: let us consider the theorem A⊃(A⊃A ) . It is easy to verify that this theorem has 
only two closed normal derivations, namely:
25 Another option also available is, obviously, rejecting (β). This could be done by, say, sticking to the idea that 
the actual end- and undischarged top-formulas of a derivation are perfectly faithful expressions of the result 
proved by means of such derivation. But that seems to yield a notion of proof that is too narrow from the very
outset – in case one maintains (α), for instance, one could not even identify two proofs one of which is a 
proper schematic instance of the other. (β) could of course also be rejected by other means – one, 
suggested to me by Prof. Schroeder-Heister, amounts to considering that what the generalisation procedure 
reveals is not to be understood as the “real result” of the proof carried out by means of a derivation, but 
rather as the “potential” of such a proof – where the potential of a proof is the most general result the 
computation carried out to perform the proof may prove. In such a case, though, it is rather unclear what one 
should consider to be the actual result of a proof: in case it is the end formula of the derivation by means of 
which the proof was performed, we are back to the previous case, i.e. the concept of proof seems too 
narrow; in case it is however the same as the proof’s potential, then there is no real denial of (β). 
Distinguishing any shade of grey between these two options seems difficult, and picking one, if any, would be
just arbitrary – and, as we shall see in the sequel, more extreme options in the direction of the second one 
involve significant problems. 
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[A ]1
A⊃A
1
A⊃(A⊃A)
[A ]1
A⊃A
A⊃(A⊃A )
1  
Clearly, though, neither of the derivations above is maximally generalised: the first can be 
further generalised to a derivation of B⊃(A⊃A) , and the second, to one of A⊃(B⊃A) . 
Q.E.D.
Even if we are under the assumption of the normalisation thesis, this result alone 
merely states that there are some theorems which cannot be derived normally as “real 
results” of some proof. At this point, it could still well be the case that such theorems cannot 
be derived at all as real results of some proof, i.e. as conclusions of a maximally generalised 
derivation – in other words, that such theorems are not real results obtained in proofs at all, 
but rather mere “instances”, so to speak, of what proofs actually prove. However, considering 
the same theorem used as example above, it can be shown that this hypothesis does not hold
in general:
THEOREM: There are theorems that cannot be derived as conclusions of maximally 
generalised closed normal derivations but that can be derived as conclusions of non-normal 
maximally generalised closed derivations.
PROOF: As shown above, the theorem A⊃(A⊃A ) cannot be derived as conclusion of a 
maximally generalised closed normal derivation. It is nevertheless the conclusion of the 
following maximally generalised non-normal closed derivation:
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[A ]1
A⊃A
A⊃(A⊃A )
1
[A⊃A ]4 [A ]2
A
A⊃A
[A⊃A]4 [A]3
A
A
A⊃A
2
A⊃(A⊃A)
3
(A⊃A)⊃(A⊃(A⊃A ))
4
[A ]5
A⊃A
5
A⊃(A⊃A)
Q.E.D.
A possibility closely related to the one the general validity of which was just refuted by 
the example above is indeed rhetorically entertained by Hindley in his 1997 Basic Simple 
Type Theory, p.93; there, the author wonders about an eventual “aristocracy” of implicational 
theorems that are principal types of some closed lambda-term (i.e., by Curry-Howard, 
theorems that are conclusions of some maximally generalised closed derivation), in 
opposition to an eventual class of implicational theorems that are principal types of no 
lambda-term. He rules this possibility out in the immediate sequel, however, by presenting the
so called converse principal type theorem, which in the present context could be given the 
following formulation:
THEOREM (CPT theorem): every implicational theorem can be obtained as the conclusion of 
some maximally generalised closed derivation.
PROOF: See Hindley’s presentation in Basic Simple Type Theory (from p.93). Q.E.D.
(CPT theorem, together with the normalisation theorem, directly yields a corollary:
COROLLARY (weak “principalisation”): Every implicational theorem A has a derivation Π that 
can be turned into a maximally generalised derivation Π’ of A exclusively by means of β- and 
ὴ-conversions.
83
PROOF: Direct consequence of CPT and normalisation. Q.E.D.
Given this, one might find it worth pursuing a proof of what would be a stronger result:
Conjecture (“principalisation”): Every derivation Π of an implicational theorem A can be turned
into a maximally generalised derivation Π’ of A exclusively by means of β- and ὴ-conversions.
Or maybe an even stronger:
Conjecture (strong “principalisation”): Every sequence of βὴ-reduction of every derivation Π of
an implicational theorem A contains a maximally generalised derivation Π’ of A.
The corollary itself is at best somewhat suggestive, but any of these conjectures, if proved, 
should show an interesting connection between β- and ὴ- conversions and the property of 
maximal generality of a derivation. This could indeed ground a reinterpretation of the notion of
normality of derivations to be attached to such conversions, alternative to that of Prawitz. One
could thus understand normality and normal forms of derivations as having to do with bonds 
of variables and maximal generality, the alternative guiding notions, instead of subformula 
principle and absence of “detours” – to be normal would then mean to be a derivation of its 
own principal type, rather than a detour-free derivation of its conclusion.)
Now, the combination of the first with any of the two latter results just presented – no 
matter if the stronger or the weaker, which follows from it – provides a good argument against 
the normalisation thesis. If one takes seriously the idea that principal types – i.e. results of 
maximally generalised derivations – are good formal counterparts of the results of proofs 
carried out by means of their respective derivations (or, at any rate, that they are better formal
counterparts of these than end-formulas taken crudely, which seems plausible), then these 
results entail that there are some results of proofs that simply cannot be proved normally viz. 
canonically.
Were the problem merely the existence of proofs of different results in a same class of 
equivalence, as Došen’s point seems to suggest, then it could in principle still be the case that
the results of non-normal derivations “altered” by means of the normalisation procedure could 
be obtained by means of some other canonical derivation than that to which the non-normal 
derivation in question reduces. Furthermore, as pointed above, the advocate of the 
normalisation thesis could still simply relax its original requirements and accept that proofs of 
different results can be identified. But the problem is actually more serious: since there are 
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some real results which can only be obtained non-canonically, the notion of canonical proof 
that underlies and motivates philosophically the normalisation thesis is incomplete with 
respect to the results that can be proved. This means that, for the sake of the completeness 
of the deductive system with respect to what we have understood as the actual results of 
proofs, we simply cannot do without non-normal viz. non-canonical derivations. 
From a merely formal standpoint, this situation indeed implies the existence of an 
“aristocracy” of theorems; though one of a different kind from that hypothesised by Hindley. 
This would consist in the set of theorems which can be proved as conclusions of maximally 
generalised normal derivations, in opposition to those which cannot, i.e. those which can be 
proved normally only if not as a conclusion of a maximally generalised closed derivation 
(which are all others, by the normalisation theorem), those which can be proved as a 
conclusion of a maximally generalised closed derivation only if not normally (which 
encompass at least all other implicational ones, by the CPT theorem presented above), and 
eventually also those which cannot be proved as a conclusion of a maximally generalised 
closed derivation at all (if any; I do not know whether or not there are such theorems). 
How to interpret the meaning of the existence of such an aristocracy is of course a 
debatable matter. One could, for instance, take the membership in the aristocracy as the 
proper criterion to understand what a real result of a proof is, and indeed return to an 
understanding of the normalisation thesis as belonging to its original category in the 
taxonomy, viz. restricted to the result. This would nevertheless bring about the rather unusual 
consequence that the actual result proved by, say, a maximally generalised derivation of
A⊃(A⊃A ) is in fact expressed by either A⊃(B⊃A) or B⊃(A⊃A) , which are the 
conclusions of the correspondent possible maximally generalised normal forms of such a 
derivation – and that, in general, some theorems, including some that are conclusions of 
maximally generalised closed derivations, do not really express proof results. 
But still, even if one does not go this way and prefers accepting that there can be equal
proofs of different results, the semantical significance of the existence of such an aristocracy 
within the context of the Prawitz-Dummett proof-theoretic semantics that underpins the 
normalisation thesis is quite heavy: given that the meaning of a proposition is established by 
what counts as a canonical proof of it, and that a proposition expressed by a theorem not 
belonging to the aristocracy – e.g. A⊃(A⊃A ) – has no such proof (the fact that its 
correspondent theorem has such a derivation being here irrelevant, for, given the 
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assumptions under which we now are, this theorem is not the proper expression of the result 
of the proof carried out by means of such a derivation), its meaning (say, as a valid 
proposition)  is at the very best inevitably subordinated to, or dependent on the meaning of 
the aristocrats with which it is related, namely the conclusions of the maximal generalisations 
of the normal forms of the maximally generalised derivations of which it is a conclusion – in 
the case of the example given, A⊃(B⊃A) and B⊃(A⊃A) . Given the fact that the 
deductive construction of A⊃(A⊃A ) – and of at least any implicational theorem whatsoever,
for that matter – as the expression of the result of a proof which by no means demands – or 
even allows – more general conclusions is perfectly possible, it is very odd to tie oneself to a 
semantics that implies a dependence of the proof-theoretic meaning of the non-aristocrats on 
that of the aristocrats merely for the sake of sustaining that β- and ὴ- conversions are identity 
preserving. In a sentence: there is hardly any reason that is not essentially ad hoc why 
normality (understood as freedom of “detours”) should be seen as playing a more prominent 
role than principality (understood as maximal generalisation of a derivation with preservation 
of the structure of inference rules and assumption discharges) in the proper comprehension of
identity of proofs .
It is therefore not merely because reductions may alter the result proved by means of a
derivation, but rather because only by means of non-normal derivations can we express 
proofs of certain results – a rather different formal fact –  that it seems really strange to 
believe that the differences between normal and non-normal forms of derivations in general 
are innocuous in any sense relevant to the discussion of identity of proofs.   
a.2. Feferman’s objection to the normalisation thesis
In his 1975 review of Prawitz 1971 Ideas and Results, Feferman suggested a very 
sensible and startlingly obvious objection to the proposal on identity of proofs put forward in 
the article. It is, in essence, the following: one cannot be expected to accept that a derivation 
that is more informative than some other in a relevant way is equivalent to it viz. represent the
same proof the latter does; and it is obviously the case that, by means of reductions, pieces of
information – pieces of what can indeed be regarded as essential information – can be simply
86
wiped out of a derivation. The author gives as an example “a derivation D which ends with
of ∀ x A (x) followed by (∀−elimination) to get an instance A(t). Let  
D reduce to D' in n.f. [normal form]. In general, we know more from D than we do from D' and 
we would say D and D' represent distinct proofs.” 
Feferman’s line of thought in this objection is not only far from extravagant, but also 
apparently intimately connected to a question that arguably helped prompting the interest on 
the investigation of identity of proofs, which finds good expression in a quote attributed to 
Kreisel: “What more do we know if we have proved a theorem by restricted means than if we 
merely know that it is true?”  Put roughly, it seems that the initial discussion in the sixties and 
early seventies on identity of proofs hinges upon the initial assumption that two proofs of a 
same given result can bring about different pieces of knowledge; hence, it seems quite natural
to infer that a proof that clearly yields less knowledge than some other cannot be reasonably 
considered identical to it – i.e., that what one gets to know by means of a proof is an essential
trait of the proof’s identity.
If read in an even more abstract register, Feferman’s objection can actually be seen as 
a sort of general case instantiated by the objection described in III.2.a.1. The idea is, as 
stated before, that cutting off or, in general, altering information that might be regarded as 
essential from a proof is not identity preserving in general; and the variable bonds erased and
created by the reductions can be understood as precisely such sort of information.
Notwithstanding the fact that he rejects the normalisation thesis on identity of proofs 
based on this argument, Feferman does see some significance in the formal relations 
involved in its formulation. On that matter, he claims: 
“Even if it does not settle the relation of identity between proofs, the work described by 
Prawitz may give simple syntactic explanations of other familiar relations and operations, for 
example, for the idea of one proof specializing to another or of extracting from a proof just 
what is needed for its particular conclusion. Obvious formal candidates for these are the 
relation: [proof] D followed by ∀ -elimination reduces to [proof] D'; and the operation, 
normalize [proof] D, respectively.” 
It is worth noting that Feferman makes this point in a way that might give rise to some 
confusion. The idea of “extracting from a proof just what is needed for its particular 
conclusion” can be taken in such a way as to demand that one knows beforehand certain 
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things regarding the identity of the proof represented by the derivation under scrutiny. In 
particular, to justify the claim that normalisation would be a good way of “extracting from a 
proof just what is needed for its particular conclusion”, one would have to know that, say, no 
part of a normal derivation could be regarded as not “needed”with respect to the particular 
conclusion of the proof it represents – which would clearly imply that e.g. no two distinct 
normal derivations could represent the same proof. But such assumptions would not be 
justified in the absence of a theory on identity of proofs such as e.g. Prawitz’s. The possibility 
of such a reading – which is of course neither the only nor the best possible one – of 
Feferman’s suggestion could be avoided, however, by substituting the notion of “just what is 
needed” by a notion of just what is relevant along the lines described in footnote 22 above.   
Be that as it may, Prawitz 1981 p.249 answers to this objection by suggesting that if 
one sees proofs not “as a collection of sentences but as the result of applying certain 
operations to obtain a certain end result”, his thesis is safeguarded from the threat posed by 
Feferman’s observation – the truth of which he recognises as undeniable, however. 
Just what was meant by “the result of applying certain operations to obtain a certain 
end result” and exactly how this is opposed to “a collection  of sentences” is of course not 
very clear; but this is not a matter on which I intend to dwell right now. Let us rather notice the 
peculiarity of Prawitz’s argumentative move here, which in short consists of stating which 
informal conception of “proof” is in fact properly described by his theory on identity of proofs. 
In the first place, it seems that a more solid interpretation of Feferman’s argument is 
that it is a criticism precisely to the relevance, importance or even acceptability in the context 
in question of an informal notion of proof the identity of which is insensible to such relevant 
semantic changes as the one it points at. Hence, Prawitz claim that his formal proposal 
matches a given informal notion of proof which displays such shortcomings is not really an 
answer, and does nothing to put his proposal out of the reach of Feferman’s point.
Let us nevertheless suppose, for the sake of the argument, that Prawitz interpreted 
Feferman’s criticism in an adequate way, and it really is the case that the reviewer merely 
failed to understand which informal concept of proof was at stake in his formal proposal on 
identity of proofs. If this is really the case, then Prawitz could have answered to any criticism 
whatsoever to his (or indeed any other) formal proposal with smaller or larger amounts of 
creativity – i.e. by claiming to have intended to describe a certain notion of proof (regardless 
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of how abstruse) that happens to match the formal proposal in question. Regarding this point, 
Troelstra is quite precise in an observation made in his Non-extensional equality:
“If we think of the objects of the theory as ‘direct proofs’ whose canonical descriptions are 
normal deductions (cf. numbers and numerals in the case of arithmetic), then the inference 
rules →I, →E correspond to certain operations on direct proofs; the normalisation theorem 
then establishes that these operations are always defined, and permits us to regard any 
deduction as a description of a direct proof. The conjecture [i.e. the normalisation thesis] in 
the direction <= [soundness] then becomes trivially true.
But if the deductions are seen as descriptions of a more general concept of proof (...) 
(in the same manner as closed terms are descriptions of computations in the case of 
arithmetic) it may be argued that intensional equality should correspond to (literal) equality of 
deductions; and then the conjecture is false.
So, without further information about the intended concept of proof, the conjecture in 
the direction <= [soundness] is meaningless because, as just explained, ambiguous.”
It thus hardly seems that a real debate happened after all. Indeed, it looks like 
Feferman merely pointed at something that he – quite understandably – deems an essential 
trait of proofs to which Prawitz’s formal characterisation of identity of proofs does not make 
justice; and that Prawitz, instead of either somehow disputing the essentiality of this trait to 
the notion of proof or showing why his notion does not disregard it, was contented to 
formulate an informal notion of proof that he deems acceptable without further and the identity
of which is insensitive to this trait.
Notice that, while voicing the above objection to the normalisation thesis, that 
significantly shares Feferman’s line of reasoning, Troelstra also argues that the kind of 
conception of proof Feferman mobilises in his objection suggests us to regard the issue of 
identity of proofs as somehow reducing to the uninteresting relation of explicit syntactical 
identity between derivations:  
“… if the deductions are seen as descriptions of a more general concept of proof [than that of 
“direct proof”](…) it may be argued that intensional equality [viz. identity of proofs] should 
correspond to (literal) equality of deductions; and then the conjecture is false.”
This might indeed be seen as a more explicit expression of the same accusation 
Prawitz quite subtly suggested about Feferman’s idea on proofs and their identity with the 
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expression “collection of sentences”. Be that as it may, it is at best an overstatement: there is 
clearly more to be made with Feferman’s point than just abruptly interpreting every syntactical
variation as relevant for the semantic value of a derivation qua proof. We shall now suggest 
an adaptation of the normalisation thesis to meet the expectations expressed by Feferman in 
the mentioned review. As will be clear, the key idea in it is to differentiate between redundant 
and irrelevant maximal formulas.
a.2.1.  (A sketch of) an adaptation of the normalisation thesis to Feferman’s point
The normalisation thesis can be regarded as based upon the understanding that 
derivations represent proofs the result of which is the semantic value of their end-formulas, or,
more elaborately, a relation of logical consequence between the semantic value of their end-
formulas and the semantic value of their set of undischarged top-formulas. This depiction of 
the meaning of derivations arguably allows the distortion of a lot of what one could sensibly 
consider as interesting and informative deductive content encoded in a derivation into nothing
but irrelevant detours, which could therefore be eliminated "salva identitate demonstrationum"
– this is what Feferman's remark in his review of Ideas and Results points to. In other words, 
the normalisation criterion for identity of proofs depends on a rather partial account of what 
proofs are – most especially, of what proofs prove –, which thus turns it into something as 
trustworthy and adequate for identifying proofs in certain contexts as a butcher's cleaver is for
performing neurosurgery. We should therefore consider alternative ways of understanding OF
and FROM what a proof represented by a given derivation is – i.e. what occupies the places 
of consequent and antecedent in the relation of consequence that is here taken as the result 
of the proof. 
To try and incorporate Feferman’s point in an identity criterion based on normalisation, 
we start by considering that a derivation could in principle represent a proof of any of its 
“partial results” - i.e. of any one of the relations of logical consequence between the 
semantical value of its suitable sets of formulas –  that is to say, once we assume that a 
derivation represents a proof of something from something, we conclude that a derivation is 
either ambiguous with respect to the proof it represents, or simply represents many proofs the
result of which is a relation of consequence between a set of hypotheses and a conclusion. 
Given the proper restrictions, such a proof could be of anything from anything it contains – 
and this seems as unbiased, as “general” in spirit as possible in the framework of the basic 
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assumption that the result of a proof is a relation of consequence between assumptions and 
conclusion. We could also of course just say that the proof represented by a given derivation 
is the set of all proofs it contains in the former sense.
We can thus start by performing a complete analysis, so to speak, of the deductive 
information of a given derivation. This can be achieved by writing a list of every subderivation 
of  the derivation under scrutiny  – this guarantees that no deductive content shall be lost in 
eventual reduction processes we decide to perform. After this, we normalise each of these 
subderivations, in an attempt to separate, as suggested by Feferman, just what was relevant 
in them for the obtainment of the respective end-formula from the top ones.  After that, we can
discard all normal forms thereby obtained which are subderivations of some other normal 
form obtained – for they would consist in superfluous repetitions of deductive information. The
set of derivations that comes out of this will clearly contain only the normal forms of 
subderivations of the original derivation which contain the “necessary material” for the 
obtainment of each one of the formulas that occur in the original derivation as conclusion of 
some subderivation, without any repetitions or irrelevancies. Now, this set is to be understood 
as expressing the identity value of the original derivation. This gives an analysis of the 
meaning of derivations that preserves their “informational” content as would please Feferman,
and quite naturally allows for richer comparisons between them than mere identification or 
distinction. One could e.g. spot which common normal forms show up in the analyses of two 
given derivations and understand what they have in common in spite of being eventually 
distinct. In an analogy, one could explain the difference between Prawitz’s approach and the 
present one in the following way: while the first pictures proofs as paths towards a single end 
destination that can be either directly or indirectly trod, the second conceives them as a multi-
destination paths and analyses them as a “composition”, so to speak, of the direct version of 
all single-destination paths that are trod between its appropriate points.  Let us thus try and 
formulate the idea more clearly by stating the following: the identity value of a derivation Π is 
the set of the expanded normal forms Σ’i of all subderivations Σi of Π such that no Σ’i is a 
subderivation of some Σ’j , i≠j.  It is easy to see that the identity value of a derivation is unique,
which shows that this way of dealing with identity of proofs yields no ambiguous derivations.
Let us now assume that two derivations represent the same proof iff they have the 
same identity value according to the definition just given. Let us consider as example of this 
idea the analyses of the following two derivations Π and Π’:
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[ A]1
A⊃A
1
A
A B
A∧B
and
[A ]1 B
A∧B
A
A⊃A
1
In the identity value obtained for the derivation to the left, there will clearly be a 
derivation which  is not in the identity value corresponding to that to the right, and vice-versa: 
they are, respectively:
A⊃A A
A
and
A∧B
A
All other subderivations, however, are present in both sets. These two derivations are 
thus not to be identified, but they share most of their deductive information. Now, if we were to
consider the following derivation Π’’:
[ A]1
A∨A [A ]2 [ A]2
A
2
A⊃A
1
According to the normalisation thesis, Π’’ is identical to Π’. Even so, according to the criterion 
we are now considering, Π’’ clearly has less in common with Π’ than Π, which e.g. does not 
even share its end-formula.
In accordance with Feferman’s suggestion, then, reducibility assumes here a totally 
different role: instead of identifying derivations, it has to do with selecting all relevant content 
in  subderivations, so that in the end solely certain innocuous repetitions will be discarded 
from a derivations identity value. This way of conceiving of identity of proofs thus enables the 
attribution of an important role to the semantic significance of normalisation in the context of 
identity of proofs without having to rely on a teleology of proofs as heavy as the one that 
seems to underpin the normalisation thesis.
b. Claiming the completeness of (αF): the case for (β) or the reasons why Post-completeness 
(maximality) does not favour the normalisation thesis.
As mentioned previously, point (β) is frequently treated by the literature as a sort of 
Achilles heel of the normalisation thesis. This much is clear since Prawitz’s first formulation of 
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it, which is followed by his explicit acknowledgement that, while “it seems evident” that “a 
proper reduction does not affect the  identity of the proof represented”26,   it is “more difficult to
find facts that would support” this half of the “conjecture”27. He nevertheless refers us to the 
text of Kreisel published in the same volume, in which the latter attributes to Barendregt an 
idea that would be a way out of this situation: a proof of the eventual Post-completeness of 
the notion of identity determined by the normalisation thesis. The core of the idea is that the 
Post-completeness of an intended formalisation of the notion of identity of proofs would be a 
decisive argument for its completeness in case its soundness is granted28.
To bring the following points to an adequate level of clarity and self-containment, it will 
be convenient to provide a precise enough explanation of what we are referring to when 
talking of Post-completeness here. Thus, let ≡ be a relation of equivalence that holds between
derivations. We first say that a relation ≡’ is an (Γ, A)-extension of ≡ iff there are two 
derivations Π and Σ of A from Γ such that Π  Σ and Π ≡’ Σ. A relation ≡ is understood as ≢
Post-complete with respect to (Γ, A) iff its only (Γ, A)-extension is the trivial relation, i.e. the 
relation that makes all derivations of A from Γ equivalent. A relation ≡ is thus Post-complete in 
case it is Post-complete with respect to every (Γ, A).
The structure of the argument is roughly the following: Suppose that (i) a given relation 
≡ is sound with respect to identity of proofs; (ii) ≡ is also Post-complete; and (iii) identity of 
proofs  is not a trivial relation. Now suppose further, for absurdity, that (iv) ≡ is not complete 
with respect to identity of proofs. Then, by (i) and (iv), there would be more proofs of A from Γ 
identical than those already identified by ≡ – i.e. the set of proofs identified by ≡ would be a 
proper subset of the set of all identical proofs. But given (ii), this would in turn imply that 
26 Some doubt is nevertheless put, as already mentioned, upon the permutative reductions, for they are not 
based on the inversion principle, which supposedly justifies the purported identity-preserving character of β 
and ὴ.
27 Regardless of the fact that it has initially been announced as a conjecture, I purposefully eschew the 
terminology “conjecture” when referring to the normalisation thesis. In contexts that are mathematical enough
– such as that of the present discussion of identity of proofs –, a conjecture is something that is, at least in 
principle, a candidate to be mathematically proved or disproved – or, at the very least, being mathematically 
shown to be undecidable. This is however obviously not the case of the normalisation thesis, which merely 
puts forward a mathematically precise definition of what being (identical to) a specific proof , say Π, would 
be, which should be either accepted or rejected (or neither) on ultimately informal grounds.
28 Some have indeed seen the obtainment of such Post-completeness results as the central step in what they 
call a proof of completeness in case of soundness. See the abstract of Widebäck 2001: “The main result of 
this thesis is that the completeness part of the conjecture is true for the system of minimal implicational logic,
provided that soundness can be taken for granted. The result is obtained by first proving that the notion of 
βὴ-equivalence is Post-complete. (…)It is then argued that the identity relation on proofs is non-trivial, i.e. 
that there are non-identical proofs. This proves the completeness part of the conjecture.” 
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identity of proofs is trivial. By (iii), however, this is absurd. Then we deny (iv) and admit that ≡ 
is complete. To facilitate understandability, let us organise this argument more graphically:
(i) [(iv)] ¹
The set of proofs identified by ≡is a proper subset of the set of all identical proofs . (ii)
identity of proofs is trivial . (iii)
⊥
≡is complete .
1
Now, supported by this reasoning, and thanks to the already high level of confidence in
the soundness part of the normalisation thesis (which amounts to confidence in premiss (i)), 
the actual obtainment of Post-completeness results concerning the identity relation 
corresponding to the normalisation thesis (cf. e.g. abstract of Widebäck 2001 and Došen 
2003, p.14) (which amounts to an authorisation to affirm premiss (ii)) has been widely 
regarded as the until then missing stamp of approval on the completeness part of the 
normalisation thesis; and thus, as a strong reason for accepting the thesis as a whole.  There 
are, however, severe problems with this line of thought, which we shall analyse subsequently. 
Indeed, we shall argue that the Post-completeness results not only not necessarily favour but 
also may possibly play against the acceptance of the normalisation thesis, depending on 
one’s assumptions.
b.1) Post-completeness is neither essential nor decisive as an argument for completeness: 
Firstly, one should remember that the Post-completeness results only yield a “proof” of 
completeness under the condition that soundness – and also an additional premiss, 
represented above as (iii) – is assumed beforehand. It is easy to see that, instead of denying 
premiss (iv) in the last step of the argument above, one could have simply denied (i), i.e. one 
could have denied soundness – a fact which all by itself shows how very mistaken is the idea 
that such results do themselves favour the normalisation thesis. Clearly, one could have 
reasons to look at the picture upside-down and consider the Post-completeness of the notion 
of identity determined by the thesis a quite serious drawback of it – say, due to some very 
clear and appealing example of two non-equivalent derivations which should be considered 
as expressing the same proof (see e.g. synonymous derivations in section IV.2.a). The 
condition that soundness is to be “assumed beforehand” has, thus, a very strong meaning: far
more than merely assuming the soundness part of the thesis as one of the initial hypotheses 
that could in principle be somehow discharged, one must commit to sustaining it throughout 
the argument so that the desired conclusion, i.e. completeness, can be reached. In this 
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argument, completeness depends on soundness, regardless of how reasonable it is to 
assume soundness. 
Now, one may accept soundness as a premiss for different reasons (the seemingly 
strongest of them, the proof-theoretic semantic framework of Prawitz and Dummett, already 
described in section III.2.a, is of course highly questionable; but this fact is now off the point). 
One may also do this much for no reason at all, only for the sake of the argument. Each of 
these cases will be treated respectively in the next two subsections.
b.1.1) Let us then suppose that our acceptance of soundness stems from some very solidly 
grounded motivation – say, the semantical background considerations presented in section 
III.2.a. These suggest that reductions should be deemed identity preserving due to their being
based on the so-called inversion principle. But if that is so, there are no other derivations to 
be considered as reasonable candidates to being identical other than those already identified 
by the equivalence relation determined by the reductions involved in normalisation: for it is 
clear from the very outset that no other two derivations may differ only up to at most what the 
inversion principle determines as “detours”. So, in this case, the reason to affirm soundness 
already grants us completeness – for an adequate formulation of the inversion principle 
should allow us to systematically arrive at the complete set of accepted reductions.
To provide ourselves a more palpable illustration of this argument, let us remember 
how Prawitz formulates the inversion principle: “Let α be an application of an elimination rule 
that has B as consequence. Then, deductions that satisfy the sufficient condition (…) for 
deriving the major premiss of α, when combined with deductions of the minor premisses of α 
(if any), already “contain” a deduction of B; the deduction of B is thus obtainable directly from 
the given deductions without the addition of α.”
As already pointed out in section III.2.a, the principle refers first to the following 
deductive pattern:
Π1, ... ,Πn
*n(A1, ... , An1)
*
n
- introduction
Γ1
⋮
C1
⋯
Γm
⋮
Cm
B
α  
Its claim is roughly that B, the conclusion, could always be obtained by eschewing the 
introduction of *n (A1, …,An) in the following way:
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Γi
⋮
C i
⋮
Π j
⋮
B
As it happens, the inversion principle does evidently not hold for just any constant we 
could make up by bundling together randomly picked introduction and elimination rules. The 
result of substituting an instance of the first deductive pattern for one of the second for a given
constant * could well turn out not to be a derivation.  But it is quite clear that, for each of the 
intended constants, it is possible to substitute the respective instances of the first deductive 
pattern for one of the second while preserving the “good formation” (as well as the rest of the 
structure) of the derivation where they occur untouched. In other words, the reduction steps 
associated with each constant are direct instances of the more abstract reduction scheme we 
call the inversion principle. But that is not all. It is also clearly the case that other possible 
reductions concerning the intended constants are not direct instances of the inversion 
principle.
Of course, one could question whether or not the inversion principle is the only 
principle capable of motivating identity preserving transformations on derivations –- just as 
e.g. Kant believed that dictum de omni and dictum de nullo were the only principles ultimately 
capable of justifying the logical validity of inferences of reason. It is a matter of strong 
controversy whether or not some alternative reductions already suggested in the literature do 
qualify as identity preserving in some sense29. For instance, it could be argued that 
substituting the application of the introduction rule for an application of ex falso quodlibet with 
the same conclusion in the usual redexes yields yet another kind of redex, to be reduced 
without loss of identity in the same way as the correspondent usual ones. It could also be 
argued that synonymous derivations in the sense of section IV.2.a are identical. In any case, 
for all such possibilities, the same kind of remark made with respect to the inversion principle 
applies: they are ultimately the expression of principles that can – at least in principle –- be 
expressed in such a way that we know quite precisely whether or not there could be more 
29 This qualification – “identity preserving in some sense” – is actually of vital importance to the matter under 
discussion. The Post-completeness of a given set of principles deemed identity preserving in one sense 
means nothing with respect to its compatibility with another one deemed identity preserving in some other 
sense. Indeed, there should be no question regarding their compatibility: it would be comparing apples and 
oranges. All considerations in this subsection start from the assumption that all potentially identity preserving 
principles are so in the same sense, even if for different reasons.
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ways to identify derivations by virtue of them apart from the ones at hand.  Thus, with each 
principle that motivates the identification of distinct derivations, the reason to support its 
soundness should already bring with itself the argument to support its completeness. 
Those remarks considered, there are however two points that still make Post-
completeness look appealing in this scenario. The first is the one that has directly to do with 
completeness: it is the, say, sceptical consideration that there may be more principles fit to 
identify distinct derivations than the ones we (can) understand as such. But in such a case, 
we would be in a situation where there is no reason at all at hand to grant soundness to any 
of those supposed principles. The Post-completeness of the set of justified principles could 
thus serve as means to preclude the possibility that derivations no one has ever thought 
about as even possible candidates to being identical are understood as identical. Giving Post-
completeness as an argument to support completeness in such a setting is thus an inversion 
of the burden of proof, so to speak: for one should first come up with a reason that may 
satisfactorily justify the identification of further derivations than those already identified by 
justifiedly accepted principles before meaningfully challenging the completeness of such 
principles with respect to identity of proofs. The second reason concerns completeness only 
indirectly; it has to do with the possibility of “coexistence”, so to speak, of a given set of 
principles of identification of derivations with others. Let us assume we have two sets of 
principles that may induce equivalence relations between derivations. It may well be the case 
that the eventual union of these principles provokes a collapse; namely, that the equivalence 
relation induced by their union turns out to be trivial, even in case this does not happen when 
these principles are taken separately. Suppose now that we have good reasons to understand
both of them as being among those deemed identity preserving, and also that their union 
causes the kind of collapse described. Then, clearly, we must sacrifice something to avoid 
contradicting ourselves: either we give up the soundness of at least one of these sets of 
principles, in spite of having equally good reasons to understand them as sound; or we give 
up the idea that identity of proofs is not trivial. Now, the eventual Post-completeness of a 
given such set of principles poses, before anything else, a particular, in a sense limiting case 
of this kind of short blanket situation. Namely this: the union of a Post-complete set of 
principles with any other will cause the collapse of the corresponding equivalence relation 
between derivations. So, if a Post-complete set of principles is deemed sound with respect to 
identity of proofs together with any other further set of principles – even if for equally good 
and strong reasons –, then the choice must be made: either, on the one hand, we discard its 
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soundness or the soundness of all further sets of principles; or, on the other, we give up the 
non-triviality of identity of proofs. So, as claimed above, the eventual Post-completeness of a 
given set of principles indeed gives us information on how fit it is to coexist with others in the 
set of those which one deems identity preserving, namely: not at all. Whether this should 
count as a reason to take it as complete and disregard the reasons why others should also be
deemed sound with respect to identity of proofs; or as a reason to deny its soundness with 
respect to identity of proofs in spite of the reasons we have to sustain it; is a matter for which 
its Post-completeness is all by itself utterly irrelevant. 
b.1.2) These last remarks take us already to the case in which we decide to grant soundness 
to a given set of principles with respect to identity of proofs for no systematic reason, e.g. 
because the reductions seem intuitively identity preserving, or even arbitrarily, say, just for the
sake of argumentation. In such a setting, an argument for completeness is really due. Again in
this case, though, Post-completeness would not suffice as a reason to accept the thesis as a 
whole. For one could in principle have other sets of reductions resp. equivalent derivations to 
which one could be willing to grant soundness for equal reasons, and which one could simply 
decide to favour as sound while discarding the assumption of the soundness of the previous, 
Post-complete one. In principle, such sets could even be proved to be also Post-complete; 
which would then preclude even the possibility of fallaciously using Post-completeness as a 
reason ad hoc to favour the election of any of the alternatives. To facilitate understandability, 
let us try to describe this reasoning by structuring the premisses of the argument as made just
above, and then display it more graphically.
Thus, just as in the case of ≡, let us start by supposing that (i’) a given relation ≡’ is 
sound with respect to identity of proofs. Once more analogously, suppose also that (ii’) ≡’ is 
Post-complete; and, as before, that (iii) identity of proofs is not a trivial relation. Suppose 
further that (iv’) ≡’ is not complete with respect to identity of proofs. Obviously, as in the case 
of ≡, by (i’) and (iv’), there would be more proofs of A from Γ identical than those already 
identified by ≡’ – i.e. the set of proofs identified by ≡’ would be a proper subset of the set of all 
identical proofs. But given (ii’), this would in turn imply that identity of proofs is trivial. By (iii), 
however, this is absurd. Then we deny (iv’) and admit that ≡’ is complete. Graphically:
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(i ' ) [(iv ' )] ¹
The set of proofs identified by ≡' is a proper subset of the set of all identical proofs . (ii ')
identity of proofs is trivial . (iii)
⊥
≡' is complete .
1
Now, let us call these two arguments – the one that concludes the completeness of ≡ and the 
one that concludes the completeness of ≡’ – Π and Π’, respectively.  Let us also note explicitly
the assumption that defines the role of ≡’ in the argument, namely that (i≠) ≡’ and ≡ do not 
have the same extension. Now, putting Π and Π’ side by side together with (i≠) clearly leads to
absurdity. We thus face the following situation: to avoid absurdity, we should deny (i), (ii), (iii), 
(i’), (ii’) or (i≠). But none of the options seems justifiable: (ii) and (ii’) are treated as facts; (iii) is
what gives the whole discussion its raison d’être; (i≠) is merely devised to prevent the 
identification of ≡ with ≡’; and there is no reason to favour (i) instead of (i’) or vice-versa. Not 
even the possibility of seeing in the mere Post-completeness of ≡ some kind of motivation for 
denying (i’) or (i≠) ad hoc – which in any case would be completely insufficient as an 
argument – is at hand, for the hypothesis is exactly that ≡’ is also Post-complete (and this also
holds vice-versa, of course). The choice of any of the two alternatives in such a setting would 
then be unavoidably arbitrary. Graphically:
{ [(i)] , [(ii)] , [(iii)]}
Π
≡ is complete
{ [(i ' )] ,[(ii ' )] ,[ (iii)]}
Π '
≡' iscomplete [ i≠]
⊥
?? ?
Thus, in the first-place, while (ii’) remains a possibility, the burden is upon the shoulders
of the proponent of the Post-completeness argument to show that it can be safely denied – 
i.e. to avoid the possibility that her argument leads to a dead-end absurdity, the proponent 
must still show that no other relation of equivalence between derivations that can be 
considered sound with respect to identity of proofs is Post-complete. Secondly, even if she 
manages to ascertain this much, the reward is too poor: a certificate that no other equivalence
relation can be considered complete for the same ad hoc and – no matter how mathematically
convenient – philosophically insatisfactory reason that the one proved Post-complete can.
The exposition just carried out portraits far more faithfully the significance of Post-
completeness results concerning this discussion than the usual device of using them as 
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pieces of propaganda in favour of the normalisation thesis or some other formal 
characterisation of identity of proofs that enjoy this mathematical property. 
b.2) The conclusion drawn from premisses (i) and (iv) that there would be more proofs of A 
from Γ identical than ≡ identifies is only possible in the presence of an additional, implicit 
assumption: that identity of proofs is understood, from the very outset and independently of 
the normalisation thesis itself, as a relation that identifies only proofs carried out by means of 
derivations which share the same conclusion and undischarged hypotheses. This actually 
amounts to a way of placing the normalisation thesis in the category “restricted to the result” 
of our taxonomy. Let us now briefly consider the significance of this taxonomic decision. 
The formalisation of the core notion of irrelevance discussed above as the famous 
“detours” of Prawitz is per se of an ambiguous nature. On the one hand, one might regard this
formalisation as somehow conceived within the limits of a previously accepted restriction 
upon the notion of identity of proofs which places it under the category restricted to the result 
in our taxonomy – a restriction that would not only be understood as independent of how the 
notion of irrelevance should be specifically understood in the context of identity of proofs, but 
also as having the very notion of irrelevance under its jurisdiction. On the other hand, one 
might as well see this picture turned upside-down, and say that this formal rendering of the 
notion of irrelevance is not previously restricted by any means, and that the restriction to 
same sets of end- and undischarged top-formulas imposed on the notion of identity of proofs 
that results from its adoption is indeed a consequence of how irrelevance alone should be 
understood. In this second case, it is fair to understand the normalisation thesis as belonging 
to the unrestricted category in the taxonomy. 
The impression that this is a somehow innocuous, negligible conceptual distinction is 
quickly corrected when one considers e.g. precisely the argumentative strategy of appealing 
to Post-completeness to advocate the completeness of the notion of identity yielded by the 
normalisation thesis. If one supposes that the second of the options given above is the case, 
for instance, then the Post-completeness of the formal relation candidate to the role of 
counterpart of identity of proofs is completely irrelevant: for in such a case, there would be no 
reason to determine beforehand – i.e. it could not stem from an intensional restriction upon 
the notion of identity of proofs itself – that proofs carried out by means of derivations which do
not share both end-formula and assumptions are distinct. Given that the Post-completeness 
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results involved in the argument favouring completeness concern solely extensions of the 
notion of identity yielded by the normalisation thesis which identify more proofs of given A 
from given Γ than the notion of identity itself does, they become obviously insufficient as an 
argument to support the completeness of a notion that may in principle identify proofs which 
do not share both end-formula and assumptions. 
This shows that the argumentative strategy under scrutiny depends crucially, as 
already claimed, on the supposition of the first hypothesis – indeed, of a very strict form of it, 
namely, that identity of proofs identifies only proofs carried out by means of derivations which 
share conclusions and undischarged hypotheses. Given some very basic issues already 
discussed along this work, it is not only not necessary but also rather strange – even though 
very usual –  to impose this sort of restriction upon the notion of identity of proofs right from 
the outset of its investigation. Hence, in the current absence of good arguments to sustain 
such a move, it has nothing but the idea of identity of proofs outlined by the normalisation 
thesis itself to motivate it. In such a case, thus, the Post-completeness argument involves 
circular reasoning, bearing no probative import whatsoever with respect to the completeness 
of the normalisation thesis. Otherwise, the burden lies upon the shoulders of those willing to 
maintain the Post-completeness argument to provide foundations to the specific way of 
taxonimising identity of proofs upon which it depends.
These observations should be enough to make it clear that the normalisation thesis, 
very similarly to e.g. the Church-Turing thesis, is not to be regarded as a mathematical 
conjecture – for no matter how mathematically precise its formulation is, it is, at least as far as
mathematics is concerned, of a definitional rather than of a descriptive nature. The point 
made in item b.1) shows that the Post-completeness results concerning the normalisation 
thesis have been discussed in a severely partial way, and that they are not to be counted as 
arguments in favour of the normalisation thesis. The point made in item b.2) in turn shows that
taxonomic matters play a central role in arguing for or against a thesis on identity of proofs, 
which also undermines hope for any attempts to prove or disprove them, even if only partially 
or conditionally, in a way that is simultaneously mathematical and significant enough.
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c.  Proofs without irrelevancies: (γ), (strong) normalisation and uniqueness of normal form
Premiss (γ) is not, strictly speaking, a constituent of the normalisation thesis itself. This 
becomes clear when we consider its official formulation: “Two derivations represent the same 
proof iff they are (βὴ-)equivalent”.  There is no mention whatsoever to normalisation or normal
forms – and indeed, given the arguments considered so far, it seems we would not have any 
(non ad hoc) reasons to regard β- or ὴ- conversions as any less identity preserving in case 
normalisation failed for them. Widebäck (2001, p.76), for instance, seems to acknowledge the
secondary role of the obtainment of normalisation to the specific matter of identity of proofs 
rather in this spirit when he states, in his discussion of Ekman’s reduction, that “from our point
of view, the failure of weak normalization is, at most, a technical inconvenience”.   
The idea conveyed by this premiss is nevertheless quite ironically the reason why we 
refer to it as the normalisation thesis in the first place. The fact is that normalisation does hold 
for Prawitz’s reductions, which means that premiss (γ) works more as a corollary than as a 
proper addition to the normalisation thesis – and this is really one of its most remarkable 
features. The informal, motivational counterpart of the normalisation thesis does not entail 
premiss (γ) at all; but in rendering premiss (α) as (αF), the normalisation thesis outlines a 
notion of irrelevance such that it is necessarily the case that all proofs can be mechanically 
freed from their eventual purported irrelevancies. 
But the acceptance of (γ) is not all by itself enough to turn the idea behind 
normalisation thesis into something that can be formulated as suggested in the beginning, 
namely, the claim that any two proofs are significantly different if and only if they are different 
even when given without any irrelevant steps/ features. For instance, even assuming that a 
proof can be freed from all its irrelevant features, this does not mean that this can be done in 
only one way, nor that all ways of doing it would have the same outcome. So, it could in 
principle well be the case that a single derivation might end up split in two different ones when
freed from its irrelevancies in two different ways. But this possibility seems at odds with the 
idea in the formulation above: for there could then be proofs different from themselves.
This is where the uniqueness of normal form shows its importance. There are no two 
different ways of completely freeing a derivation from its irrelevancies such that they split it 
into two different irrelevancy-free versions of itself; every reduction sequence of a derivation 
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that terminates does so leading to the very same normal form in the end. The fact that strong 
normalisation holds, i.e. that every sequence of reduction terminates, makes the picture even 
more seductive: for there is then, additionally, no way of freeing a derivation of its irrelevant 
features that may not lead to an irrelevancy-free version of itself. To sum up, every possible 
way of freeing a derivation from its irrelevant features – which is by necessity built exclusively 
out of identity-preserving transformations – leads to a same and unique irrelevancy-free 
version of itself. This version – its normal form – is thus given the role of a canonical 
“representative” of the identity values of the derivations which reduce to it, which are thus of 
course, given the assumption of the non-ambiguity of the identity-value of a derivation, 
deemed to be the same.
 But as innocent as this assumption may seem, it really stands upon thin ice in this 
discussion. Let us, for instance, consider the following derivation:
⊥
A∨B
[A ]
⋮
C
[B]
⋮
C
C
Since it introduces a complex formula and eliminates it immediately after, one might 
look upon it as displaying a structure that fits the idea of a “detour” involved in the 
normalisation thesis (Indeed, the occurrence of A∨B is a maximum formula according to 
the definition given by Prawitz 1965, p.34).  There would be, however, two obvious ways in 
which we could get rid of this:
⊥
[A ]
⋮
C
or
⊥
[B]
⋮
C
 
Letting ourselves be guided by the motivating ideas of the normalisation thesis, it 
seems quite sensible to see these two simplified derivations as significantly different from 
each other – at the very least, in any case, their normalisation sequences clearly do not 
converge. This failure of uniqueness of normal form could be taken to point at a case of 
ambiguity of a derivation with respect to its identity value. This sort of phenomenon does not 
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necessarily require the presence of “detours”; indeed, it is ⊥ and ∨ that seem to be the 
main ingredients in these cases. For instance, consider the derivation:
⊥
A∨B
Motivated by the ideal of separation of the roles of the logical constants and the 
simplicity of inference rules (as e.g. described by Prawitz in section II.2.1 of his Ideas and 
Results 1971 paper), one could regard this derivation as further analysable, so that each of its
steps shall be atomic and each constant shall be introduced by its correspondent, “meaning-
giving” rule. Thus, there would be again two – and again arguably significantly different – 
ways of expanding it in order to obtain such a goal:
⊥
A
A∨B
and
⊥
B
A∨B
 
This time, however, the divergent solutions – that similarly point at what can be regarded as 
an ambiguity – do not come about by virtue of any “detours”; all derivations involved are, in 
fact, normal. 
For the cases considered, one could always claim, in the spirit of some category-
theoretic considerations on the matter, that there should be no distinction between derivations
of a given formula from absurdity, given that the latter is to be considered an initial object. 
Kosta Došen, for instance, calls the denial of the initiality of absurdity “a desperate measure, 
not in tune with the other intuitions underlying the normalization conjecture” in his 2003 
Identity of Proofs based on nomalization and generality, p.19 –  but this might well be 
regarded as, at least, an overstatement. Another way of making the problem disappear is to 
restrict from the outset the application of absurdity rule to atomic conclusions only (see e.g. 
Prawitz 1971, pp. 242, 248) – but this seems, again, an ad hoc device, hardly in tune with the 
ex falso quodlibet understanding of absurdity. To advocate for the separation of the roles of 
logical constants, one should be expected to be able to show that absurdity can be restricted 
to atomic cases only; but this would rehabilitate the examples above involving disjunction.
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3. A notion of propositional identity based on that of identity of proofs proposed by Kosta 
Došen
I believe this to be a particularly good opportunity to make some comments with 
respect to a notion of “propositional identity” put forward by Kosta Došen as seen in 
connection with the doctrine on identity of proofs under scrutiny. Došen’s general idea is that 
one can solve the issue of when two sentences are synonymous viz. represent the same 
proposition once a criterion for identity of proofs is established; more precisely, two sentences
A and B should be taken as synonymous if and only if they are isomorphic, i.e. there is a 
composition of a proof Π of B from A with a proof Π’ of A from B that is identical to the identity 
proof of A from A, and a composition of Π’ with Π that is identical to the identity proof of B from
B (where “identity proof” means a proof such that if composed with any other proof, either as 
assumption or as conclusion, yields a proof identical to the original one). The intuition behind 
the idea is briefly described by the author in Identity of Proofs based on Normalization and 
Generality in the following fashion: 
“That two sentences are isomorphic means that they behave exactly in the same manner in 
proofs: by composing, we can always extend proofs involving one of them, either as 
assumption or as conclusion, to proofs involving the other, so that nothing is lost, nor gained. 
There is always a way back. By composing further with the inverses, we return to the original 
proofs.”  
To further illustrate the notion of synonymy outlined by his formal definition, let us 
consider the two examples the author himself mentions. First, let us take A∧B and
B∧A . It is easy to see that they are isomorphic: 
A∧B
B
A∧B
A
B∧A
A
A∧B
B
A∧B
A
B∧A
B
A∧B
This derivation clearly reduces (and is therefore identical) to the identity proof of
A∧B  from A∧B (namely A∧B ). One can also clearly build an exactly analogous 
derivation that reduces to the identity proof of B∧A from B∧A by simultaneously 
substituting the occurrences of B for A and vice-versa. This means that A∧B and B∧A
are isomorphic. Now, the same could not be said about A and A∧A : 
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A∧A
A
A∧A
A
A∧A
                         
As Došen observes, in the two occurrences of the proof Π of A from A∧A  in the 
composition above, the projection used, no matter which, must have been the same; for they 
are, I repeat, copies of only one given proof Π of A from A∧A . This means that the 
composition of Π with the proof of A∧A  from A yields no redex, and therefore does not 
indeed reduce to the identity proof of A∧A  from A∧A . Graphically this can be seen 
even more clearly:
A∧A A∧A
⋱ ⋱
A A
⋱ ⋰
A∧A
or 
A∧A A∧A
⋰ ⋰
A A
⋱ ⋰
A∧A
 In words: the two occurrences of  A in the end-formula  are connected to the same 
occurrence of A, respectively the left and the right one, in the copies of the top-formula  in the 
graphs above. To use yet another intuition: in the first case, the proof generalises to a proof of
A from A∧B  , and in the second, to a proof of B from A∧B . To represent a proof that 
would reduce to the identity proof in this case, the graph would have to connect each 
occurrence of  in the end-formula, the left and the right one, with its correspondent occurrence
of  in the top-formulas:
        
A∧A A∧A
⋱ ⋰
A A
⋱ ⋰
A∧A
                              
In such a case, though, it would represent the composition not of one, but of two 
distinct proofs of A from A∧A (namely the ones obtained by the two distinct projections) 
with the proof of A∧A from A.
Now, this quite novel way of approaching synonymy of propositions envisaged by 
Došen is particularly sensitive to the same taxonomic issues that affect the Post-
completeness argument. Suppose, for instance, that we take normalisation thesis to be 
restricted to the result, and that we accept the corresponding notion of identity of proofs. 
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Then, given the remarks made in the previous sections (especially III.2.a.1.1) , we already are
comitted to a specific syntactical interpretation of the notion of result of a proof, namely: that 
the result of a proof carried out by a given derivation is the “intension” that corresponds 
exclusively to its end formula.  Were it otherwise, there would then be ways to identify proofs 
expressed by derivations that do not share an end formula. In any case, if that will not be 
granted, it should at least be granted that either this or one of the interpretations based on the
observations regarding derivations’s principal types is implied by the normalisation thesis. 
Now, if we additionally accept Došen’s idea on synonymy – in his words, “identity” of 
propositions, which is rather more specific, as our discussion concerning synonymy ahead 
shall indicate –  then e.g. A∧B  and B∧A  are, as exemplified above, identical as 
propositions. This arguably means that the intension that counts as result of a proof of .
A∧B   is different from the proposition expressed by . A∧B   – viz. more specific than 
this proposition. The picture is of course coherent, even though one might in this context find 
it unusual that the result of the proof carried out by a derivation cannot be equated to the 
proposition expressed by its end formula.  It makes one wonder what conception of result – 
since it is not that of proposition – is being aimed at after all. 
In our taxonomy, it would fall under the propositional category, in the section “intension 
stricter than a proposition”; so, one could consider something as e.g. a specific formulation of 
a proposition. But of course, one could always just answer “whatever it is that one is willing to 
call the intensional content exclusively expressed by a formula”. But rather than a dull answer,
this suggests that Došen’s idea could indeed be turned into an alternative to Carnap-style 
conceptions of intensional content. With the proper handling of taxonomy related issues, it 
could be taken to define the very notion of result of a proof as the strictest intensional content 
expressed by a formula – and this would have as a mere consequence that there is a one to 
one correspondence between formulas and such intensional contents. Based on that, one 
may proceed to understand synonymy viz. identity of propositions –  as well as of course, the 
concept of proposition itself – as a strictly intensionally defined notion, which corresponds 
precisely to the second strictest interesting sense in which we should take formulas as 
sharing an intension.
107
IV. Normalisation thesis, identity of proofs and synonymy
In this section, we will try to approach normalisation thesis as an answer to the 
question regarding identity of proofs from the perspective of synonymy – i.e., by taking the 
aimed relation of  “identity” between proofs to be indeed a particular case of synonymy. This 
approach is particularly interesting, since it seems perfectly in tune with what is probably the 
most traditional way of conceiving of proofs, namely, as linguistic expressions. This will of 
course demand some brief independent reflection on the notion of synonymy itself. Among 
other things, this part of the study shall allow for interesting comparisons between the 
normalisation thesis and other possible approaches to identity of proofs motivated by different
accounts and understandings of synonymy.
1. A brief conceptual historicisation of the notion of synonymy
It is a matter of uncertainty whether it was Aristotle or Speusippus the first between 
these two ancient thinkers to write on synonymy. In any case, the fact that both did so and 
that it is probable that the first influenced the treatment of the second significantly is enough 
to show how long actual discussion on the matter has been taking place within the literature. 
For no reason other than my complete lack of knowledge of Speusippus’ works, I shall take 
Aristotle’s developments as a starting point. Coincidentally enough, by the way, the 
explanation of the “–onymies” (viz. homonymy, synonymy and paronymy) is also the starting 
point of Aristotles treatise Categories. I now quote his explanation of synonymy in extenso, as
translated by J.L. Ackrill:
 “When things have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds
to the name is the same, they are called synonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and an 
ox are animals. Each of these is called by a common name, ‘animal’, and the definition of 
being is also the same; for if one is to give the definition of each – what being an animal is for 
each of them – one will give the same definition.”30
30 J.L. Ackrill, in Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, (Oxford, 1962).
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The first period of this passage – where the proper definition of synonymy is given – is 
rendered into English differently by J. Barnes31:
“Items are called synonymous if their name is common and in addition the account of 
their essence in respect of the name is the same.”
After giving a more precise formulation to Aristotle’s definition of synonymy, Barnes 
adds an explanatory note, apparently with the intention of avoiding what he sees as a 
misunderstanding favoured by many commentators of Aristotle: 
“According to the commentators, Aristotelian homonymy and synonymy are properties 
of 'things' rather than of words; but that is false – or at any rate, it is misleading. What is true 
is this: if the members of a group of items are homonymous or synonymous (...), it ‘does not 
follow from that fact that they are all words (nor, more generally, that they are linguistic items 
of some sort or other). But neither does it follow that none of them is a word or a linguistic 
item of some sort.”
Indeed, Ackrill not only makes explicit use of the word ‘things’ in his English version of 
Aristotle’s definition of the “–onymies”, but also says in the notes that follow his 1962 
translation of the Categories that:
“The terms ‘homonymous’ and ‘synonymous’, as defined by Aristotle (…), apply not to 
words but to things. Roughly, two things are (…) synonymous if the same name applies to 
both in the same sense.”
I believe there is good reason for sustaining both positions; and this is due precisely to 
the fact that they are not conflicting at all, rather unlike what it might seem at first sight. 
Untying this little interpretive knot will help us understanding better the notion of synonymy put
forward by the Philosopher. A brief look at the Greek version32 of the variously translated 
definition of synonymy shall help us a great deal in performing this task:
“συνώνυμα δὲὲ λέγὲται ν τό τὲ νομα κοινοὲ ν καιὲ  καταὲ  το νομα λόγος τ ς ο σίας  ὧ ὄ ὁ ὔ ῆ ὐ ὁ
α τός”ὐ
There is, as one can see, no noun in the Greek version equivalent to the words “items” 
in Barnes’ or “things” in Ackrill’s translation. These words are used to render a construction 
that finds no faithful parallel in English, based in the use of the plural relative pronoun νὧ . 
Roughly, this pronoun works in the formulation as a mere “position-holder” for that to which 
the relation of synonymy applies. In a forceful attempt to show this working in “English”, it 
31 See Barnes, J., 2012, Speusippus and Aristotle on homonymy, in Logical Matters: Essays in Ancient 
Philosophy II, pp.284 – 311, Oxford University Press, Oxford
32 Extracted from L. Minio-Paluello, 1949 Oxford.
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would look more or less like this:  “Synonymous are called those of which the name is 
common” – which almost automatically leads one to either assume that the range of the 
pronoun is groups of two or more people, or to ask: “those what?”. The first alternative is 
obviously inappropriate; the question in the second one, however, can be adequately 
answered with any term that is general enough to stand for whatever Aristotle may have 
referred to with his formulation. ‘Items’ or ‘things’, in fact, seem fit to play such a role very well.
We could thus work with the following version: “Synonymous are called those things of which 
the name is common and of which the account of the essence according to the name is the 
same.”  
Now, what Barnes denounces as misleading about the commentators remarks on 
Aristotle’s notions of the “-onymies” seems to be intimately connected to the old philosophical 
vice of attaching some special sort of ontological import to words such as ‘thing’ and ‘object’ 
that prevents them to refer to things (!) such as words and “linguistic items” – or at least make
them refer preferentially to things other than those. It is of course needless to say that the last
sentence performatively challenges such an account. It would also be unfair if Barnes 
credited any misunderstanding of this simple issue to Ackrill himself – which is one of the 
commentators he addresses, as he explicitly mentions in a footnote. In the same note Barnes 
refers to in his text, Ackrill, regarding precisely this issue, warns that “It will be necessary in 
the translation and notes to use the word ‘things’ as a blanket-term for items in any category. 
It often represents the neuter plural of a Greek article, pronoun, &c.”; thus both explaining why
a noun shows up in the translation which is absent in the Greek version and showing explicitly
that its range is not intended to be limited to some particular set of categories.
Still, why is it that Ackrill and so many others stress that the proper understanding of 
Aristotelian synonymy is that it applies “not to words but to things”? Well, a good reason for 
such an attitude is that, although Aristotle’s definition allows synonymy to apply to things in 
general – which evidently encompass words and linguistic items, as Barnes stresses –, it will 
never apply to words as words, but rather as things. What is meant by this clumsy phrase is 
that words can be synonymous in Aristotle’s sense by virtue of the fact that they are things 
that can somehow be the meaning of linguistic items, and not because they are themselves 
provided with some meaning – i.e., exactly the opposite of the common contemporary use of 
the notion of synonymy, according to which it is understood as an essentially semantical 
relation – i.e. it only applies to things inasmuch as they have meaning – that, according to our 
instrumental and provisory explication, holds whenever the meanings of the things considered
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is in some sense equivalent. So, what is characterised by the insistently repeated line “things,
not words” is an intensional rather than an extensional distinction between the Aristotelian and
the common contemporary understandings of synonymy. Indeed, from an extensional point of 
view, both notions can be taken to apply to both “things” and “words”: if I consider e.g. a 
hammer, it is Aristotle-synonymous with a screwdriver with respect to the νομαὄ  ‘tool’. For a 
quite different reason, the hammer and the screwdriver may be considered synonymous in 
the usual sense because both may be seen as devoid of meaning. This very same hammer 
may, on the other hand, be deemed synonymous in the very same  usual contemporary sense
with a written occurrence of the letter ‘T’ (in case, say, it is creatively put before two gears and
a yardstick folded to form a right angle to form the word ‘tool’). A written occurrence of the 
letter ‘T’, in turn, may, because of the very same iconic resemblance with the tool, be deemed 
synonymous with the word “hammer”. In short: if one looks extensionally upon this matter, 
there are in principle no boundaries beyond which creativity may not lead. Being a linguistic or
a non-linguistic item is an essentially intensional feature, which anything – i.e. any extension –
may or may not in principle display.  Barnes’ warning is thus less prone to generate – instead 
of avoiding, as he certainly intended – even more misunderstandings when formulated in 
these terms: the observation that Aristotle’s synonymy applies to things and not to words 
should by no means be taken extensionally, but rather intensionally. When one considers the 
points just exposed, this seem to be indeed quite obvious.  
The important intensional distinction between Aristotle’s notion of synonymy and ours 
should not however be interpreted as proof that they have nothing to do with each other. In 
the first place, it should be observed that contemporary use of synonymy is at least 
extensionally equivalent with a particular case of Aristotle’s concept as defined in the 
Categories. This is indeed quite easy to see, and can be explained as follows: given that a 
thing T has a certain meaning, take that it is possible to build a predicate (i.e. an νομαὄ ) O 
that is common to all and only the things that are equivalent to T in meaning. In such a case, 
one can say that something is synonymous to T in the usual sense if and only if it is Aristotle-
synonymous to T with respect to O. The idea is quite trivial: if the relation of semantical 
equivalence may be “simulated” – and therefore indirectly attributed – by means of a 
predication, then it can be defined as a particular case of Aristotelian synonymy.  Secondly, 
one should not overlook the fact that one of the most visible features that distinguish the two 
conceptions of synonymy – namely, the fact that ours is an n-ary equivalence relation that 
may be applied to n things while Aristotle’s is a binary relation between a set of things and an 
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νομαὄ  – is not but a merely apparent difference; it concerns the formulations rather than the 
notions themselves. This becomes clear once one observes that the role played by the νομαὄ
in Aristotle’s synonymy is that of a criterion according to which the things in the set considered
are or are not equivalent. Of course, usual attribution of synonymy is also in accordance to 
some criterion – although this is not commonly made explicit as in Aristotle, which contributes 
to the frequent misunderstandings and disagreements on the matter. Indeed, it is as if 
contemporary debate on synonymy somehow always presupposes that there is one correct  
criterion of equivalence – the nature of which is still unrevealed. More shall be said on this 
specific point later (section 4.2).  
There is nevertheless still a third remark regarding the relation between these two 
notions of synonymy which makes them look even more similar to one another, namely: none 
of the things to which Aristotle’s notion of synonymy may apply was seen by the philsosopher 
as “devoid of meaning”. Just as our linguistic expressions in general express something – 
senses, if you will –, so can things in general be looked upon as “expressions” of their 
respective essences within Aristotle’s conceptual economy. What I claim – and again neither 
could nor shall defend here – is that there is an intrinsic transitivity, which contemporarily is 
usually attributed only to the linguistic realm (as in e.g. what means vs. what is meant), that 
pervades, and, what is even stronger, characterises the structure of the ontological realm 
according to the Aristotelian doctrine (as in, e.g. appearance vs. essence). 
Just to give the reader a brief indication of what this claim is based upon, let us 
consider the Greek expression occurring in the mentioned definition of synonymy in the 
Categories translated by Ackrill as “definition of being” and by Barnes as “account of 
essence”, namely,  “λόγος τ ς ο σίαςῆ ὐ ”. One is to take seriously the observation made by 
Ackrill that to understand Aristotle’s notion of synonymous things as things to which the same 
name applies in the same sense is rough. This shortcut to a contemporarily more accessible 
rendering of the Stagirite’s notion indeed involves an unjustifiable anachronism, which 
consists in implicitly identifying  λόγος τ ς ο σίαςῆ ὐ , i.e., definition of being or account of 
essence, with what we nowadays understand as sense. “Sense” is usually taken in the 
philosophical literature as expressing a or the intensional aspect of a linguistic expression’s 
semantical value. However, tempting and didactically useful as it may be to lend “λόγος τ ς ῆ
ο σίαςὐ ” similar contours, it must be recognised that the parallelism between the two notions is
rather more minimalistic: what they indeed have in common is that both, each in its proper 
conceptual context, play the role of the reason why a name applies to a thing.  It is because of
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the same definition of being human, or the same account of the essence of human33, that the 
name “human” applies to both Plato and Socrates; and one could analogously say that Plato 
is human in the same sense that Socrates is human. Nevertheless, it is clear that this by no 
means implies that the sense of a name has anything whatsoever to do with some “essence” 
or “being”, whatever should such notions be taken to mean; and it is unclear what the relation 
would be between the definition of being correspondent to a name and this name’s sense, in 
case sense were an available notion to analyse aspects of a name in the discussed context – 
a point which is also unclear.  From these observations, one can thus conclude that in his 
discussion of synonymy, and in general of the –onymies,  Aristotle attaches what would 
nowadays be usually regarded as the semantic content or value of a name to what is 
probably the most crucial ontological notion within his conceptual economy, namely: ο σίαὐ . It 
is a necessary condition for a name to apply to something that this name expresses or has 
associated to it a certain definition of being – or, alternatively, that this name expresses or has
associated to it a certain account of an essence; and it is further required, and I assume this 
to be clear enough, that the ο σία accounted for or defined ὐ underlies the thing in question (in 
the sense of “underlie” – a rendering of the greek expression “καθ’ ποκὲ σθαι”ὑ ῖ  34, translated 
by Ackrill as “to be said of” –  to be explained by Aristotle shortly after in the Categories, at 
chapter II, 1a20 – 1b10).  The fact that a name applies to a thing is thus due to the 
concurrence of two analogous facts, namely: on the one hand, at the level of language, that 
the name “expresses” a certain ο σίαὐ ; and on the other hand, at the level of reality, that the 
thing “displays” such ο σίαὐ .
 So, just as things are synonymous in the usual sense because they express the same 
meaning – i.e. some semantical/linguistic feature – according to a certain criterion (say, for 
example, their denotation), so are things synonymous in the Aristotelian sense because they 
“display” the same ο σίαὐ  – i.e. some ontological feature – which happens to be “expressed” 
by a certain name. In other words: both notions of synonymy share a feature that can be seen
as what is actually essential about synonymy, namely: they deem things synonymous 
33 Barnes’ translation seems inferior to  Ackrill’s in the following point: “the definition of being that corresponds 
to the name“(Ackrill) vs. “the account of their essence in respect of the name”(Barnes). Barnes’s version, by 
employing the pronoun “their”, explicitly attributes the “essence” (ο σίαὐ ) referred to in the phrase “account of 
essence”( λόγος τ ςῆ  ο σίαςὐ ) to the things candidate to being synonymous. Such explicit attribution does 
clearly not happen in Ackrill’s version, in which the “being” (ο σίαὐ ) occurring in the phrase “definition of 
being” (λόγος τ ςῆ  ο σίαςὐ ) is not attributed explicitly to anything in particular, exactly as in the Greek text.
34 The expressions occurs in the text in present participle form, καθ’ ποκὲίμὲνοςὑ , and has its sense contrasted 
by Aristotle with that of νἐ  ποκὲίμὲνοςὑ , i.e., inherent, in a free translation. This last expression is rendered 
by Ackrill as “to be in”. 
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inasmuch as they are equivalent as expressions or instances of a given principle or criterion –
be the latter of an ontological or semantical/linguistic nature.
2. Synonymy and identity of proofs
Since proofs can be regarded as linguistic expressions/entities – actually, as discussed
in the prologue, Aristotle’s notion of συλλογισμός was indeed conceived in a rather linguistic 
register, to begin with –, it is neither surprising nor extravagant that one looks upon their 
meanings as what determines necessarily and sufficiently the behaviour of a relation of 
semantic equivalence holding among them; and this precise relation is a reasonable 
candidate to the role of what one refers to when talking about identity of proofs.  This 
approach actually invites one to talk of synonymy of proofs instead of identity of proofs – a 
terminology that timidly showed up in some of the earliest papers to address the matter from 
the viewpoint of the normalisation thesis (see Kreisel 1971, p.117; Prawitz 1971, p.237), and 
later fell into disuse. 
As already suggested in the discussion of Aristotle’s notion of synonymy, contemporary
use of this concept differs from that of the Stagirite in at least two important respects: it is 
restricted to linguistic expressions; and it seldom – if ever – incorporates a locus equivalent to
that of the νομα ὄ in Aristotle’s version of the relation – i.e. arguably, a position for the criterion
of synonymy . 
It is not the case, of course, that contemporary synonymy is applied without any 
reference at all – even if implicit – to some criterion. Notwithstanding, the contemporary 
criterion of synonymy is a fixed one, the same for every case: meaning. Indeed, synonymy 
became practically a shorthand for identity viz. equivalence of meaning.  This “absoluteness” 
of meaning as the criterion of synonymy could be reasonably regarded, by the way, as an 
explanation for the suppression of the position of criterion from the relation itself. The 
problem, though, is that meaning is itself a notion of which contemporary literature presents 
overwhelmingly many (and much) different accounts. The effect is that the fixation of meaning
as the criterion of synonymy ends up being, on the one hand, enough for the suppression of 
the position of criterion from the relation; but, on the other, not enough for fixing just which 
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criterion is effectively being employed from among the many possible that arise with different 
answers to what meaning means. Thus the strange appropriation and treatment of the notion 
of synonymy that can be witnessed in the literature of the first and beginning of the second 
half of the 20th century, especially in authors belonging to the so-called analytic tradition: an 
intense debate concerning what the right account (viz. criterion) of synonymy should be, 
intimately tied with the discussion on how the notion of analyticity should be understood. 
The same conceptual atmosphere in which this sort of dispute emerged was still in 
force, so to speak, as the terminology of synonymy was dropped in the discussion of identity 
of proofs – which was thus presumably not a mere strike of chance. In order not to 
compromise oneself with a notion depicted as being rather strict (cf. e.g. Carnap’s notion of 
intensional isomorphism presented in his Meaning and Necessity or, for an even more radical 
and strict picture, Goodman’s “On Likeness of Meaning” and the homonymous notion he 
characterises therein), it is understandable that one sets apart two issues: synonymy of 
proofs and identity of proofs. Synonymy of proofs – or rather of derivations – would then be a 
stricter semantic question – it has to do with e.g. understanding what Carnap would have 
called the intensional structure of syntactic expressions of proofs; in plain terms, it is about 
what derivations mean, taken stricto sensu. Identity of proofs as conceived in the framework 
of the normalisation thesis, could rather be understood as a twofold issue: on the one hand, 
as a relation of equivalence which holds not between derivations, but rather between what 
they represent – namely proofs, however these and their representation by derivations are to 
be understood; on the other, in turn, again as an equivalence relation between derivations, 
but this time an arguably looser one than synonymy – in Goodman’s terminology, it would 
demand a lesser degree of likeness of meaning than synonymy. 
Now, in the second of its senses, identity of proofs is not necessarily distinguishable 
from synonymy of derivations – if so, then merely in degree, not in nature. As already said, 
synonymy might be regarded as stricter due to, mainly, the recent history of the term; but we 
could well succeed in unearthing some plausible reason to reverse the order of strictness if 
we were interested in fighting for these terms.  
In the first of its senses, though,  identity of proofs is a necessarily distinct question 
from any relation of semantic equivalence between derivations viz. syntactic expressions of 
proofs, for it concerns objects in a distinct category than that of those. This category of objects
is, let us say, the most fundamental one within the context of the normalisation thesis. Just 
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what these objects – i.e. proofs – would be, and thus what features in them should determine 
their identity and contribute to make them distinguishable from one another is a difficult 
question to answer; especially because it seems we can barely state in clear words – let 
alone come to an agreement about – what the subject matter is when we talk of proofs.  
According to how different authors approach and interpret the thesis, different objects at this 
level are aimed at, and thus respectively different relations of identity between them are 
considered to be in force: from a trivial notion of identity which only holds between an object 
(namely, a shared semantical content – viz. an intension or an extension – of derivations) and 
itself; to a relation between “intensions” which merely mirror the syntactical objects to which 
they are attached. 
This is actually a good indication of just how astonishingly little agreement we have on 
the nature of such supposed objects – and  there seems to be little to no sense in engaging  
in such a general-spirited quest for the true identity criteria of something about which we are, 
in plain terms, so clueless. A clear enough notion of proof must serve as the background of a 
“scientific” investigation on identity of proofs, and it comes as no surprise that any such effort 
is hopeless – because pointless – in its absence. This exact point is made by Troelstra in his 
1975 text Non-extensional equality (p.318) regarding the soundness of the normalisation 
thesis with respect to identity of proofs:
“If we think of the objects of theory as ‘direct proofs’ whose canonical descriptions are 
normal deductions (cf. numbers and numerals in the case of arithmetic), then the inference 
rules →I, →E correspond to certain operations on direct proofs; the normalistion theorem then
establishes that these operations are always defined, and permits us to regard any deduction 
as a description of a direct proof. The conjecture [i.e. the normalisation thesis] in the direction 
<= [soundness] then becomes trivially true.
But if the deductions are seen as descriptions of a more general concept of proof (...) 
(in the same manner as closed terms are descriptions of computations in the case of 
arithmetic) it may be argued that intensional equality should correspond to (literal) equality of 
deductions; and then the conjecture is false.
So, without further information about the intended concept of proof, the conjecture in 
the direction <= [soundness] is meaningless because, as just explained, ambiguous.”
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Such a requirement, I understand, might sound for some as an unreasonable demand 
for an ideal starting point – it looks like we are doing nothing but, piece by piece, starting to 
set the perfect scenario for a Plato-like drama consisting in Socrates torturing some poor soul 
into frustration by demanding an answer to the deep philosophical question: “what is a 
proof?”, and then saying that things shall not get started unless the whole story does not end 
in aporia. As far as we are concerned, there is actually no reason to assume that such a quest
would have any point at all; it might well be that there is no such thing as THE notion of proof, 
the nature of which is lying in the deep shadows of oblivion, waiting to be discovered and 
revealed by some chivalrous ε δότα φ ταἰ ῶ . But it should be made clear from the very 
beginning that the setting of the starting point of a reasonable attempt to deal with the 
question of the identity of proofs need neither involve such an epic “τί στι”ἐ  enterprise, nor be 
philosophically conformist or arbitrary. Indeed, all the information we need is at everyone’s 
disposal, and it is namely this: we use proofs and talk about them in various contexts; and 
both our use and talk of proofs should provide us with enough indication to, in each proper 
context, properly carry out the evaluation of any attempted answer to questions regarding the 
identity of proofs. Generality does not have to be an aim.
Ironically enough, there are also those who, in an attitude that might sound quite 
contrary to the remarks just made, claim that identity of proofs is an issue of the utmost 
importance in answering the question “what is a proof?” (see e.g. Kosta Došen 2003). This is 
of course not wrong; without the determination of a proper criterion of identity, nothing like the 
notion of a proof (as opposed to other proofs of the same kind, so to say) could be achieved. 
But there is a difference between this viewpoint and that according to which lack of clarity on 
what proofs are prevents the investigation of their identity: the latter aims at describing proofs,
while the second is a definitional approach to proofs. While these two endeavours can of 
course be synchronised and even carried out by means of a single effort, they obviously do 
not have to be; and it is quite hard to evaluate to which extent or in which sense the 
normalisation thesis succeeds in the task of carrying either of them out.
Let us now make some considerations on how the normalisation conjecture compares 
to other compelling ideas concerning synonymy of derivations and identity of proofs.
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a. The normalisation thesis and a notion of synonymy of proofs inspired by Carnap’s 
intensional isomorphism 
 
Firstly, we will define a notion of synonymy of proofs which is in tune with the Zeitgeist 
of the investigations of the first half of the 20th century to serve as a measure of evaluation of 
the normalisation thesis in two senses: in the first place, as itself another notion of synonymy 
of proofs intended at capturing a stricter intensional content of derivations – if this makes any 
sense –, and in the second, as a formalisation of a notion of identity of proofs.
A preliminary notion is thus needed:
Definition of rule isomorphism:
Given two inference rules belonging respectively to the connectives *n and *’m, let Ai 
resp. A’j, Bi’ resp. B’j’, Γi’’ resp. Γ’j’’ , C resp. C’ be, respectively: a (minor) premiss of *n rule resp. 
*’m rule; an argument expression of the occurrence of *n(B1,…,Bn) resp. *’m(B’1,…,B’m) in the *n 
rule resp. *’m rule; a set of assumptions on which a (minor) premiss of *n rule resp. *’m rule 
depends; and the conclusion of the of *n rule resp. *’m rule iff *n rule resp. *’m rule is an 
elimination rule. *n rule and *’m rule are said to be isomorphic if and only if there’s a bijective 
correspondence f between their aforementioned syntactic elements such that:
a) f(Ai) = A’j
b) f(Bi’) = B’j’
c) f(Γi’’) = Γ’j’’
d) f(C) = C’
e) f(Ai) = A’j  iff  f(Γi) = Γ’j
f) If f(Γi’’) = Γ’j’’ , then Γi’’ and Γ’j’’ have the same number of elements.
g) (Anaphora preservation) For each Ai [Bi] [Dq ϵ Γi] [C], if and only if Ai [Bi] [Dq ϵ Γi] [C] is 
identical with, respectively, either Ai’ or Bi’ or Dq’ ϵ Γi’ or C, then f(Ai)[f(Bi)] [D’k ϵ f(Γi)] 
[f(C)] is identical with, respectively, either f(Ai’)or f(Bi’) or D’k’ ϵ f(Γi’)or f(C).
Remarks: 
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i. The schematic variables A, B, C and D (with or without primes or indexes) in the rule 
schemata may only be instantiated by atomic schematic variables; in other words, the only
inference rules considered are introduction rules in which there are no occurrences of 
operators but that mentioned in the conclusion, and elimination rules in which there are no
occurrences of operators but that mentioned in the major premiss. In the applications of 
the inference rules, on the other hand, other operators may occur accordingly;
ii. An operator has a set of inference rules, i.e. it cannot have two or more identical 
inference rules associated to it.
We now proceed to the definition of the notion itself:
Definition of synonymy (≡int):
1. For atomic A and B: A ≡int B iff A ⊢ B and B ⊢ A;
2. For connectives:  *n ≡int *’m iff  for each rule of  *n, there is a rule of  *m  (and vice-versa) such 
that the two rules are isomorphic;
3. A:= *n(A1,…,An) and B:= *’m(B1,…,Bm) :  A ≡int B iff: 
    a) *n ≡int *’m; 
    b) there is a bijective function f: Ai  |→ Bj, 0≤ i ≤ n, 0≤ j ≤ m, such that            
        f(Ai) ≡int   Ai;  
4. Γ:= {A1,…,An} and Δ:={B1,…,Bm}:  Γ ≡int Δ iff  there is a bijective function  
    f: Ai |→ Bj , 0≤ i ≤ n, 0≤ j ≤ m,  such that f(Ai) ≡int Ai;
5.For derivations:
5.1.  Let Π and Π’ be , respectively, the following derivations ending in introductions:
[Γ1] ,
Σ1
A1 ,
...,
...,
[Γn]
Σn
An
*(B1 ,... ,Bn)
 and 
[Γ '1] ,
Σ ' 1
A '1 ,
...,
...,
[Γ'm]
Σ 'm
A 'm
*(B' 1 ,... ,B 'm)
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Then Π ≡int Π’ iff:
a) for every derivation Σi of premiss Ai depending on Γi, there is a derivation Σ’j of premiss A’j 
depending on Γ’j such that: 
(i) Γi ≡int Γ’j;   
(ii) Ai ≡int A’j; 
(iii) Σi ≡int Σ’ j; and 
b) for every derivation Σ’j of premiss A’j depending on Γ’j, there is a derivation Σ i of premiss Ai 
depending on Γi such that: 
(i) Γi ≡int Γ’j;       
(ii) Ai ≡int A’j; 
(iii) Σi ≡int Σ’ j ; and
c) *(B1,…,Bn’) ≡int *’(B’1,…,B’m’);
5.2. Let Π  and Π’ be, respectively, the following derivations ending in eliminations:
[Γ1] ,
Σ1
A1 ,
...,
...,
[Γk ]
Σk
A k , *
n
(B1, ... ,Bn) ,
[Γq] ,
Σq
Aq ,
... ,
... ,
[Γn ' ]
Σn '
An '
C
and
[Γ '1] ,
Σ ' 1
A '1 ,
...,
...,
[Γ' k ' ]
Σ ' k '
A ' k ' , *'
m
(B ' 1, ... ,B 'm) ,
[Γ 'q ' ] ,
Σ ' q '
A ' q ' ,
... ,
... ,
[Γ 'm' ]
Σ 'm'
A 'm'
C '
Then Π ≡int Π’ iff:
a) *(B1,…,Bn’) ≡int *’(B’1,…,B’m’);
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b) for every derivation Σi of minor premiss Ai depending on Γi, there is a derivation Σ’j of minor 
premiss A’j depending on Γ’j such that: 
(i) Γi ≡int Γ’j; 
(ii) Ai ≡int A’j; 
(iii) Σi ≡int Σ’j;
c) for every derivation Σ’j of minor premiss A’j depending on Γ’j, there is a derivation Σi of minor
premiss Ai depending on Γi such that: 
(i) Γi ≡int Γ’j;  
(ii) Ai ≡int A’j;
(iii) Σi ≡int Σ’j;
d) C ≡int C’
a.1. Remarks on this notion of synonymy
Those familiar with Carnap’s 1947 work Meaning and Necessity will probably have 
recognised that the notion of synonymy, as well as the notion of meaning that it inevitably 
suggests, are not but an adaptation of an original idea of his. They correspond – and not 
really roughly – to his notions of intensional isomorphism and intensional structure (cf. §14, 
chapter I of the mentioned book). Notwithstanding, there are some noteworthy features of the 
present account of this idea that differ from Carnap’s own exposition of it. The three first are 
obvious enough: 
(a) Carnap’s own treatment of the idea does not contemplate derivations, while the one
offered here  has been formulated purposely to give an account of them; 
(b) he defines the notion in a much broader way – namely, for any language 
whatsoever which has a certain grammatical structure. Here, in turn, a more specific – though
comprehensive enough – formalism is addressed: natural deduction systems for propositional
logic, with the due mentioned restrictions; and 
(c) while Carnap relies on model-theoretic semantic notions to formulate his idea, it is 
rendered here in a purely proof-theoretic semantic framework – i.e. instead of basing 
synonymy in notions such as L-equivalence, the notion of interderivability and a simple 
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correspondence between the syntactic structure of the inference rules of propositional 
operators are used as touchstone. 
There are also some interesting differences which concern, I believe, the motivation 
behind the two formulations. It seems, for instance, that Carnap put the possibility of 
comparing the meaning of expressions formulated in different languages in foreground when 
providing his definitions and explanations on the matter. While composing the present 
account, on the other hand, no attention whatsoever was paid to this. It is simply focused on 
defining a rudimentary notion of logical synonymy for some given language/deductive system 
which displays the required features. Because of this peculiarity of Carnap’s aim, I daresay 
that his own presentation of the idea ends up lending it outlines of the “explicatum” – to use a 
word of his – of a hybrid between synonymy and translation; notions which are, of course, 
quite different in relevant ways. It seems one could provide sensible reasons to support that, 
say, (A&B) is a good translation of (A ^ B) while (B&A) is not; after all, as Carnap himself puts 
it, meaning components other than those which he calls “cognitive” or “designative” are of 
capital relevance for the adequate translation of sentences. On the other hand, it is likely that 
a logical account of synonymy which entails – as Carnap’s own does – that, for instance, it is 
a necessary condition for having non-homonymous synonymous expressions belonging to a 
same given language that there is some atomic component of one which is not a component 
of the other – which implies that e.g. the meaning of (A&B) differs from that of (B&A) – would 
be contrary to some familiar and compelling pre-conceived ideas on the matter. 
As concisely as I am capable of putting it, it seems to me that Carnap is not clear 
enough with respect to his choice of criteria to govern his use of notions such as syntactical 
structure and intensional structure. In fact I believe he was specially unfortunate in formulating
rule b of his definition of intensional  isomorphism – one of whose clauses states that it is a 
necessary condition for two expressions A and B to be intensionally isomorphic that their 
correspondent component expressions be not only intensionally isomorphic, but also occupy 
the same position as arguments in the main expression. On this specific rule of his definition, 
he comments: 
“In accord with our previous discussion of the explicandum, rule b in this definition 
takes into consideration the order in which argument expressions occur but disregards the 
place of the main subdesignator. For the intensional structure, in contrast to the merely 
syntactical structure, only the order of application is essential, not the order and manner of 
spelling.”
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A page later, in the beginning of §15, he remarks a striking similarity between the 
notion of intensional isomorphism just outlined and that of equivalence of analytic meaning 
put forward by C. I. Lewis. He quotes Lewis’s definition of the notion, and then goes on to 
point at some differences between it and his own account of synonymy – which leads him to 
make some critical comments on Lewis that, although quite to the point, are not exactly 
relevant for our present considerations. Curiously enough, though, Carnap does not mention 
a relevant difference between the mentioned clause of his rule b and the “correspondent” 
clause in Lewis’s definition. The requirement made by Lewis’s clause is that “the order of 
corresponding constituents is the same in both [expressions], or can be made the same 
without alteration of the intension of either whole expression" (emphasis by myself) – a clearly
less strict one than Carnap’s own. It allows, for instance, for non-homonymous expressions of
a certain language with exactly the same atomic components to be synonymous – in 
particular, it entails that e.g. (A&B) and (B&A) are synonymous35. This might be regarded as 
an advantage of Lewis’s formulation over Carnap’s. Of course, the “order of application” is, 
generally speaking, essential to the intensional structure; one could not claim with no further 
that e.g. (A→B) and (B→A) are even extensionally, let alone intensionally the same. It just 
does not follow from this that any difference whatsoever in the order of application will yield 
different intensional structures. Why should we regard the order of application as essential to 
the meaning of e.g. a propositional operation such as conjunction? This is a point where the 
motivational difference between Carnap’s exposition and the present, as mentioned above, 
shows some of its consequences.
If this series of remarks on the matter were to stop now, it would sound as if it were 
being suggested here that Carnap has depicted with his stricter definition of intensional 
isomorphism – his “explicatum”  for synonymy, let us keep in mind –  an equivalence relation 
looser than identity of what he calls syntactical structure and yet stricter than identity of 
intensional structure, the one which he actually intended to characterize. In crescent order of 
strictness, we would have: (i) identity of intensional structure; (ii) the equivalence relation 
actually defined by Carnap as intensional isomorphism; (iii) identity of syntactical structure; 
(iv) syntactical identity or homonymy, i.e. to be a copy of; (v) sameness as an occurrence of a 
given sign. Relation iii – or, better said, the notion of syntactical structure, in terms of which it 
is formulated – is left unspecified by Carnap to the point of, I believe, jeopardising its 
35 Strictly  speaking  it  does  not  entail  this,  because  Lewis’s  defines  the  relation  “equivalence  of  analytic
meaning” only for valid and inconsistent statements. This restriction can nevertheless be safely – and quite
profitably, as Carnap himself suggests – ignored.
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meaningfulness.  Relation ii in turn, though well explained enough, has also no clear role in 
the discussion of synonymy; perhaps some adequate variation of it could yield good fruits if 
employed for explaining aspects of the concept of translation from a logical viewpoint. 
There is nevertheless one more aspect worth mentioning; actually, something that 
Carnap wrongly dismisses as unproblematic, but is a quite relevant topic. When comparing, 
for example, expressions like ((A&B)&C )and  its counterpart &&ABC in prefix notation, it 
seems that he would have supported that they should be regarded as intensionally 
isomorphic. This position is curiously loose, though – it just seems that infix notation can 
generate ambiguous “expressions” which are simply impossible to construct in prefix notation,
where parentheses are unnecessary. Of course, one could object to this by reminding me of 
the reason why I put the word “expressions” between quotation marks in the previous 
sentence – i.e., there are no ambiguous expressions in infix notation because what would be 
ambiguous expressions is simply ruled out by an additional grammatical stipulation: the 
compulsory parenthisation of compound (sub)expressions – including of some  to which such 
a move represents no change whatsoever in meaning. But in prefix notation it is just so that 
one could not possibly abolish some disambiguation rule or convention in order to allow 
ambiguous expressions to occur – ambiguity is ruled out from scratch, without redundancies, 
irrelevancies (e.g. outermost parentheses) or priority conventions, by the very grammatically 
determined syntactical structure of compound expressions. In other words, there is a 
grammatical incongruence between languages with infix and prefix notation which suggests a 
difference in intensional structure between expressions one would regard – quite correctly – 
as translations of one another in two such languages. No such incompatibility would occur, 
though, should we compare expressions in languages with prefix and postfix notation – a 
case in which only a difference in “manner of spelling” would in fact obtain. 
Three morals to this last part of the story: (a) identifying, even if only extensionally, the 
notions of “cognitive” and “designative” meaning – or, put another way, understanding 
meaning insofar as it concerns logic in terms of designation – apparently lead Carnap to the 
impossibility of distinguishing some shades of grey between intension and syntax that are 
important for the adequate understanding of a notion such as intensional structure, for 
instance, subtle intensional differences such as the one just described between infix and 
prefix notations; (b) even from a logical standpoint, translation is a conceptually troublesome 
business, which requires the preservation of sometimes less, sometimes more than 
synonymy – which is all by itself a notion surrounded by enough mist; (c) one should use 
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extreme doses of both caution and honesty when employing technical vocabulary and 
devices for clarifying conceptual purposes. All understand perfectly that parentheses are 
disambiguation devices; therefore, there is no point in saying that things such as A&B&C are 
devoid of meaning only because grammar stipulates that they are not expressions or well-
formed formulas – ambiguous and meaningless are, after all, at least quite different if not 
indeed contrary notions. Actually, one could regard precisely this sort of “expression” – “ill-
formed” formulas, if you will; something whose distinction from things such as, say, &A→˅B is 
quite clear and precise – as a good reason why people insist on adding the frequently 
referred to as meaningless “well-formed” before “formulas”. 
a.2. Comparison between the presented notion of synonymy and identity (or synonymy) of 
proofs according to the normalisation thesis
 Some expectations as to how a notion of synonymy in the spirit of the one defined 
here and a notion of equivalence of derivations aimed at formalising identity of proofs should 
behave with respect to each other seem to make sense. Following the considerations of 
Carnap and C.I. Lewis, the notion of synonymy defined above is very strict and somewhat dull
– its goal is to capture, so to speak, the strictest level of intensional content expressed by an 
expression which is wider than its mere syntactical features. It is thus expected that any other 
significant semantical equivalence relation between derivations – be it thought as intensional 
or extensional – is to be by necessity complete with respect to this sort of relation of 
synonymy. Such an expectation is however obviously not met by means of the adoption of the
notion of synonymy just defined and of a notion of equivalence of derivations in accordance 
with the normalisation thesis.
THEOREM: there are non-βὴ-equivalent synonymous derivations.
PROOF: There are synonymous derivations which do not share the same end-formula and 
hence cannot be βὴ-equivalent, e.g.:
p
p∨q
p
q∨p
 
Q.E.D. 
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If we accept the notion of synonymy just presented and, simultaneously, that the 
equivalence relation between derivations yielded by the normalisation thesis is a good formal 
interpretation of identity of proofs, then we are forced to the conclusion that the latter is, quite 
counter-intuitively, not complete with respect to synonymy of derivations.  Whether we take 
identity of proofs as a relation of extensional or of intensional nature, it will be expected that 
synonymous derivations – in the strict Carnap-Lewis sense intended – must 
be/express/represent the same proof. One could, of course, say that the notion of synonymy 
presented is too coarse and should not allow for non-βὴ-equivalent derivations to be 
synonymous – but then again, it seems that synonymy will have to be thought as coinciding 
with plain syntactical identity. On the other hand, in turn, if one is inclined to accept that all 
derivations deemed synonymous by the notion just presented indeed share the sort of 
intensional content aimed at by Carnap and others, it seems that we would have to 
incorporate some more derivations to the list of those which are identified by the 
normalisation thesis as being/expressing/representing the same proof – namely all non-βὴ-
equivalent synonymous derivations.  The two derivations exemplified above, for instance, 
again point at a taxonomical issue involved in the normalisation thesis: the fact that there can 
be no two equivalent derivations with different end-formulas makes us wonder, whether we 
take the normalisation criterion as restricted to the result or not, about the extent to which the 
normalisation thesis can be understood as compatible with a general, non-trivial picture of 
synonymy of formulas, for instance.
The situation is nevertheless quite obviously worse than what the derivations just 
exemplified show. Thus:
THEOREM 2: there are non-βὴ-equivalent synonymous derivations sharing the same set of 
assumptions and end formula.
PROOF: 
p∧p
p
∧E1
p∧p
p
∧E2
Q.E.D.
Synonymy as defined here thus additionally identifies some derivations from a certain 
Γ to a certain A which are not identical according to the normalisation thesis. Because of the 
already mentioned Post-completeness results, however, this means that adding all 
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synonymous derivations to the list of those identified by the normalisation thesis will trivialise 
the identity of derivations from Γ to A for at least some Γ and some A which yielded more than 
one proof. This clearly poses an even stronger argument for the incompatibility between the 
present notion of synonymy and the notion of identity of the normalisation thesis: for it is not 
just that the latter is merely incomplete with respect to a dully strict notion of synonymy such 
as the former; it also simply cannot be completed as to encompass the dully strict idea of the 
former without significant losses. This could also serve as a good example of how the results 
of Post-completeness concerning the notion of identity yielded by the normalisation thesis can
be regarded as showing a weakness rather than a merit of it. 
Notwithstanding, there are limits to the damage caused by the addition of synonymous 
derivations to those identified by the normalisation thesis. For the next theorem, we need 
preliminary notions:
a)Counterpart function: let  Π and Π’ be synonymous derivations. A function Cp: Π --> Π’ is 
called a counterpart function iff:
(i) Cp(Π) = (Π’);
(ii) let Σ be a subderivation of Π such that the distance of the end formula of Σ  from the end 
formula of Π is n. Then Cp(Σ) = Σ’, where Σ’ is a subderivation of Cp(Π), Σ’ ≡ int Σ and the 
distance of the end formula of Σ from the end formula of Cp(Π) is n;
(iii) let A be the end formula of a subderivation Σ of Π. Then Cp(A) = A’, where A’ is the end 
formula of Cp(Σ);
(iv) Let B be a subformula of the end formula A of a subderivation Σ of Π. Then Cp(B) = B’ , 
where B’ is a subformula of Cp(A) such that B ≡int B’.
b) Perfect synonymy: Let Π and Π’ be derivations. Π and Π’ are perfectly synonymous iff 
there is a counterpart function Cp: Π --> Π’ such that Cp(Π) [Cp(Σ)] [Cp(A)] [Cp(B)] = Π [Σ] 
[A] [B].
In plain words, two synonymous derivations are perfectly synonymous iff they share exactly 
the same formulas in the same “places”!
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THEOREM 3: let Π and Π’ be synonymous derivations and share the same set of hypotheses 
Γ and end formula D; then the normal forms of Π and Π’ are perfectly synonymous.
PROOF: 
• If Π and Π’ are perfectly synonymous, the theorem follows trivially; 
• Suppose now that Π and Π’ are not perfectly synonymous. Then there are occurences of 
formulas A and B such that A ≠ B, A ≡int B, A[B] occurs in Π[Π’], and there is no Cp: Π --> 
Π’ such that Cp(A)=A; 
• Let now all Πi [Π’i] (i<n) be reducts of Π[Π’] and Πn[Π’n] the normal form of Π[Π’]. Then 
either (a)A[B] occurs as a maximal formula in some Πi[Π’i], or (b) A[B] occurs in Πn[Π’n]; 
• In case (a), then A[B] does not occur in Πn[Π’n], which implies that Πn and Π’n are perfectly 
synonymous;
• In case (b), then, by the subformula principle, either A[B] is a subformula of D, or A[B] is a 
subformula of some C  Γ. But it cannot be the case that A is a subformula of either D or ϵ
of some C  Γ – were it the case, then, since Π and Π’ share D and Γ, there would be ϵ
some Cp: Π --> Π’ such that Cp(A)=A, which contradicts the hypothesis under which we 
are that there is no Cp: Π --> Π’ such that Cp(A)=A.  Since (b) takes us to contradiction, 
then A[B] does not occur in Πn[Π’n]; which again implies that Πn and Π’n are perfectly 
synonymous;
• Therefore, Πn and Π’n are perfectly synonymous. 
Q.E.D.    
Together with theorem 2, theorem 3 tells us that all non-equivalent derivations from a certain 
Γ to a certain A identified by synonymy reduce to perfectly synonymous normal forms. In 
other words, given the maximality results, if one accepts the normalisation thesis, theorem 3 
tells us which derivations have their identity trivialised by synonymy. Thus, with the 
acceptance of the normalisation thesis, synonymy trivializes the identity of all and only those 
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derivations from a certain Γ to a certain A such that there are at least two non-equivalent 
perfectly synonymous normal derivations Π and Π’ from Γ to A.
b. Comparison between the normalisation thesis and the thesis of “principality”
Another interesting way of approaching identity of proofs is by means of an idea 
suggested by the notion of principal type of a λ-term. In a natural deduction setting, the notion
of principal type of a term corresponds to the end-formula of a maximally generalised 
derivation. This idea was already explored in III.2.a.1 and it is considered in some works 
concerning identity of proofs – though not itself as a supposedly sound and complete criterion
for identifying derivations that correspond to identical proofs (see e.g. Widebäck 2001). As a 
full thesis on identity of proofs, it could be basically expressed like this: two derivations are 
equivalent as proofs iff they have the same principal type, i.e. iff the conclusions or their 
maximal generalisations are the same. Let us call this the principality thesis on identity of 
proofs.
Inversely to what (for some) happens with the normalisation thesis, the appealing part 
of the principality thesis is supposedly its claim to completeness with respect to identity of 
proofs, its soundness being more obviously objectionable. The reason for this situation is 
basically the same sort of interpretation that led Kosta Došen to see in the relation between 
principality and β- and ὴ- conversions a reason to raise an objection against the soundness of
the normalisation thesis: in the first place, the idea that the principal type of a derivation, not 
its end-formula, is the actual result of the proof at stake in it; and secondly, that all identical 
proofs must share the same result. Since the principality thesis does identify all and only 
derivations with the same principal type, it thus generates a class of equivalence of 
derivations all of which certainly satisfy a supposedly necessary condition for representing 
identical proofs – i.e. sameness of result –; thence the trustworthiness of the claim to 
completeness. Soundness, on the other hand, must be somehow further argued for. 
Another way of looking at the meaning of generalising a derivation and the notion of 
principal type within the framework of identity of proofs and the principality thesis was 
suggested to me by Prof. Schroeder-Heister: if one erases the formulas of a derivation, but 
keeps the applications of inference rules and discharge of hypotheses untouched, one 
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obtains a sort of formal skeleton of the proof – which corresponds to an untyped lambda-term.
Thanks to the principal type theorem, we know that such structures can be assigned a 
principal type viz. have a maximally generalised version. Thus, the conclusion of a maximally 
generalised derivation – which corresponds to the principal type of a lambda term – is the 
expression of the potential of such argumentative structure, viz. the most general result it is 
capable of proving. The claim involved in the principality thesis would then be quite different: 
sameness of potential understood in this sense would be the necessary and sufficient 
condition for two derivations to be deemed equivalent as proofs. 
Understood in this second way, the principality thesis seems to pose a similar question 
regarding its soundness in case of completeness: it relies on  the notion of potential of a 
skeleton defined by means of the notion of principal type and stipulates thereby a notion of 
equivalence such that derivations whose skeletons share the same potential i.e. the same 
principal type should be identified; but it seems that, if anything, sameness of potential should
be a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for two derivations to be the same as proofs.
The difference between these two approaches lets itself be explained by, again, a 
taxonomic issue. The first approach, on the one hand, identifies proofs for having the same 
result; the second, int turn, for having the same potential. So, while the first could be 
described as regarding proofs as performed deductions considered in abstracto – thus putting
proofs in the category “performed” –,  the second seems to understand proofs as deductions 
that can be performed – thus framing proofs as belonging to the category “performable”. In 
this way, by understanding proofs as respectively different things, what the first approach 
regards as the result of a proof is exactly what the second regards as the potential of a proof. 
As observed in the comparisons between derivations made in section III.2.a.1, neither 
β- nor ὴ- conversions preserve principality – which means that normalisation thesis identifies 
derivations with different principal types. Therefore, no matter in which of the two ways 
described above principality thesis is understood, it seems to be in direct conflict with the 
normalisation thesis in the following way: its completeness, for which we arguably have 
convincing informal grounds, implies that the soundness of the normalisation thesis, for which
we also purportedly have equally convincing informal grounds,  does not hold. And the 
converse is also the case: if normalisation thesis is sound, then principality thesis is not 
complete. This means that the two basic intuitions about proofs and their identity which we 
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supposedly have enough and equally strong reasons to accept from the outset are 
incompatible. Which one would then be right?
Such a dilemma is in fact the fruit of a misunderstanding. The reason for it to come 
about is fundamentally the idea that both the normalisation thesis and the principality thesis 
are incompatible competing ways to answer to the same question, namely, the one 
concerning the criteria of identity of proofs, when in fact they are not – or at least not in a way 
that poses any significant problem. The actual incompatibility is indeed a formal one: because
the normalisation thesis is not sound with respect to the principality thesis, they cannot both 
hold as, respectively, sound and complete criteria of equivalence of derivations. But they can 
both be taken to hold as criteria for identity of proofs, for the proofs “individuated” by each of 
such criteria of identity could simply be taken to, say, belong to different types. So, just as 
<2,3> and <4,6> are the same rational number but not the same ordered pair of natural 
numbers, so are the pairs of derivations in the examples in section III.2.a.1 the same proof – 
when proof means what is individuated by the identity criterion yielded by the normalisation 
thesis and they are taken to be proofs – and also not the same proof – when proof means 
what is individuated by the identity criterion yielded by the principality thesis and they are 
taken to be proofs.  One could, it is true, wonder which of the two types, if any, truly 
corresponds to THE concept of proof; but, as already suggested before, as far as we are 
concerned, such a thing is most likely a senseless idea.
But in any case, there is something that attention to our taxonomy of criteria may tell us
concerning the adequacy of each of these proposals. While normalisation thesis seems in no 
sense to fit into any of the “trivial” categories, the principality thesis seems clearly to be 
intended as a criterion which is trivial and restricted to the result. For it yields a criterion that 
reduces the identity of proofs to that of something different – in this case, either the result or 
the potential of the structure of a derivation. In this sense, despite yielding a syntactically non-
trivial equivalence relation between derivations (even when one considers derivations from a 
certain Γ to a certain A) just as much as the normalisation thesis does, it is a way of putting 
proofs apart that essentially fits into the “purely extensional” background conception that two 
proofs are equal iff they have the same result.  From the viewpoint that motivates the 
normalisation thesis, such a proposal would thus be, roughly put, a mere syntactical 
sophistication of the idea against which the investigation of identity of proofs started to be 
undertaken in the first place, namely: that there can be no two different proofs of the same 
131
result. So, as indicated by our taxonomic evaluation, the principality thesis yields a trivial 
criterion of identity of proofs restricted to the result.  And this is definitely an important 
information when considering how this criterion shapes our understanding of what a proof 
is/means in contexts in which it is adopted, and also which tasks/questions such a criterion is 
able to perform/answer.
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V. Towards an evaluation of the normalisation thesis: the case of Church-Turing thesis 
as touchstone
In order to properly assess whether or not a given enterprise was successful, it is 
usually required that one knows clearly the purpose for which it has been undertaken, or 
according to which it is to be evaluated. In the eventual absence of such a purpose, any 
question concerning success or failure becomes unanswerable, because ultimately 
senseless. And in case the purpose is vague and unclear, or in case there are many distinct, 
sometimes even conflicting purposes attached to the enterprise, then the judgement of its 
success is doomed to be, even ideally considered, equally vague, unclear or conflicting. 
These quite unremarkable observations should suffice to convey to the reader the core 
reason why it is ultimately impossible that the comments to be made in this section represent 
any sort of proper evaluation of the success of the normalisation thesis itself: for the purpose 
or purposes for which it has been put forward or according to which it should be evaluated 
have not been stated explicitly or clearly enough, and are not really well understood or agreed
upon as yet.
This is hardly the first occasion where this sort of observation is made regarding the 
normalisation thesis. Troelstra, for instance, in a passage already transcribed here36, 
addresses the very same issue: there, he calls the thesis ultimately “meaningless”, because 
“ambiguous” with respect to the notion of proof intended – i.e. since it is not possible to 
determine which notion of proof the thesis aim to describe, its merit could not be evaluate. 
The formulation of his diagnosis does make it sound senseless, though; for ambiguity comes 
about not where meaning lacks, but rather contrarily, where there is a kind of superabundance
thereof. It is also not quite clear if it is due to ambiguity, vagueness or some other 
phenomenon concerning the terms and concepts involved that we lack reasons to properly 
judge how well the normalisation thesis fares overall. Unlike Troelstra, however, we shall here
not simply rest contented with stating the impossibility of making a precise evaluation of the 
merits of the normalisation thesis due to our difficulty in determining its actual purposes. 
There is, after all, quite a number of relevant and clear enough philosophical projects which 
one could think such a thesis might be directed at, or maybe not unreasonably considered as 
a candidate to adequately perform – and thus we can, supposition after supposition, come to 
a better understanding of, at the very least, the extent to which some of the philosophical 
36 Section IV.2.
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projects normalisation thesis is at least in principle capable of performing are worth pursuing. 
In what follows, a comparison will be made between the normalisation thesis and the Church-
Turing thesis concerning some key aspects of them. Due to their several and significant 
conceptual similarities, as well as convenient differences, and to the possibility of a more solid
historical assessment of the latter, this will be useful to give us a measure for the reasonability
of our eventual judgements and expectations concerning the former.  
1.  The Church-Turing thesis and the normalisation thesis compared
The famous epithet Church-Turing thesis is employed in the literature to refer to a 
variety of related theses that typically characterise some notion of computation or 
effectiveness by means of the formal notions of Turing machines or λ-definability. Here, we 
will use it to primarily refer to the following formulation: All and only effective computations can
be carried out by a Turing machine viz. are λ-definable. On some occasions, the 
normalisation thesis has been deemed analogous to the Church-Turing thesis with respect to 
how it addresses its object. Kosta Došen 2003, p.4, for instance, says:  
“The Normalization Conjecture is an assertion of the same kind as Church’s Thesis: we 
should not expect a formal proof of it. (...) The Normalization Conjecture attempts to give a 
formal reconstruction of an intuitive notion. (Like Church’s Thesis, the Normalization 
Conjecture might be taken as a kind of definition. It is, however, better to distinguish this 
particular kind of definition by a special name. The Normalization Conjecture (...) might be 
taken as a case of analysis (...))”
a. Other theses more closely analogous to Church-Turing thesis
To be more accurate, the analogy of Church-Turing thesis seems to be stricter with 
other theses put forward within the literature of general proof theory, closely related to the 
normalisation thesis yet distinct from it. One, for instance, is claimed by Prawitz 1971, and 
could be stated as follows: every proof in first order logic can be carried out by means of 
some Gentzen-style natural deduction derivation, and by means of every such derivation can 
some such proof be carried out. Indeed, one can see that Prawitz underlines still a further 
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point of analogy between the specific formulation of Church-Turing thesis in terms of Turing 
machines and the thesis he claims in his text in terms of Gentzen-style natural deduction 
derivations, namely: both these formalisms would yield “completely analysed” versions of 
what they render formally. Such analogy is explicitly stressed by Prawitz in his text (1971, 
2.1.3, p. 246):
“(...)Gentzen’s systems of natural deduction are not arbitrary formalizations of first order logic
but constitutes a significant analysis of the proofs in this logic. The situation may be compared
to the attempts to characterize the notion of computation where e.g. the formalism of μ-
recursive functions or even the general recursive functions may be regarded as an 
extensional characterization of this notion while Turing’s analysis is such that one may 
reasonably assert the thesis that every computation when sufficiently analysed can be broken
down in the operations described by Turing.”
Dummett’s so called “fundamental assumption”is also more strictly analogous to 
Church-Turing thesis than the normalisation thesis. In Dummett’s own words, the fundamental
assumption states that ‘‘if we have a valid argument for a complex sentence, we can construct
a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules 
governing its principal operator’’ (Dummett 1991, p.254) – i.e. a valid argument in canonical 
form. Turing 1954 puts forward a thesis closely related to Church-Turing thesis and with 
respect to the nature of puzzles that illustrates this analogy most clearly:
“(…) the normal form for puzzles is the substitution type of puzzle. More definitely we can say:
Given any puzzle we can find a corresponding substitution puzzle which is equivalent to it in 
the sense that given a solution of the one we can easily use it to find a solution of the other.”
Where Turing speaks of puzzles in this passage, one could well speak of effective 
computations, valid arguments or proofs;  where he speaks of the substitution type of puzzle, 
one could talk in terms of, respectively, Turing machines or valid canonical arguments; and 
where he speaks of a correspondence viz. equivalence between solutions, one could speak 
of sameness of, respectively, inputs and outputs or assumptions and conclusion.
Realise, further, that the status of such theses depends crucially on how one 
approaches the notion characterised by the thesis in question. If one, for instance, takes the 
135
valid arguments referred to by the fundamental assumption to be natural deduction 
derivations in intuitionistic first order logic, the “assumption” becomes in fact a theorem – 
indeed, a corollary to the normal form theorem. A more general or a less sharp viz. formally 
stated view of what one understands by a valid argument for a complex sentence, however, 
may lend the assumption more definitional contours. In fact, this is exactly what Turing 
observes about the above stated thesis on puzzles, right after formulating it:    
“This statement is still somewhat lacking in definiteness, and will remain so. I do not propose, 
for instance, to enter here into the question as to what I mean by the word ‘easily’. (...) In so 
far as we know a priori what is a puzzle and what is not, the statement is a theorem. In so far 
as we do not know what puzzles are, the statement is a definition which tells us something 
about what they are.”
We will come back to this passage (probably still a few times) later, for it also applies in 
important senses to the normalisation thesis.
2. First relevant point of analogy: characterisations of a notion in formally tractable terms 
which claim to be sound and complete
Notwithstanding the observations just made, the analogy observed by Došen between 
the normalisation thesis and the Church-Turing thesis is still significant and illuminating. In 
fact, all of the above mentioned theses share a very important trait with the normalisation 
thesis, namely: all theses offer a characterisation of a notion – say, an “explicandum” – in 
terms of a formally tractable concept, and claim that this formal characterisation is sound and 
complete with respect to the characterised notion. Thus, just as the Church-Turing thesis 
suggests the possibility of soundly and completely characterising the informal notion of 
effective computability at stake in e.g. Turing’s 1936 paper37 in terms of the formal notions of 
Turing-machines and λ-definability; just as Prawitz 1971 characterises first order logic proofs 
as soundly and completely38 analysable in terms of natural deduction derivations; just as 
37 Which is a quite specific one; more on this topic later.
38 This “completely” holds both in the sense that all proofs can be analysed in this way and in the sense that the
analysis is complete i.e. breaks them down into their most elementary component steps; yet the first of these
senses is the obviously the relevant one to the described analogy.
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Dummett assumes that the existence of canonical valid arguments of appropriate form is 
necessary and sufficient to explain the validity of arguments in general; and just as Turing 
proposes that the specifically defined notion of substitution puzzle soundly and completely 
characterises the general notion of puzzle; so does the normalisation thesis intend to provide 
a sound and complete characterisation of the informal viz. semantical notion of identity 
between proofs viz. semantical equivalence between derivations in terms of the formal viz. 
syntactical notion of (βὴ-)equivalence based on the reductions involved in the normalisation of
natural deduction derivations. By means of the normalisation thesis, though, another thesis 
that is again closer in form to those mentioned above is suggested, namely: that proofs are 
soundly and completely expressed by normal derivations alone (thus, a strengthening of 
Prawitz’s aforementioned thesis, which is acknowledged by Prawitz 1971 himself to follow 
from his argumentation (see p.258, 4.1.2.1 )).
3. Second relevant point of analogy: theses, not conjectures
a. No mathematical statements, therefore no candidates to be mathematically proved or 
disproved
The cogency of Došen’s point that a formal proof of the normalisation thesis should not 
be expected has already been advocated here (actually, we were, it seems, rather more 
radical than Došen on this point: he seems to side with Kreisel and Barendregt in stating that 
the Post-completeness argument is an efficient way of justifying the completeness part of the 
normalisation thesis once its soundness is granted; a point specifically against which we 
argued in section III.2.b). The Church-Turing thesis39, likewise, is usually not treated as 
subject to formal justification40. Turing himself, for instance, in the 1936 article where the 
thesis as put forward by himself can be first identified, expresses a similar opinion in a most 
positive way: “All arguments which can be given [to show the thesis] are bound to be, 
fundamentally, appeals to intuition, and for this reason rather unsatisfactory mathematically”. 
When commenting the closely related 1954 thesis on puzzles, he puts the point in an even 
more eloquent way: “ The statement is moreover one which one does not attempt to prove. 
39 Most comments to be made will also apply to the other mentioned related theses.
40 Although there are exceptions: see, e.g. Kripke 2013, who claims that the Church-Turing thesis is a corollary 
of Gödel’s completeness theorem for first-order predicate logic with identity.
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Propaganda is more appropriate to it than proof(...)”. The reason for such a diagnosis – or, 
seen from another angle, the diagnosis to which this observation gives rise – can be regarded
as the same in all cases: the theses in question, no matter how one employs or understand 
them, are of a rather informal nature – i.e. despite being formulated (at least partially) in 
mathematical terms, they are no mathematical statements (in the sense that they are no 
statements of mathematics as e.g. 1+1=2 is); therefore, they cannot possibly be expected to 
be decided (or shown undecidable) mathematically. This is, by the way, the first reason why 
the normalisation thesis – just as much as the Church-Turing thesis – cannot be reasonably 
regarded as a mere mathematical fancy: it is not, strictly speaking, entirely or even essentially
mathematical in nature. It is yet to be argued, though, why, if at all, it should not be regarded 
as a mathematically formulated metaphysical or ideological fancy, in mathematics or 
elsewhere.
The terminology “conjecture”, most frequently employed when referring to the 
normalisation thesis, has also been purposefully eschewed here for this reason (though not 
only). In contexts that are mathematical enough – such as that of the present discussion of 
identity of proofs –, a conjecture is usually something that is, at least in principle, a candidate 
to be mathematically proved or disproved – or, at the very least, being mathematically shown 
to be undecidable.
b. Definitions, not “scientific” conjectures viz. hypotheses: definitions can be used in many 
ways
Furthermore – and this is the second reason why the label “conjecture” is rejected here
– , these theses need not in principle be taken as formal reconstructions of some given 
informal notion. Another aspect they share pointed at by Došen is their definitional character; 
and definitions may well be taken as stipulative, creative, or, more interestingly, propositive 
rather than descriptive in nature. Church, for instance, in the 1936 paper where the thesis is 
first put forward by himself in terms of λ-definability, refers to his proposal as a “definition of 
effective calculability”; and rather in the same spirit, one could regard the normalisation thesis 
as a definition of, say, semantical equivalence between natural deduction derivations. Such 
definitions could in turn be taken to be attempts to actively, positively build or give substance 
to a notion which was previously not there, or that, at best, was too fuzzy, volatile or obscure 
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to serve certain purposes, instead of to truly, faithfully or precisely capture or depict some 
informal notion assumed to be somehow previously viz. independently determined. Thus, 
inasmuch as they are taken as attempts at formally reconstructing an informal notion given 
beforehand, both theses are just as “true” as they are faithful renderings of the given intended
informal notion into formally tractable terms. Otherwise, inasmuch as they are proposals as to
how we can positively specify and deal with certain ideas not assumed to be previously or 
independently given or determined in any particular way, these theses should not be looked 
upon as having any pretension of being “true” in any sense, and are just as good as they are 
successful, when used as definitions, in allowing viz. blocking uses of the defined notion in 
accordance with the goals one has, whatever these are. Turing summarises the points made 
here in V.3.a and V.3.b  in the already transcribed comments to the mentioned analogous 
195441 thesis on puzzles:
 “The statement is moreover one which one does not attempt to prove. Propaganda is more 
appropriate to it than proof, for its status is something between a theorem and a definition. In 
so far as we know a priori what is a puzzle and what is not, the statement is a theorem. In so 
far as we do not know what puzzles are, the statement is a definition which tells us something
about what they are.”
Where Turing speaks of puzzles in this passage, one could well speak of effective 
computations or identity of proofs – or even simply proofs –, and the observation would still 
hold. Thus, in yet another sense, it is a thesis and not a conjecture or a hypothesis the proper 
object of our interest when addressing the normalisation thesis on identity of proofs: the 
conjecture that can be made by suggesting this thesis as a possibly true hypothesis – of 
mathematical or other nature – is merely one among the possible ways one can employ the 
thesis, and it has no privilege in this investigation. Analogously, we do not speak of, say,  the 
normalisation stipulation or postulate on identity of proofs – for, just the same, a, say, non-
veritative way of putting the thesis has no reason to be privileged here. The terminology 
thesis, unsatisfactory as it may be in the discussed respect, follows that which is already 
sedimented by use in the case of Church-Turing thesis, and seems at any rate less 
problematic than the considered alternatives.  
41 Turing, A.M., 1954, “Solvable and Unsolvable Problems”, Science News, 31: 7–23; reprinted in Copeland 
2004b: 582–595
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4. Third relevant point of analogy: initial acceptance of soundness, not of completeness
Another important aspect in which Church-Turing thesis and the normalisation thesis 
are similar is the fact that while their proponents deem their soundness to be somehow 
obvious, they dedicate significant efforts to argue for their completeness, which they do not 
take for granted.
A reconstruction of some assumptions under which the soundness part of the 
normalisation thesis could be taken for granted was given in III.2.a, and some relevant 
objections to it have also been explored in III.2.a.1 and III.2.a.2. Objections  to – or, as a 
matter of fact, discussion of a satisfactory level of philosophical depth in general of – the 
soundness of Church-Turing thesis are nevertheless relatively less frequent42, the standard, 
overwhelmingly hegemonic attitude being its tacit acceptance.
On the other hand, the completeness of both theses is more frequently questioned, 
and quite understandably so for especially one before all – many – other reasons: they 
impose clear and sharp limits to notions manipulated in a great variety of senses which are 
frequently not sharp at all. This is even more true in the case of proofs and their identity, due 
to the frequent presence of talk of proofs in most variegated contexts in everyday life. In spite 
of the fact that the notion of (effective) computability has close relations with distinct notions 
such as constructibility, feasibility etc., it is usually employed in much more restrict contexts – 
usually philosophical or mathematical, being quite infrequent in non-theoretical or academic 
contexts.
5. A brief comparative evaluation of the success of the two theses
a. Church-Turing thesis’s unequivocal triumph as the fertile soil of a science, not as one of its 
fruits
Church-Turing thesis is possibly one of the most successful propositions of its kind. 
The diagnosis made by Turing as early as 1948 is the following:
42 Two to appear in the literature of which I am aware can be respectively found in Péter, R. Rekursivität und 
Konstruktivität, Constructivity in Mathematics, Amsterdam 1959, pp. 226-233.; and Porte, J. Quelques 
pseudo-paradoxes de la “calculabilité effective”, Actes du 2me Congrès International de Cybernetique, 
Namur, Belgium,1960, pp. 332-334.
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“It is found in practice that L.C.M.s can do anything that could be described as ‘rule of 
thumb’ or ‘purely mechanical’ [i.e. effectivelly computable]. This is sufficiently well established 
that it is now agreed amongst logicians that ‘calculable by means of an L.C.M. [a Turing 
machine]’ is the correct accurate rendering of such phrases.”
Copeland 201743, for instance, recognises the virtual consensus amongst logicians on 
the matter as applicable even to today’s situation – which shows that the thesis is way past 
the possibility of being called a mere fancy. As Turing exemplifies with his opinion, the reason 
for such high acceptance is usually attributed to “practice”: In the first place, in tune with 
Turing’s own way of putting the matter, all examples of functions deemed effectively 
computable that have been considered so far actually happen to be computable by Turing 
machines. But perhaps even more importantly, all relevant concurrent attempts to give 
mathematically tractable substance to the notion of effective computability – in particular 
Church’s and Turing’s – have turned out to be extensionally equivalent in spite of the 
sometimes very distinct ideas and formal apparatus in terms of which they are formulated. 
This is actually sometimes described as indicative of a formalism independent character of 
the thesis’s claim: the exact same class of functions is, after all, selected as effectively 
computable in all approaches.
But notice that practice only offers “arguments” – and quite indecisive ones –  to 
support, first,  the completeness part of the thesis: for the lack of knowledge of 
counterexamples – or of how they could be produced from potential examples – and the 
overwhelming variety of  examples show, if anything, our lack of concrete material to believe 
that the thesis may leave out something that should be regarded as an effective computation; 
and second, the non-ideological character of the very notion of effective computability yielded 
by the mentioned theses: the extensional coincidence of all considered ideologies arguably 
suggests this much. But what about soundness? Which aspect of practice offers any 
arguments to favour the idea that everything that Turing machines can compute is in fact 
effectively computable or purely mechanical?
I believe that a proper look at why people have been persuaded of Church-Turing 
thesis’s soundness in the past and nowadays is perhaps one of the best ways to understand 
43 Copeland, B. Jack, "The Church-Turing Thesis", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/church-turing/>.
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both the reason and the meaning of the hegemonic acceptance of the whole thesis. It is fairly 
clear that the thesis was put forward – at least in the versions proposed by Church and Turing
– as an attempt not so much to reconstruct, but rather to make a certain informal, in some 
senses deemed “vague” notion of effective computability or calculability a precise one. Now, 
such an enterprise involves establishing sharp limits for the notion to be defined; but this task 
obviously cannot be guided simply by rigorous observance of the limits of the aimed notion 
itself. In fact, there was no such thing as limits that could be rigorously observed attached to 
the informal notion in question. In this sense, rather than a reconstruction, Church-Turing’s 
thesis is, not only from a historical but also from a conceptual, semantical viewpoint, more 
likely a contribution; an actual addition to a previous notion of computability which was in fact 
transformed by it. The evaluation of the soundness of the thesis, thus, cannot really be 
understood as mere comparison with some related previous informal notion of computability 
which is supposedly to be successfully mimicked by it; it is simply peremptory to even assume
there was such thing.
This suggestion goes against, it seems, Copeland’s 2017 view on the matter. He claims
that “effective”, “mechanical”, “systematic” etc. are informal “terms of art” in logic, 
mathematics and computer science that depart significantly from their everyday usage in 
these contexts. He goes on, and states that these terms are all synonymous when employed 
in these specific contexts, and that their meaning is as precisely determined as described by 
the following clauses, which I quote:
“A method, or procedure, M, for achieving some desired result is called ‘effective’ (or 
‘systematic’ or ‘mechanical’) just in case:
1.M is set out in terms of a finite number of exact instructions (each instruction being 
expressed by means of a finite number of symbols);
2.M will, if carried out without error, produce the desired result in a finite number of steps;
3.M can (in practice or in principle) be carried out by a human being unaided by any 
machinery except paper and pencil;
4.M demands no insight, intuition, or ingenuity, on the part of the human being carrying out 
the method.”
Now, as much as this suggestion has a reasonable claim to hold with respect to today’s
employment of this vocabulary in the mentioned fields – which, more than mere manipulation 
142
of terminology “of art”, is rather technical –, it is hard to see evidence that the mathematical 
community uniformly employed – let alone was aware of employing – an informal notion of 
effectiveness as clearly determined as the one just depicted before the publication of, more 
than any other, Turing’s 1936 own groundbreaking informal account of the notion. The fact 
that reasonable – yet thus far clearly defeated from a historical viewpoint – criticism from quite
capable practitioners of mathematics has arisen until at least as late as 1960, as already 
observed, specifically against the soundness of the thesis speaks in favour of this.
Moreover, the notion of computability by a Turing machine, besides being a remarkably
accurate formalisation of Turing’s own informal understanding of computability – which is the 
actual soul of his contribution to the debate on effective computability –, allows for a 
mathematically very fruitful way of employing the until then somewhat elusive notion of 
effective computability. This last observation could hardly be overstated – we are talking of a 
formal development which yielded solutions to the halting problem and to the 
Entscheidungsproblem just to start with.
Thus, the fact that the Church-Turing thesis is a remarkably faithful formalisation of 
Turing’s own proposed informal account of effective computability is hardly the most decisive 
factor for the initial endorsement of the soundness of this thesis – at least insofar as it is 
considered as formulated here, namely: “All and only effective computations can be carried 
out by a Turing machine viz. are λ-definable” – ; rather, such endorsement seems to stem 
from the fact that Turing’s solid informal conception of effective computability was probably as 
appealing as possible when measured within the mainstream ideological framework on 
effectiveness and computability at his time. A remarkable illustration of this point is the 
consideration of Gödel’s appreciation of the significance of Turing’s work for the proper 
support of the Church-Turing thesis. He remained clearly unconvinced of the thesis even after
it was demonstrated by Church and Kleene in 1935 that λ-definability and general 
recursiveness are extensionally equivalent, only to enthusiastically endorse the thesis after 
Turing’s account of computability in his 1936 article. Regarding this, he said:
“Turing's work gives an analysis of the concept of "mechanical procedure" (alias "algorithm" or
"computation procedure" or "finite combinatorial procedure"). This concept is shown to be 
equivalent with that of a "Turing machine."” (quoted from Davis 1965, p. 72. My emphasis.)
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The “concept” referred by Gödel as yielded by Turing’s analysis is not the formal one of
a Turing machine, or else his claim to its being shown to be equivalent to that of a Turing 
machine would be pointless. He further claims that:
“We had not perceived the sharp concept of mechanical procedures sharply before Turing, 
who brought us to the right perspective.” (Quoted in Wang 1974, p. 85)
As observed above, then, the crucial aspect of Turing’s account of computability is his 
convincing philosophical presentation of (a) why a certain informal notion of effective 
computability is very appealing for clear reasons and (b) how it can be very faithfully 
formalised in a certain remarkably simple and interesting, fruitful way (i.e. Turing machines); 
which only as a bonus happens to be extensionally equivalent to other suggested formal 
criteria to define effective computations. These other formal criteria were never sufficiently 
underpinned from a philosophical point of view; they were not shown to germinate from a 
previous appealing informal account of effective computability, and thus remained unjustified 
in their general claims both to soundness and to completeness. Gödel’s appreciation of the 
matter is thus, in this respect, very close to the one presented here. 
However, according to the present appreciation of the matter – which in this respect 
departs from that of Gödel, as will be clear –, the appeal of Turing’s informal account of 
computability resides in the fact that it is both (a) compatible with the vague notion of effective
computability employed at the time, in the sense that it is neither clearly unsound nor clearly 
incomplete with respect to it; and (b) by extending and transforming this previous vague 
notion of computability into a more detailed and solid – yet still informal – one, it offers the 
basis for a mathematical handling and further development of this notion of unparalleled 
power. This is in fact why one should not take Turing’s wording as mere verbal frolic when he 
talks of propaganda, rather than proof, being more adequate to support the thesis: this is true 
in senses probably deeper than the mathematical one. As just suggested, thus, the decisive 
factor in the acceptance of the thesis – and most especially of its soundness – has to do with 
the conceptual and mathematical possibilities it was capable of inaugurating; it is therefore 
not a matter of accepting it because it depicts faithfully a notion of effective computation which
was previously there – somehow “in the air”44, whatever this means –, but rather because it 
44 See e.g. p.51 of Gandy, R., 1988, “The Confluence of Ideas in 1936”, in R. Herken (ed.), 1988, The Universal Turing 
Machine: A Half-Century Survey, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 51–102.
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outlines a notion of effective computation which is remarkably powerful from both a 
conceptual and a technical point of view. And it is hardly relevant here whether or not people 
believe they have accepted Church-Turing thesis due to its faithful correspondence to a 
previous notion of computability; the fact is that such a notion had never really been 
expressed before Turing, which makes it take a leap of faith to believe that it was even 
already there beforehand viz. independently of his formulation. This sort of understanding 
seems to be emblematically exemplified by, again, the attitude of Gödel towards the Church-
Turing thesis, who, in the second of his quoted passages above, refers to what seems to be 
an assumed previously given “sharp” concept to which Turing’s analysis corresponds. It is 
especially in this respect that his view departs from ours. Closer to our viewpoint is the one 
suggested by Church 1937. Post (Post 1936, p.105) criticised Church’s understanding of his 
own identification of λ-definability and “effective calculability” as a definition of effective 
calculability as masking the fact that it is rather a “working hypothesis”, in need of “continual 
verification”; in reviewing Post’s article, Church then responded to the criticism by claiming 
something close, yet somewhat less radical, to what is stated here about there being no 
reasons to assume that there is a previous notion of calculability against which the 
“hypothesis” is to be verified, and that it thus establishes, rather than merely describes, the 
addressed notion:
“[Post] takes this identification as a "working hypothesis" in need of continual verification. To 
this the reviewer would object that effectiveness in the ordinary (not explicitly defined) sense 
has not been given an exact definition, and hence the working hypothesis in question has not 
an exact meaning. To define effectiveness as computability by an arbitrary machine subject to
the restrictions of finiteness would seem to be an adequate representation of the ordinary 
notion, and if this is done the need for a working hypothesis disappears.”  
An analogy might be useful to summarise the interpretation advocated here. If we think
of certain political leaders and ideologies which, coincidentally or not – most probably not –, 
have emerged and gained massive endorsement in the 1930s’ West, the massive 
endorsement of the Church-Turing thesis itself might be better understood. More specifically, 
this is meant in the following sense: one would have a hard time defending the claim that e.g. 
national-socialism or Adolf Hitler found massive approval amongst Germans in this decade 
due to the fact that they merely mirrored viz. efficiently applied a somehow previously 
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constituted body of political convictions these people held beforehand. Rather than mere 
faithful codification and executors of a previously established popular will, it seems that they 
achieved the rather more spectacular deed of offering these people a new ideology; one that 
was capable not only of accommodating their old, previous ideals, but also, in adapting, 
changing and adding most significantly to them, to provide these people with a solid sense of 
purpose. They brought about and embodied what appeared like clear-cut, unambiguous 
political guidelines and goals which Germans, due to a series of social and historical 
circumstances, not only lacked but also longed for, and also, on the basis of their previous, 
vague, disempowered and ineffectual political convictions and attitude, believed they were 
able and willing to endorse. The suggestion here is to understand the triumph of the Church-
Turing thesis as sharing a similar structure: rather than a faithful expression of pre-existent 
ideology, it is a brand new ideology, capable of imprinting to the old one the sense, direction 
and acceleration it lacked and longed for in a variety of senses. Again: Turing’s use of the 
word “propaganda” is most suggestive if not confined from the outset into the straightjacket of 
a mere touch of witty humour – which, by the way, it quite possibly was intended to be. In art 
as in life; except for the fact that national-socialism was rather heavily countered and 
defeated, while theoretical and practical work involving computation and complexity flourished
and triumphed upon the basis of Church-Turing thesis – at least for the time being. 
In any case, conceding as much as we can, the Church-Turing thesis is at the very 
least, if you will, a case where the so-called paradox of analysis finds an instance which 
clearly goes far beyond a mere theoretical fuss: even if we do accept that it is, as so 
frequently suggested, the formal version of a mere analysis of an independently and 
previously given notion of effective computability, it is difficult to see how such an analysis 
could have brought that much transformation in the use of the analysed notion without having 
a meaning which is essentially different from that of the latter. But then how, in which sense 
could one still call it a mere analysis?
The “propaganda” in favour of the employment of the Church-Turing thesis to guide the
handling of notions such as “effective computability” and equivalents has indeed been so 
successful that a remarkable phenomenon can be observed in the present stage of their 
discussion: computable by Turing machines, λ-definable and equivalent notions – especially 
the first of these, due to the very simple and familiar terms in which it is formulated –  became
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indeed paradigmatic cases of what one deems effectively computable in an “intuitive”45  
sense. So, in practice, the soundness of the Church-Turing thesis is not altogether detachable
from the frequently supposed “intuitive”, “pre-theoretical” departure point of the discussion of 
computability. At the very least not anymore. In a sense, thus, to deny the soundness of 
Church-Turing thesis is literally close to nonsensical – which shows that this thesis has 
succeeded in establishing the paradigm of what it is to be effectively computable, rather than 
in truly describing this notion.  
b. The normalisation thesis: a footnote written in pencil
Matters stand quite differently when it comes to the normalisation thesis, as recalling 
some of the points already made along this work should now make clear. Although explicit 
and mathematically oriented attempts to account for identity of proofs in a systematic fashion 
is a rather recent business – even more than that on computability –, we have argued here 
that discussion of identity of proofs of a rather formal nature can be found in classical 
philosophical literature since at least as early as the 18th century; and, maybe even more 
importantly, the core informal concept at stake in the thesis  – namely, proof – has been 
employed as a “term of art” in philosophy, logic and mathematics for almost as long as there 
have been such disciplines. This means that the philosophical consideration of the concepts 
addressed by the normalisation thesis go way farther back in history than the relatively young 
discussion of computability, which one could take pains to trace back to, at the earliest, say, 
Leibniz and other 17th century thinkers, and which in any case did not acquire some of the 
most essential features of its shape before Hilbert and his foundational enterprise.
Quite contrarily to the expectations that such a picture could generate, however, the 
notion of proof at stake in the normalisation thesis has far more clear-cut determined traces 
than the notion of effectiveness addressed by the Church-Turing thesis: from the very outset, 
all eventual proofs that cannot be expressed as natural deduction derivations are not 
contemplated, while in principle all procedures/computations are possible candidates to 
effectiveness. The normalisation thesis thus works only in an environment where a clear and 
specific application criterion for proofs is granted, and is either evidently false or simply ill-
45 My experience is that the use of this notion – “intuitive” –, while hardly being of any significant utility at all in 
philosophical discussion, usually comes at the expensive cost of bringing about a great deal of confusion to it. Therefore
it is purposefully avoided here as much as possible.
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formulated in its absence – unlike what happens in the case of the Church-Turing thesis, 
which itself provides such a clear application criterion to a notion of effective computation that 
is not necessarily previously specified in any way.
But before we proceed into our evaluation of the normalisation thesis and how it 
compares to that of the Church-Turing thesis, maybe now is the proper time for a brief  
interlude, in which we are to ask ourselves this: What does this mean: a term of art? Where 
does such a use of a term lie between a technical, i.e. explicitly stipulated in a fix and possibly
arbitrary fashion, and a non-theoretical, spontaneous or unreflective one? In the cases that 
now interest us, as in many others, it is most certainly not the case that philosophers, 
mathematicians and scientists just chose to use a given term to express a certain specific 
concept of their disciplines out of no particular reason and in a way independent from its 
meaning in other contexts where its rules of employment are well enough sedimented by 
linguistic practices. Terms of art become terms of art usually due to their behaviour elsewhere 
in language, and not independently of it, let alone in spite of it. Thus, e.g. “effectiveness” in 
logic, mathematics and computer science is not some extraterrestrial appropriation of a term 
which is employed in most other contexts to refer to some distinct, “usual” notion of 
effectiveness; an appropriation alien to the sense in which one says that e.g. using a blunt 
razor blade is not very effective for shaving one’s beard. Of course one must recognise that 
e.g. while writing truth tables is a mathematically effective procedure to test whether or not 
any given sentence of classical propositional logic is tautological, it could hardly be regarded 
as effective in a practical sense for testing the tautologousness of sentences with many 
different variables – it may simply take too long, to the point of unfeasibility. But does this 
mean that we are dealing with different notions of effectiveness in each of these cases? Some
fallacies, for instance, may be deemed rhetorically very effective arguments, despite their 
being clearly epistemically ineffective. Would it not rather be the case of effectiveness – a 
single, non-technical and democratically accessible notion, which means, quite obviously, the 
character of methods or procedures that produce or are capable of producing a certain effect 
– being measured by different standards, according to different requirements and goals 
involved in respective tasks or activities? This reflection applies to both cases considered 
here, of course. This means that proofs, as well as their identity, are also not to be looked 
upon in this investigation as completely isolated instances of notions which are not but 
homonymous to some supposed everyday notions of proof and their identity; insulated 
notions, over the determination of the meaning of which logicians, mathematicians and 
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computer scientists would have complete and exclusive power. I fail to see reasons why 
anyone should feel entitled to consider what would be such linguistic aberrations as relevant, 
even as mere possibilities, to the present discussion.
Now, turning back to the matter of the normalisation thesis: the points observed above 
actually highlight one of the most important discrepant aspects between the two compared 
theses. Very generally stated, it is this: the normalisation thesis and the Church-Turing thesis 
work as answers to fundamentally different kinds of questions regarding their respective 
objects. As stated previously: while the Church-Turing thesis is an attempt at providing the 
notion of effective computation with an application criterion, the normalisation thesis, as 
remarked before, works only under the previous assumption of a specific application criterion 
for proofs, and provides an identity criterion for proofs. Thus, while the Church-Turing thesis 
answers to the question “what is it for a computation to be effective?” – first, in the intensional 
sense of “what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the predicate ‘effective 
computation’ to apply to something?”, and then consequently also in the extensional sense of 
“to what does the predicate “effective computation” applies?” –, the normalisation thesis 
needs to first take for granted that the answer to the question “what is it for something to be 
proof?” (asked in the same sense as in the case of effective computation) is “to be 
expressible as a derivation.”, to only then present itself as an answer to the question “what is 
a proof?” –  in the sense of “what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for something 
that is a proof to be the proof it is and no other, regardless of which proof it is?”.  Notice that 
the Church-Turing thesis has absolutely nothing at all to say about the identity or individuation
criteria of that which it selects as effective computations.
When Aristotle considers the matter of definitions and essences, for instance, the 
difference between these two sorts of questions was not exactly an issue. The instances, so 
to speak, of the essences considered were particular things in reality, thus having their 
individuation and identity trivially guaranteed from the very outset: a distinct instance means a
distinct thing, for a thing “qua thing” is obviously only identical to itself. Thus, e.g. rational 
animal is a perfectly sufficient definition of man, despite the fact that it gives one no 
instructions as to how a man is to be distinguished amongst men; i.e. it expresses the τοὸ  τί νἦ
ε ναιἶ  (“what-it-is-to-be”) of the species man quite perfectly, because the question concerning 
individuation and identity criteria never really emerges due to the nature of the instances 
considered. In the setting of the theses we are now considering, however, our reference to 
computations and proofs as “real things” whose identity is trivially guaranteed and intrinsically 
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non-problematic (if we do refer to such things at all, which seems to be, as remarked 
elsewhere, assumed by e.g. the most paradigmatic formulation of the normalisation thesis) is 
always mediated, so to speak, by some kind of linguistic representative, the identity value of 
which (if conceived as determined necessarily and sufficiently by what it represents, which 
again seems to be assumed by the most paradigmatic formulation of the normalisation thesis)
is not trivially guaranteed in any manner. Thus, the expression of what would be a rough 
counterpart of the τοὸ  τί ν ε ναιἦ ἶ  of the addressed notions in a contemporary lexicon demands 
that we make the identity – or, to express things better, the equivalence – criterion of such 
representatives explicit; a task which is demanded by the “critical” approach inherited from the
tradition in which the contemporary treatment of these matters is historically inserted. This 
means that the normalisation thesis does, together with the mentioned assumption on which it
depends, offer an account of what it is to be a proof, while the Church-Turing thesis does not 
– or at the very least not necessarily – offer an account of what it is to be a computation; if so, 
then only a partial one.
The fact that the implications of the normalisation thesis are, in the sense just 
described, clearly farther-reaching with respect to the depiction of the contours of its object – 
and by that now we mean proofs rather than identity of proofs – than that of the Church-
Turing thesis are with respect to its respective object – namely effective computations – could 
be regarded as a relevant point in the explanation of why the first is so clearly less accepted 
than the second, even if one only considers their respective claims to soundness. But 
probably the most drastic factor is really the lack of appeal and potential for publicity of the 
first within the current ideological status quo of the mathematical and philosophical 
establishment, as opposed to that of the second. While it feels, as already mentioned, almost 
absurd to contradict the soundness of the Church-Turing thesis in any discussion of its 
subject-matter that is not really radically deviant from mainstream, it is simply too easy to 
think of quite unextravagant counterexamples to the soundness of the normalisation thesis – 
some of which were already presented and discussed here. And this is, again, of course not 
due to one being true and the other false, but rather to the acceptance of one having served, 
from the very beginning, as a remarkably good springboard for the further development of 
what was, until its appearance, mainstream ideology on matters to which effectiveness of 
computations is a central issue, such as e.g. solvability of mathematical problems; while the 
acceptance of the other seems to allow no clearly foreseeable significant further development
towards a clearly more powerful or somehow advantageous way of dealing with any 
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interesting question which is already stated. In fact, it might be relevant in explaining this to 
consider the reason why identity of proofs as a problem itself, unlike that of effective 
computability, never really caught the eye of mainstream mathematics: it has not yet been 
clearly connected with any “bigger” issue in this area. Those who have given it their attention 
for not exclusively ludic reasons seem to see it as a question worth being answered mainly for
what they consider to be its own intrinsic conceptual import, intimately tied to a philosophical 
endeavour, namely getting to understand what a proof is. So, while the Church-Turing thesis 
was indelibly written on a page in the history of thought which was, until it came about, filled 
with many questions and practically no answers – the one on effective computability –, the 
normalisation thesis is still no more than a sketchy draft written in pencil on the page on 
proofs; a page that has been marked by countless indelible questions and answers since the 
very dawn of Philosophy. It now disputes a space in this page’s footer – to which attention has
been led back as soon as interest in directly and formally investigating proofs was once again 
awoken –, side by side with less visible yet very interesting considerations, such as those of 
Kant on identity of proofs, made in the times when formal logic was still virtually exhausted by 
syllogistic.
6. On a possible interdependence between the two theses
One could be tempted to say that, in this context, the normalisation thesis can work as 
a partial answer to the more general question concerning the identity of effective 
computations. Mimicking mutatis mutandi the formulation of the question which the 
normalisation thesis proposes to answer, we could formulate this one so: when do two Turing 
machines / λ-terms represent the same computation?  The idea would thus be that the 
mentioned background assumption of the normalisation thesis can actually be looked upon as
the statement of a particular case of the Church-Turing thesis. As just stated, this assumption 
consists in the acceptance of a specific application criterion for proofs – i.e. roughly, a criterion
that determines the necessary and sufficient conditions to be satisfied by something so that 
the predicate “proof” applies to it. Now, one of the theses mentioned and described previously
as more closely analogous to the Church-Turing Thesis than the normalisation thesis itself 
offers precisely such a criterion – namely, the one claimed by Prawitz 1971, according to 
which every proof in first order logic can be carried out by means of some Gentzen-style 
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natural deduction derivation, and by means of every such derivation can some such proof be 
carried out. Thus, providing an identity criterion for proofs could be taken as ultimately 
amounting to providing an identity criterion for some specific subclass of effective 
computations. This consideration involves, however, a very significant mistake. More 
specifically, it would be conditioned by a failure to observe the fact that the notions of proof 
(the informal one, formally specified by the background assumption of the normalisation 
thesis, of course) and effective computation (also the informal one, as characterised by 
Church-Turing thesis), despite having intrinsically related application criteria, are still at least 
in principle essentially distinct viz. not necessarily related – in particular, there is no reason at 
all to see proofs as a subclass of effective computations, since the identity criteria of the latter 
are left undefined and might thus be completely distinct from those of the first (as e.g. in the 
case of positive rational numbers and ordered pairs of positive natural numbers, mentioned in
other section of this work). It is not difficult to understand that the background assumption of 
the normalisation thesis implies not that first order logic proofs are all expressible by effective 
computations of a special class; but rather that these proofs are all expressible by that which, 
according to the Church-Turing thesis, also expresses certain effective computations – 
namely those formal expressions of effective computations ( typed λ-terms, etc.)  that 
somehow correspond (Curry-Howard) to formal expressions of proofs (natural deduction 
derivations). Nevertheless, it would suffice to assume that first-order logic proofs indeed are a 
particular subclass of effective computations in Turing’s informal sense – which would not 
seem extravagant at all, given the fact that the acceptance of the background assumption of 
the normalisation thesis is far greater than that of the normalisation thesis itself – to restore 
the claims just shown to be in principle unfounded.
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VI. Concluding remarks: What can we (not) accomplish with the normalisation thesis
The observations made thus far suggest that, even before the normalisation thesis 
itself, the very question concerning identity of proofs – even if restricted to the version to 
which the normalisation thesis actually presents an answer –, unlike the one on effectiveness 
of computation, answered by the Church-Turing thesis, has no clear potential, import or utility 
to broader mathematical and conceptual problems. Its only clear intrinsic connection seems to
be to the philosophical question which motivates it, namely: what is a proof?
Answering this particular philosophical question does not seem to be within the 
prioritised scope of interests of significantly many significant mathematicians or philosophers 
– in many cases, not even of those few who occupy themselves with proof theoretic 
investigations. Notwithstanding, it seems that enough propaganda, both in quantity and in 
quality, could change this situation. History indicates that the piece of publicity I offer here will 
most probably result completely ineffectual for this purpose.  It is a clear fact that the eminent,
unavoidable, intrinsic political import of proofs in general – which, as suggested in the 
prologue, has as its provenance and its effect the eminent, unavoidable, intrinsic political 
import of knowledge  – has been systematically made invisible in our tradition; a historical 
move which was crucial so that these conceptual devices could have a chance to in practice 
exert and achieve – in very particular and questionable ways, of course – the political roles 
and goals Plato devised for them from the very beginning. So, insistently underlining these 
features as I make here will probably, instead of casting light upon the great importance and 
interest of improving one’s understanding of proofs and their meaning, only make my 
discourse sound as either rather confused and somewhat hallucinatory or just off the point. Be
that as it may, what my lack of talent as an adman leaves me as alternative to my current 
attitude is either to silence, or to adopt the clearly even less productive option of surrendering 
to the flow of propaganda that I here counter and, at the very best, adding some more 
baroquish scholastic meanders to one or more of the still unfinished yet already overburdened
epistemic-oriented cathedrals of theory and terminology on proofs, which have so far 
notoriously failed to illuminate the relevant aspects of this notion in which we are interested in 
this investigation.
In any case, let us suppose that one could triumph in this enterprise of publicity and 
bring proofs and their identity to the very center of mathematicians and philosophers 
considerations and concerns, rather like it was with effectiveness and computability in the first
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half of the 20th century. What would then be our reasons to endorse something such as the 
normalisation thesis?
It is easy to see that any reasons to do this much would not be “scientific”: no informal 
notion of proof that is not too fabricated and/or partial to perform the (already chimerical 
enough) task of “capturing what is essential about proof” corresponds faithfully to that formally
outlined by the normalisation thesis. Those that do, e.g. a proper version of BHK, are 
interesting enough to explain certain phenomena about proofs as semantical counterparts of 
derivations; but obviously its coverage of the addressed notion is not enough. As already 
shown and stressed, the counterexamples are too many, too significant and too 
unextravagant.
This brings as a consequence that the normalisation thesis could also not serve as a 
“scientific” springboard to the investigation of proofs even nearly as efficiently as the Church-
Turing thesis served to the investigation of effective computation. Since too much obvious and
obviously interesting material cannot be handled as proofs under its acceptance, eventual 
results obtained would lack the necessary conceptual comprehensiveness to yield acceptable
enough characterisations of what a proof is. The background assumption of the normalisation 
thesis, however, which is, as observed above, significantly more analogous to the Church-
Turing thesis than the normalisation thesis itself, has been exerting the role of such a 
springboard – though, it seems, with much less coverage with respect to proofs (unless, 
arguably, we were to restrict ourselves to a realm of “effective” first-order proofs) than the 
Church-Turing thesis has with respect to effective computations. This is of course hardly 
surprising: for as already mentioned, the historical development and provenance of the notion
of proof is significantly more intricate and remote than that of the notion of (effective) 
computation, which makes it sound rather reasonable that it should be expected to be more 
difficult to coherently and cohesively describe, let alone formalise.
But propaganda, it seems, could in principle change even this. In such a case, we 
would of course be talking of an enterprise of publicity far more prodigious than overruling 
some relevant and sensible yet few voices contrary to the soundness or to the completeness46
of a certain notion of effective computation. Notwithstanding, the right amount of time and the 
wrong kind of interests could really allow for portentous possibilities. When considering 
related issues in the conclusion of his 2003, Kosta Došen says that:
46 For a case built specifically against the complenetess of the Church-Turing thesis, see Kalmár, L., 1959, “An Argument 
Against the Plausibility of Church’s Thesis”, in A. Heyting (ed.), 1959, Constructivity in Mathematics, Amsterdam: 
North-Holland: 72–80.
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“The complaint might be voiced that with the Normalization (…) [Conjecture] we are 
giving very limited answers to the question of identity of proofs. What about identity of proofs 
in the rest of mathematics, outside logic? Shouldn’t we take into account many other 
inference rules, and not only those based on logical constants? Perhaps not if the structure of
proofs is taken to be purely logical. Perhaps conjectures like the Normalization (…) 
[Conjecture] are not far from the end of the road.
Faced with two concrete proofs in mathematics—for example, two proofs of the 
Theorem of Pythagoras, or something more involved—it could seem pretty hopeless to try to 
decide whether they are identical just armed with the Normalization Conjecture(...). But this 
hopelessness might just be the hopelessness of formalization. We are overwhelmed not by 
complicated principles, but by sheer quantity.”
The question would then be: would this be desirable? Do we want something as the 
normalisation thesis to take over as the touchstone of our investigations concerning proofs? If
so, why? Given all the points raised previously against the soundness and the completeness 
of the normalisation thesis – points that purposefully do not even resort to the issue of 
“limitedness” mentioned by Došen –  it seems to me that our manipulation of the notion of 
proof would inescapably have to be severely distorted and deformed in order to fit into the 
straightjacket the normalisation thesis offers as a royal garb.
But let us suppose for a moment that I can be proved wrong, and the apparent 
shortcomings of the normalisation thesis could be somehow circumvented, by flares of wit or 
sheer diligence. One would then have shown that it is possible to “analyse”, to systematically 
and generally rewrite our use and talk of proofs, inasmuch as it lies within the scope of the 
normalisation thesis, in terms of the notion of proof that is determined by this thesis. One 
could maybe even get to show that only a very special aristocracy of notions of proof is 
capable of playing such a role, i.e. allowing that our use and talk of proofs is organised to 
form a neatly structured edifice, the architecture of which, no matter how complex or large in 
dimensions, rests stolid upon one single point.
There are, however, severe problems with this sort of enterprise. One is that people 
usually – and quite understandably, though not really justifiably – fear too much that their 
edifices go down once they put too much efforts into building them. If the foundational points 
are made of sand, or the edifice walls of playing cards, they will most probably try to turn them
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into cement and concrete with the alchemy that only propaganda makes possible – they 
would then not only have become indestructible, but also impossible to reorganise or 
restructure without employing a great deal of demolishing power and getting rid of large, 
heavy masses of debris and rubble. Another is that people also tend to lose interest in other 
possible ways of looking at a certain phenomenon once they succeed in organising it in as 
systematic and exhaustive a way as they can – especially if a great deal of effort or passion 
was involved in this. I believe – and for reasons that I believe to be clear enough – that these 
frequent phenomena are notoriously deleterious to the enterprise of understanding matters 
that we address; which seems to me to be something of the utmost importance in 
philosophical endeavours.
Therefore, I tend to see no sufficiently good reason why investing in such possibilities 
of systematisation of the semantical and philosophical account of proofs as the one the 
normalisation thesis seems, at least in principle, to offer. They are per se, it seems, not at all 
pernicious – but it just happens that, within history, nothing is ever per se. And it is history that
shows their potential and tendency to lead to perfectly justified ideological totalitarianisms, 
which I most understandably fear. Alas, as Wittgenstein noticed already in those days, most 
still tend to proudly wallow in craving for the generality I so frequently dread.
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